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ABSTRACT 
This thesis offers creaturely readings of Holocaust literature, where a creature as defined by 
Anat Pick is ‘first and foremost a living body – material, temporal, and vulnerable’. I also use 
the concept of creatureliness to approach animal suffering: a question which many authors 
have compared to the Holocaust. In Chapter One, I analyse moments in Holocaust 
testimonies where survivors compare themselves, their situation or their perpetrators to 
animals. In Chapter Two, I analyse Beatrice and Virgil by Yann Martel. This novel gestures 
towards a creaturely poetics as Foer compares human victims of atrocity during the 
Holocaust with animal suffering and vice-versa. I read it through two models of 
creatureliness offered by Anat Pick and Eric Santner in order to gauge which model best 
suits my thesis. In Chapter Three, I move forward using Pick’s model of creatureliness to 
analyse two novels by J. M. Coetzee: in Disgrace, Coetzee traces a shared sense of 
vulnerability and affliction between humans and animals in Post-Apartheid South Africa, and 
in Elizabeth Costello the protagonist directly compares animal cruelty to the Holocaust. In 
my final chapter, I analyse Eternal Treblinka by Charles Patterson and ‘The Letter Writer’ by 
Isaac Bashevis Singer as two, contrasting ways by which authors compare our treatment of 
animals to the Holocaust, and see how well both forms fit with Michael Rothberg’s 
multidirectional model of memory. This allows me to question whether it is desirable or 
even possible to apply a multidirectional ethics to all creatures. Overall, this thesis questions 
how and why creatures are depicted in literatures of atrocity (particularly the Holocaust), 
and how and why we might choose to read literature through a creaturely prism. 
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Introduction 
In his Holocaust testimony, If This is a Man, Primo Levi describes his interview with Dr 
Pannwitz, who tests Levi on his knowledge of chemistry. Levi focuses on the look which 
passes between them: 
that look was not one between two men; and if I had known how completely to 
explain the nature of that look, which came as if across the glass window of an 
aquarium between two beings who live in different worlds, I would also have 
explained the essence of the great insanity of the Third Germany.1 
Despite being the same species and, for the purposes of the interview, sharing the same 
language as the Nazi doctor, Pannwitz regards Levi as separate from the human race. The 
closest thing of this world to which Levi can compare it is the look between that of a man 
and a fish in an aquarium: separated not only by species but also by medium. The fish is 
scaled, cold-blooded, exists out of air and – in this case – is taken out of its natural habitat to 
be scrutinised under the voyeuristic gaze of humans. Levi believes that the look may be 
metonymic for the ‘great insanity of the Third Reich’, as a system which dehumanised Jews 
and, as such, allowed perpetrators to murder millions of humans whilst countless more 
bystanders allowed the atrocity to continue. 
 Many activists for animal rights and authors in Animal Studies have taken a 
comparison such as this and turned it on its head to argue that, if humans were treated like 
animals during the Holocaust, it stands to reason that animals are treated like Holocaust 
victims. Authors who have considered this view in philosophy, literary criticism or works of 
                                                             
1 Primo Levi, If This is a Man and The Truce, trans. Stuart Woolf (London: Abacus, 2009), pp.111-112. 
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fiction include, but are not limited to, Jacques Derrida, Charles Patterson, Karen Davis, J. M. 
Coetzee and Isaac Bashevis Singer. In most cases, the authors are aware that such a 
comparison is cause for ethical concern. In Elizabeth Costello, for example, the protagonist 
gives a lecture arguing that factory farming is comparable to the Holocaust and receives a 
letter from an audience member who argues that her comparison is intolerable.2 Similarly, 
in ‘The Holocaust and the Henmaid’s Tale’, Karen Davis prefaces her comparison between 
the Holocaust and animal cruelty with an extended discussion on the nature of metaphors: 
‘when the oppression of one group is used metaphorically to illuminate the oppression of 
another group, justice requires that the oppression that forms the basis of the comparison 
be comprehended in its own right’.3 She understands that the comparison has been 
criticised, but argues on a logical plane that it is only right to consider both sides of a 
metaphor, as otherwise the function of a metaphor is intrinsically flawed. 
To apply this line of thought to Levi’s comparison between himself and a creature at 
an aquarium is to implicate the human race in a level of ‘insanity’ comparable to that of the 
Third Reich. By this logic, the Third Reich (rather than the look shared between the doctor 
and Levi) may even become metaphor for the ‘insanity’ of the human species who kill 
animals for food, pay to see them in an aquarium, or turn a blind eye to the practices of 
factory farming. It does not take long to follow this logic to the conclusion that non-human 
and human animals exist on the same ethical plane and, as such, must be given equal rights. 
It is easy both to see how this concept causes offence, and how it might be ridiculed. For 
example, Adam Roberts considers the comparison between animal cruelty and the 
                                                             
2 J. M. Coetzee, Elizabeth Costello (London: Vintage, 2003), p.94. This will be abbreviated to EC within the text 
and all subsequent references are to this edition. 
3 Karen Davis, ‘The Holocaust and the Henmaid’s Tale’ (New York: Lantern Books, 2005), p.4. 
7 
 
Holocaust in his novel Bête, which is based on the idea that animals should be given 
equivalent rights to humans. Although Roberts speculates some positive outcomes of this 
ethical turn, there are numerous other examples where situations descend into a farcical 
dystopia, such as when a human and his dog win a court case to be allowed to engage in a 
sexual relationship.4 With this example in mind, an argument for ‘insanity’ can be made on 
both sides of the debate. 
An effective text to help unpick the intricacies of this debate is one which I shall 
analyse more thoroughly in Chapter Three: Elizabeth Costello. In Coetzee’s novel, Elizabeth 
Costello understands that a comparison between the Holocaust and animal cruelty polarises 
people and stops them from engaging with the seed of an idea which was put forward 
initially: be that a debate on the nature of metaphor, concern for animal welfare, or a desire 
to reapproach the Holocaust from a new angle. Costello feels that she is implicated in a 
genocidal species and cannot understand how humans can be so loving and yet so cruel, 
and her family cannot understand why she engages with animal questions on such a 
personal level. The result is an impasse reached by both, and it is difficult to see how the 
debate can progress on such divisive grounds. Yet, in Elizabeth Costello Coetzee uses his 
fictional space to allow both the debate and the implications of this debate to play out. The 
novel is first and foremost a work of fiction and, as such, its implications in ethico-political 
fields should be read through that prism. More so than philosophical treatises, Elizabeth 
Costello approaches the question of the animal, and especially the comparison between 
animal cruelty and the Holocaust, without the same risk of polarisation faced by Costello 
herself. As Anat Pick recognises in her analysis of ‘The Lives of Animals’ (the novella 
                                                             
4 Adam Roberts, Bête (London: Goliancz, 2014), pp.44-45. 
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embedded in Elizabeth Costello), it is ‘not just a confounding text, but a text about the state 
of being confounded’.5 In other words, the debate for whether or not our treatment of 
animals is comparable to the Holocaust is less of a focus of Coetzee’s text than the literary 
presentation of a character who is moved by this belief. 
Moreover, Coetzee’s use of the Holocaust in this comparison may not simply be for 
dramatic effect and polarisation; it may also gesture towards the impasse reached by 
Costello and her family. In this sense, the Holocaust is compared to animal suffering on a 
literal plane, but may also symbolise what Cora Diamond terms the ‘difficult reality’ of 
Costello’s – and our – thinking of it.6 To explain a difficult reality, Diamond refers to Ted 
Hughes’ poem, ‘Six Young Men’, where Hughes gestures towards the sublime feeling one 
might feel when looking at a photograph of young men, full of life, who since have died. This 
is also an example to which I return in Chapter Three, but for the purpose of clarification, 
the difficult reality is not simply coming to understand the fact that these men appear alive 
when they are not; it is also the realisation of one’s own exposure to death having been 
faced with something at once so full of life and yet so vividly dead. As Diamond explains: 
‘What interests me there is the experience of the mind’s not being able to encompass 
something which it encounters. It is capable of making one go mad to try, to bring together 
in thought what cannot be thought’.7 This ‘madness’ is equal to the ‘insanity’ of the Third 
Reich as outlined by Levi, or the impasse felt by Costello. In all three cases, one must resort 
to figurative language or philosophy to try and explain the inexplicable: respectively, the 
‘contradictory permanent horrors’ felt by witnessing the young men; the look from behind 
                                                             
5 Anat Pick, Creaturely Poetics (New York: Columbia University Press), p.9. 
6 Cora Diamond, ‘The Difficulty of Reality and the Difficulty of Philosophy’, Philosophy and Animal Life (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2008), pp.43-89. 
7 Diamond, ‘The Difficulty of Reality’, p.44. 
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glass between two beings of different worlds at Auschwitz; and the Holocaust-like atrocity 
faced by the animal kingdom (and, as such, Costello herself, who feels the animality of her 
body the older she gets).8 
Therefore, comparing animal cruelty to the Holocaust and vice versa not only serves 
to highlight impossible likenesses between the two atrocities, but also gestures towards this 
feeling of inexplicability. James Young summarises some key ideas offered by scholars on 
why the Holocaust resists understanding and, subsequently, realistic literary representation. 
These include Frederick Hoffman’s assertion that the intrinsic violence in atrocity destroys 
structures seeking to contain it; Terrence Des Pres’ suggestion that Holocaust survivors’ 
experiences ‘are so horrible that they actually resist the fictionalizing that […] informs most 
remembering’; and Saul Friedländer’s argument that ‘beginning with the First World War 
and culminating in Auschwitz, reality itself became so extreme as to outstrip language’s 
capacity to represent it altogether’.9 Although each interpretation is unique from the others, 
all recognise that the Holocaust cannot be contained in structures which seek to represent 
it. Therefore, to compare other atrocities to the Holocaust as a series of events which 
reached beyond the limits of our understanding, is to exemplify the difficult reality one 
might also face in light of other traumatic events. With regard to animal suffering, the 
difficult reality is extended because of the species barrier which exists between humans and 
other animals. It is this combination of factors – a comparison of atrocities, their 
representation in literature, as well as literature’s representation of the difficult realities 
they present – which I analyse at length within this thesis. 
                                                             
8 Ted Hughes, ‘Six Young Men’, The Hawk in the Rain (London: Faber and Faber, 1957), p.55. Quoted in 
Diamond, ‘The Difficulty of Reality’, p.44. 
9 James E. Young, Writing and Rewriting the Holocaust: Narrative and the Consequences of Interpretation 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), p.16. 
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 Michael Rothberg writes about the differences between remembering one atrocity 
in light of another, and remembering one atrocity at the expense of another in his text 
Multidirectional Memory.10 This might also be used to help explain the ethical concerns 
when comparing atrocities more generally. Rothberg contrasts ‘competitive memory’ – the 
idea that one atrocity should be remembered above another – with ‘multidirectional 
memory’. Whereas the former causes polarisation on the scale experienced by Costello, the 
latter widens the discursive field whereby atrocities might be traced through one another 
and, as such, remembered simultaneously. This may be exemplified by the difference 
between saying that animal cruelty is worse than the Holocaust, and the idea that there 
might be similarities between the two atrocities which can be brought to the fore through a 
closer inspection of both. A further merit of this multidirectional approach, beyond finding 
commonalities between the two, is the fact that where one atrocity traces the other, both 
are memorialised in the fabric of the other. It is the difference between screen memory 
defined as one memory blocking or ‘screening’ another from view, and screen memory 
defined as looking through a screen from one atrocity to the other, both separate but 
touching at the point of perception. This image also helps to work through difficult realities: 
instead of reaching an impasse as would be caused by one event blocking, screening or 
overwhelming all else, one may look through this screen to other events which are similarly 
impossible to comprehend. One may then trace similarities between these impasses, much 
in the same way as Coetzee can explore the state of being overwhelmed through his 
connections with Elizabeth Costello whilst remaining at an authorial distance from – being 
‘screened off’ from – the character. 
                                                             
10 Michael Rothberg, Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009). 
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 This thesis offers an exploration into the issues and concepts outlined above. I 
analyse animal metaphors in Holocaust Literature in order to ground the comparison within 
survivor testimonies, before engaging with Holocaust Literature on a broader scale. This 
includes works of fiction that both explicitly and implicitly draw upon the Holocaust to 
explore other forms of suffering, and particularly animal suffering, as well as works of non-
fiction such as Eternal Treblinka by Charles Patterson which directly compares our 
treatment of animals to the Holocaust. However, the focus of this thesis is not to ask 
whether or not a comparison is appropriate; it is primarily to analyse the representation of 
such comparisons within literature and, as such, ask why different forms are more 
appropriate than others, and interrogate the role of literature in the debate. For, as Hayden 
White suggests, 
contemporary critical theory permits us to believe more confidently than ever 
before that ‘poetizing’ is not an activity that hovers over, transcends, or 
otherwise remains alienated from life or reality, but represents a mode of praxis 
which serves as the immediate base of all cultural activity.11 
White claims that poetizing does not necessarily deflect from reality but may itself form ‘a 
mode of praxis’. In other words, literature has a responsibility which reaches beyond the 
page to directly engage with and build upon worldly events. Where this thesis analyses 
representations of animal suffering within Holocaust literature, it also considers how 
literature might change perceptions with regard to our treatment of vulnerable beings, and 
as such what it means for literature to be read as a creaturely poetics. This is a term which I  
                                                             
11 Hayden White, Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism (London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1978), p.126. 
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analyse at length in Chapter Two but which may loosely be defined as literature or a mode 
of thought that considers the shared vulnerability of all bodies, above and beyond 
anthropocentric philosophising. 
 Holocaust literature bears a responsibility to authors and readers, especially in 
testimonies where survivor accounts not only allow victims of atrocity to work through their 
traumatic experiences, but also accounts for much of our historical understanding of the 
Holocaust. Therefore, this is an example of worldly literature as ‘a mode of praxis which 
serves as the immediate base of all cultural activity’. Consequently, where literature draws 
comparisons between the events of the Holocaust and other atrocities, it must balance its 
responsibility to not deflect from the realities of the Holocaust, with a cultural enquiry into 
other events which might become worldly through this comparison. This is why a 
multidirectional approach is vital, as it traces one event through another without 
disengaging with either. Reading Holocaust literature as a creaturely poetics is therefore 
suitable because it encourages a praxis which engages with living, vulnerable bodies on a 
multidirectional plane, and specifically questions the role of literature in moving beyond a 
mere representation of these bodies to an ethical involvement with them. 
 This is because, creatureliness, as suggested by Anat Pick, is a state of temporal, 
bodily vulnerability which exists in all living creatures inclusive of humans and other animals. 
It accounts for ‘the permutations of necessity and materiality that condition and shape 
human life’ even when other aspects of our humanity have been stripped back.12 Pick 
argues that creatureliness is what was left of Holocaust victims’ humanity when every effort 
was made to dehumanise them. She argues it should not be considered a loss of humanity 
                                                             
12 Anat Pick, Creaturely Poetics, p.5. 
13 
 
that Muselmanner were stripped to this bare state, but rather it should be accepted as an 
intrinsic and sacred part of our humanity which we share with other animals. By extension, a 
creaturely poetics is a mode of praxis which engages with our shared creatureliness with 
other, vulnerable bodies. As creatureliness exists beyond language, it is difficult to access 
through literature. However, as this thesis argues, there are ways in which authors might 
gesture towards creatureliness in their novels, such as in Beatrice and Virgil where Yann 
Martel depicts two animal characters trying to communicate suffering, or in ‘The Letter 
Writer’, where Isaac Bashevis Singer’s magical realist style encourages a reading whereby 
the protagonist’s bond with a woman may be paralleled with his affection for a mouse. 
Indeed, these are two texts which I analyse at length within this thesis, the outline of which 
is as follows. 
 In Chapter One, I engage with the animal-Holocaust comparison as it is best 
recognised: through testimonies where survivors compare themselves, their treatment or 
their perpetrators to animals. This chapter is the least theoretical of the four as the focus is 
not on creatureliness as a concept but rather as a way of communicating atrocity 
perpetrated on humans, by humans. This chapter splits into further sections which consider 
how choosing different animal species affects the comparison. The animals on which I 
choose to focus are common sites of comparison within Holocaust testimonies: insects, 
vermin, dogs and pigs, as well as group metaphors, specifically flocks and herds. Splitting the 
chapter into analysis of different species not only allows me to highlight differences 
between the survivors’ choice of metaphor, but also similarities. Chiefly, the similarity which 
unites all of the species is the use of animal metaphor to imply dehumanisation. If the 
survivor compares him or herself to an animal, it usually implies that they are treated as 
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subhuman, and if they compare perpetrators to animals it often connotes a lack of 
humanity. This is especially relevant to later chapters in which I analyse creatureliness more 
explicitly, where a key component of creatureliness as outlined by Pick is the awareness that 
what happened during the Holocaust did not fall outside the definition of what it means to 
be human. Indeed, Pick insists that ‘the Holocaust performed a violent unraveling of human 
identity, disclosing human contingency and the genocidal impulses inherent in striving for 
human perfection’.13 This is to say both that there is something intrinsically human about 
the willingness to dehumanise others, and that in being dehumanised there is something 
which remains human, but in a creaturely sense, within the victim: no matter what the 
species – insect, vermin, dog, pig or human – there remains a bodily vulnerability common 
to all. 
 Art Spiegelman’s Maus would, in obvious ways, fit with this chapter’s focus on 
animal metaphors in Holocaust testimonies.14 For example, the fact that Jewish people are 
drawn as mice conveys their vulnerability, especially in the presence of German – and so 
often Nazi – cats. Moreover, Spiegelman explains his choice of animal metaphors in 
Metamaus, which would allow me to dictate rather than speculate the reasons behind his 
graphic representations.15 However, Spiegelman’s graphic novel does not feature within the 
chapter for the following reasons: first and foremost, animal symbolism in Maus is already 
explored extensively within the field of Holocaust Literature; a tiny but significant 
proportion of which are referenced here.16 As such, in order to add to the wealth of ideas 
                                                             
13 Pick, Creaturely Poetics, p.6. 
14 Art Spiegelman, The Complete Maus (London: Penguin Books, 2003). 
15 Art Spiegelman, Metamaus (New York City: The Viking Press, 2011). 
16 Richard De Angelis, ‘Of Mice and Vermin: Animals as Absent Referent in Art Spiegelman’s Maus’, 
International Journal of Comic Art (Spring 2005), pp.230-249; Michael A. Chaney, ‘Animal Subjects of the 
Graphic Novel’, College Literature, 38:3 (Summer, 2011), pp.129-149; Andreas Huyssen, ‘Of Mice and Mimesis: 
Reading Spiegelman with Adorno’, New German Critique, 81 (Autumn, 2000), pp.65-82; Andrew Loman, ‘“Well 
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already offered by scholars, I would have to dedicate a large portion of this chapter to the 
study of Maus. This would limit the number of testimonies I could analyse, which in turn 
would undermine the aim of Chapter One to gesture towards the vast number of Holocaust 
testimonies in which authors use animal imagery. As well as this, Spiegelman’s 
representation of his father’s testimony includes these animal metaphors where Vladek’s 
original recordings do not. They have been applied both retrospectively to Vladek’s story, 
and – at times – in order to convey Art’s own identity crisis. Even when Maus does not 
depict scenes from Vladek’s time in Auschwitz, the mouse metaphor persists partly in order 
to retain a sense of artistic continuity within the novel. These tropes are so different from 
other uses of animals within Holocaust testimonies that, as discussed, they demand too 
much analysis separate to that of other testimonies to fit into this chapter. 
 Chapter Two analyses reciprocal metaphors in Beatrice and Virgil by Yann Martel. 
Here, the Holocaust and animal suffering allegorise one another in Martel’s metatextual 
novel. Following on from Chapter One’s exploration into depictions of humans as vulnerable 
and dehumanised creatures, this chapter introduces the concept of creatureliness as 
defined by Anat Pick and Eric Santner. Whereas Santner approaches creatureliness from an 
anthropocentric angle – necessarily so, one might argue, being as we are human – Pick calls 
for a way of reading which gestures towards the vulnerable body we share with other 
animals. Beatrice and Virgil often blurs the boundaries not only between representation of 
the Holocaust and animal cruelty but also and subsequently between human and animal 
characters (two main characters are talking animals, for example), and therefore it is 
                                                             
Intended Liberal Slop”: Allegories of Race in Spiegelman’s Maus’, Journal of American Studies, 40:3 (December, 
2006), pp.551-571; Michael E. Staub, ‘The Shoah Goes On and On: Remembrance and Representation in Art 
Spiegelman’s Maus’, MELUS, 20:3 (Autumn, 1995), pp.33-46. 
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difficult to gauge which model best fits the text. Nonetheless, the key question in the play 
within Beatrice and Virgil is how the two animals can speak about the atrocities they 
experienced. They find ways to approach the conversation and even ways to bear its burden 
more easily, but ultimately they fail. It is this exploration into the failure of language to 
represent reality, and specifically a bodily, creaturely reality, which allows me to conclude 
that Pick’s model of creatureliness is more relevant to a thesis which focuses on the 
incommunicability of suffering and the impasse experienced when comparing atrocities. 
 Moving forward using Pick’s model of creatureliness, and in the spirit of comparing 
atrocities, I closely analyse two novels by J. M. Coetzee in Chapter Three: Elizabeth Costello, 
where the title character compares the Holocaust to animal cruelty, and Disgrace which is 
set in post-Apartheid South Africa but often parallels the vulnerability of South Africans with 
the animals that surround them. In Disgrace Coetzee uses Holocaust imagery and even the 
term Lösung – or ‘solution’ – to describe the plight of the humans and animals of Post-
Apartheid South Africa. Whereas the majority of this thesis considers explicit comparisons of 
the Holocaust to other atrocities, Disgrace allows me to consider the effects of implicitly 
referencing the genocide to allude to other atrocities. This chapter also allows me to analyse 
Pick’s concept of creatureliness more thoroughly, as the focus shifts from using fiction to 
compare models of creatureliness, as in Chapter Two, to using one model to analyse other 
works of fiction. Therefore, the works of Simone Weil – which are influential to Pick’s 
understanding and application of creatureliness – also feature prominently in Chapter 
Three, especially in an extended discussion of the secularisation of grace. Indeed, in 
Disgrace, David Lurie, who disgraces himself throughout the novel, eventually learns to 
attend to the suffering and even the deceased bodies of animals, which Coetzee depicts as 
17 
 
an act of grace. Elizabeth Costello, on the other hand, is more sympathetic to animals 
throughout Coetzee’s novel. Yet, she finds it difficult to reach the same levels of 
attentiveness as Lurie, whose only real engagement with other animals before the novel 
was through eating them. Analysing these novels side-by-side and under a creaturely lens 
allows me to consider both how fiction can develop characters who learn to live a creaturely 
existence, as in Disgrace, and how it might engage with the difficult realities of a creaturely 
poetics, as that which brings Elizabeth Costello to an impasse in her work as an author, as 
well as in her life as a vulnerable, ageing woman. 
 This thesis’ final chapter introduces Michael Rothberg’s Multidirectional Memory as 
a key theoretical text alongside Creaturely Poetics. Here, I consider how well a creaturely 
poetics fits with a multidirectional ethics, considering Pick’s stance that creatureliness unites 
humans with other animals. To explore this, I consider Charles Patterson’s Eternal Treblinka: 
a text which, from its title, seems to posit that factory farming is more atrocious than the 
Holocaust (thereby committing to a competitive model of memory) but which may actually 
adhere to a multidirectional ethics as outlined by Rothberg. Patterson’s title is taken from 
‘The Letter Writer’: a short story by Isaac Bashevis Singer which employs magical realist 
tropes as well as being a work of Holocaust fiction. I consider how these two strands of 
genre affect the comparison its protagonist, Herman, makes between animal suffering and 
the Holocaust, during his eulogy to a mouse. Finally, I question whether or not displacing 
Singer’s quotation to entitle a work of historical non-fiction may be considered ethically 
suspect, at least in the sense outlined at the beginning of this introduction, or whether – by 
engaging with a creaturely poetics through Singer’s fiction and applying it to reality – 
18 
 
Patterson affirms that poetizing indeed ‘represents a mode of praxis which serves as the 
immediate base of all cultural activity’. 
Overall, this thesis seeks to engage with a creaturely poetics through literatures of 
atrocity and specifically Holocaust literature. As creatureliness and Holocaust Literature 
come together at the point of structurelessness, incomprehension and wordlessness, there 
are moments of impasse where authors can only gesture towards difficult realities, or 
analyse the effects of the impasse itself on characters who seek to engage. Where Chapter 
One offers a broad but basic insight into animal metaphors used in Holocaust literature, 
subsequent chapters build in theory from Anat Pick and Eric Santner in Chapter Two, to 
Simone Weil in Chapter Three, through Michael Rothberg in Chapter Four. Each theory 
builds upon the last without deflecting, as philosophising often does, from the ubiquitous 
figure at the heart of this thesis: the creaturely body. 
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Chapter One 
 
‘Man in the crevices and depths of his true nature’: Comparing Humans to Other Animals in 
Holocaust Testimonies 
 
Introduction 
 
Animal metaphors are often used in Holocaust testimonies. They have many different 
purposes depending on how they are used: to convey the prisoners’ feelings, to convey the 
prisoners’ physical state, to paraphrase their perpetrators and to exhibit acts of inhumanity, 
and subsequently to convey the victims’ treatment at the hands of the Nazis. Moreover, 
there are many different types of animals used metaphorically in Holocaust testimonies and 
each one comes with its own set of associations. To highlight this, I have split my chapter 
into four sections: insects, vermin, dogs and pigs, and one further section which discusses 
the group metaphors ‘flock’ and ‘herd’. Each section focuses on how and why that specific 
animal is used in Holocaust testimonies. In each section, I show how animals are used both 
as symbol and as such. This corresponds to identifying with animals on a symbolic plane 
such as when prisoners are treated as animals, and identifying with animals on a literal 
plane such as when they are treated as animals are treated. In other words, prisoners 
sometimes compare themselves to animals to symbolise traits such as dirtiness or greed, 
but at other times they make a direct comparison between their treatment and the 
treatment of animals. To highlight the difference I shall use an example which is not specific 
to any particular animal. Primo Levi clarifies his identification with animals rather than 
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animals as symbol, when he differentiates between eating like an animal (i.e. eating in a 
disgusting manner) and simply eating as an animal would eat: 
 
The Kapo comes to us periodically and calls: ‘We hat noch zu fressen?’ He does 
not say it from derision or to sneer, but because this way of eating on our feet, 
furiously, burning our mouths and throats, without time to breathe, really is 
‘fressen’, the way of eating of animals, and certainly not ‘essen’, the human way 
of eating, seated in front of a table, religiously. ‘Fressen’ is exactly the word, and 
it is used currently among us.17 
 
The Kapo uses this term ‘without derision or sneer’, showing how Levi believes the word 
‘fressen’ is used not to insult but rather to describe. It is a new word – a camp word – in that 
its previous meaning (an animal’s specific way of eating) has been transposed to mean 
something different (the way humans can eat as animals eat). Eating comes with a set of 
traditions which have been cast aside in these new conditions. Whereas, previously, eating 
may have included ritualistic elements (take, for instance, the symbolism of Passover), now 
eating loses all of its symbolic meaning and becomes the physical act of ingesting. ‘Essen’, 
which connotes humanity, tradition, the ritualistic elements of presenting, eating and 
remembering a meal, becomes ‘fressen’: the transport of food from plate to stomach. 
Therefore, in this case prisoners identify with animals in a way that is specifically non-
symbolic. 
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 Although this chapter is driven by testimony rather than theory, it is important to 
clarify both what is meant by animal metaphors and why they are of concern. Of particular 
interest is George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s text Metaphors We Live By, so called because 
its authors show how metaphors shape our thoughts and ultimately our actions on a day to 
day basis, even without us realising it. For example, some animal metaphors in Holocaust 
testimonies are explicit where others are less so. Take, for instance, the difference between 
the following three uses of dogs in testimony: 
 
With no spoons the women bent over the common tin like dogs around a 
bowl.18 
 
The Meister’s barks are already turning into growls.19 
 
Can one liken these dogs to men? No – and again No.20 
 
The first is an explicit comparison between women and dogs eating, the second is an 
example of where a dog is evoked through associated language such as ‘barks’ and ‘growls’, 
and the third is an example where ‘dogs’ is first and foremost an insult connoting 
inhumanity. Lakoff and Johnson explore how such metaphorical language is a key to cultural 
understanding: 
                                                             
18 Giuliana Tedeschi, There is a Place on Earth: A Woman in Birkenau, trans. Tim Parks (London: Lime Tree, 
1993), p.7. 
19 Robert Antelme, The Human Race, trans. Jeffrey Haight and Annie Mahler (Marlboro: The Marlboro Press, 
1992), p.58. 
20Mr. Brukarz, ‘My Experience In The Concentration Camps Dachau and Buchenwald’, retrieved from Mrs 
Brukarz (London: Wiener Library, Document Reference: P.III.h No.67 Dachau, 1954), p.4.  
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The most fundamental values in a culture will be coherent with the metaphorical 
structure of the most fundamental concepts in our culture. [...] In general, which 
values are given priority is partly a matter of the subculture one lives in and 
partly a matter of personal values. [...] In addition to subcultures, there are 
groups whose defining characteristic is that they share certain important values 
that conflict with those of the mainstream culture. [...] Individuals, like groups, 
vary in their priorities and in the ways they define what is good or virtuous to 
them. In this sense, they are subgroups of one. Relative to what is important for 
them, their individual value systems are coherent with the major orientational 
metaphors of the main-stream culture.21 
 
Here, Lakoff and Johnson explain that things we may take as being either fundamentally 
true or valuable are often expressed metaphorically, and show that, through analysing the 
metaphors we use, we can examine what it is we value and whether it is coherent with 
mainstream values or whether it is specific to ourselves. For example, taking the above 
quotation, ‘can one liken these dogs to men?’, the word ‘dog’ is used as an insult to connote 
inhumanity. The fact that it is an insult shows that, as a society, we value dogs less than 
people. This means that the metaphor is a comment both on the perpetrators and, more 
implicitly, on our attitudes towards dogs. This becomes even clearer in the section exploring 
pig metaphors, as pigs are non-kosher and therefore when ‘pig’ is used as an insult it is 
                                                             
21George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (London: University of Chicago Press, 2003), pp.22-
24. 
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insulting both on the fundamental, mainstream concept that animals are lesser than 
humans, and also on a sub-cultural level. 
 However, there are also many ways in which different species of animal are used to 
connote the same characteristic. As discussed, comparing someone to an animal might 
connote a level of inhumanity whether that animal is a dog, rat, pig, or another animal. On 
the other hand, this same observation may lead to the opposite conclusion: that as humans 
are compared to any number of animals, there is something intrinsically animalistic in what 
it means to be human, and that this comes to the fore during events such as the Holocaust 
where humans are pushed to their limits. Paradoxically, this assumes that what we might 
consider ‘inhuman’ is an inherent part of the human condition. This, in turn, would suggest 
that there is a common bond which exists between humans and other animals and, as such, 
that comparing humans to other animals may reveal something about our humanity. This is 
an idea which I trace throughout this thesis, as I move on to analyse reciprocal metaphors – 
where humans are not only compared to animals but also vice versa -  and consider how 
common bonds between humans and other animals are represented in literature. 
 A focus on literature is one of the fundamental ways in which this thesis is separate 
from other texts that trope animality and the Holocaust. For example, Boria Sax dedicates 
an entire section of Animals in the Third Reich to analysing different animals in the context 
of Nazi Germany: in ‘The Symbolism of Animals in Nazi Germany’, he analyses animals 
symbolically, showing, for example, how Aryans were to model themselves on wolves.22 
However, he does not refer in detail to Holocaust testimony, but rather focuses on historical 
moments such as the writing of new laws pertaining to animals, or societal interest in such 
                                                             
22 Boria Sax, Animals in the Third Reich: Pets, Scapegoats, and the Holocaust (New York: Decalogue Books, 
2009), pp.45-98; pp.72-80. 
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theories as evolution. By analysing animal metaphors through a close reading of Holocaust 
testimonies, this chapter gauges both how we might consider animals in relation to 
ourselves and how they are used to consider others on a conceptual plane. Although this 
thesis focuses on the Holocaust as a limit case for the representation of humans, and also as 
an event which necessitated shifts in literary representations of atrocity and the suffering 
body, it offers an exploration into the representation of animals in literature more widely, 
and specifically the ways in which humans trace elements of their humanity in other animals 
through literature. However, in order to move forward in this vein, Chapter One offers a 
consideration of the use of animals as symbol of inhumanity – or perhaps the ‘inhumane’ 
strand of humanity – in Holocaust testimonies. 
 
Insects 
 
 Insect metaphors appear in many Holocaust testimonies and serve to highlight 
feelings of powerlessness and insignificance amongst prisoners. In other cases, victims 
identify with insects en masse, which conveys feelings such as loss of identity and 
dispensability. Such metaphors agree with ideas of insects in comparison with ourselves, 
which further shows how the metaphor is used not only to present the dehumanisation 
process inflicted on prisoners, but sometimes to anthropomorphise insects. This duality at 
once shows how prisoners were considered by perpetrators and how they considered 
themselves. In other words, it highlights how they were conscious of the process of 
dehumanisation. 
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 Louis de Wijze exemplifies this duality in his testimony Only My Life, where twice he 
compares aspects of Buna concentration camp to an anthill. In this first example, de Wijze 
describes a factory in which prisoners believe there to have been thirty thousand workers: 
 
The factory grounds are now teeming with people. It looks like an anthill. Even 
the organization at Buna resembles that of an industrious ant colony. Everything 
is structured down to the most minute detail. There are guards, and there is a 
strict discipline to control the masses. However, there is a big difference: Ants 
are instinctively forced to work and sacrifice themselves for the greater good, up 
to the point of mass suicide. We, on the contrary, who are endowed with our 
own free will and feelings, are working because we have been enslaved by an 
aggressive minority.23 
 
De Wijze recognises that there is a stark difference between appearance and reality: the 
teeming factory grounds may look like an ant colony, and the intense work being carried out 
may be comparable to the inner workings of an anthill, but whereas ants have an innate 
compulsion to work tirelessly for ‘the greater good’, these prisoners are forced against their 
will to work for the enemy. Moreover, de Wijze notes that ants often work towards mass 
death, whereas prisoners work on pain of their individual deaths, knowing that many of 
their fellow workers will have succumbed to theirs even by the following day. Using the 
word ‘enslaved’, de Wijze furthers the divide: unlike cattle and pets, ants are not 
domesticated animals, so any analogy between slavery and domestication cannot be made. 
                                                             
23 Louis de Wijze, Only My Life: A Survivor’s Story, trans. Victor de Wijze (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), p. 
48. Later, de Wijze compares the camp to an anthill to describe the prisoners’ excitement over imminent 
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Instead, it is the prisoners’ enslavement which makes them appear to be working as ants, 
yet it is this enslavement (and their consciousness of it) which simultaneously denies the 
analogy.  
 Martha W, a Sinti woman who was deported to Belzec, gives an interview with Karen 
Guth where she also compares her surroundings to an anthill. In this part of her testimony 
she is waiting to be taken to the camp: 
 
Im Mai, ich glaube, es war der 16. Mai 1940, haben sie uns alle abgeholt und 
zum Fruchtschuppen im Hafen gebracht(Hamburg). So richtig genau erinnere ich 
mich gar nicht mehr. Ich weiß nur, dass da so furchtbar viele Leute in dem 
Schuppen waren. Da war es wie so in einem Ameisenhaufen, so viele Menschen, 
die durcheinander liefen. 
 
In May, I think it was 16 May 1940, they came to pick us up and brought us to 
the fruit warehouse in a harbour of Hamburg. I really do not remember myself 
properly. I only know that there were an awful lot of people in the warehouse. It 
was like being in an anthill, so many people were confusedly running around.24 
 
Unlike de Wijze’s account, Martha’s testimony is in the past tense and she is more aware of 
her memory’s limitations. She describes the warehouse as being like an anthill not because 
of the order but rather because of the disorder. Therefore, the simile is used to highlight a 
completely different element of her experience: whereas Wijze counts himself as a part of 
                                                             
24 Martha W, ‘The Story of Martha W’, <http://www.deathcamps.org/belzec/romamarthaw_de.html.>, (1 
January 2006). My own translation. 
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the structure, Martha stresses the incomprehensibility of her situation. ‘It was like being in 
an anthill’ does not necessarily imply that she considers herself an ant in the simile. Rather, 
it is likely that her simile highlights the confusion she would feel were she to be put in an 
anthill as herself: herself ‘being’ in an anthill. This reading is supported by the fact that she 
cannot remember herself properly: the people are like ants because their faces are 
indistinguishable; she notes only how busy and confused everyone seemed en masse. This 
stark difference between two seemingly similar similes shows the complexity involved in 
using animals figuratively. Both recognise a separation between the animals and the people 
to which they are compared (Wijze explicitly notes the difference in free will and feelings 
between people and ants, and Martha notes only the confusion she would feel should she 
herself be put into an anthill), but they each use ants to exemplify opposite qualities: Wijze 
for order and Martha for disorder. This shows that we use animal metaphors not to evoke 
the qualities of an individual species, but rather the qualities we perceive them as having. In 
the above examples, Wejze’s conception of order and Martha’s conception of disorder are 
placed upon ants, therefore ants come to symbolise order and disorder, respectively. From 
this it is easy to see how dehumanisation is dangerous from a conceptual perspective: if you 
begin to see people as animals, then they become reflections of your idea of that animal. If 
prisoners are compared to insects by their perpetrators, then it is only so long before these 
perpetrators may begin to see them as small, identical and ultimately exterminable. 
 Primo Levi also uses an ant metaphor in If This Is a Man. He describes the suffering 
of prisoners in Auschwitz, focusing not only on their physical suffering during the day but 
also their feverish suffering during the night. Here he describes reality interwoven with 
nightmares, the two barely distinguishable as the content of the latter is based on the 
cruelty of the former: 
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So our nights drag on. […] One wakes up at every moment, frozen with terror, 
shaking in every limb, under the impression of an order shouted out by a voice 
full of anger in a language not understood. The procession to the bucket and the 
thud of bare heels on the wooden floor turns into another symbolic procession: 
it is us again, grey and identical, small as ants, yet so huge as to reach up to the 
stars, bound one against the other, countless, covering the plain as far as the 
horizon; sometimes melting into a single substance, a sorrowful turmoil in which 
we all feel ourselves trapped and suffocated; sometimes marching in a circle, 
without beginning or end, with a blinding giddiness and a sea of nausea rising 
from the praecordia to the gullet; until hunger or cold or the fullness of our 
bladders turn our dreams into their customary forms.25 
 
Here, the comparison to animals is explicitly symbolic. Unlike ants marching, incognizant, 
Levi calls their movement a ‘procession’, which connotes a ceremony. Although Levi 
compares prisoners to ants, this also confirms their humanity, as it is only through 
consciousness that they can understand the animal comparison on a symbolic plane. It is 
unclear whether Levi is using this metaphor to describe the time he spends asleep or awake, 
so interwoven are these states that during sleep he wakes up at ‘every moment’. Therefore, 
to touch upon a more psychoanalytical reading, the ant metaphor here is somewhere 
between the conscious and the unconscious. It is the idea of ants as creatures which are 
small (perhaps connoting insignificance), grey and identical (a loss of identity), marching 
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endlessly (a procession to the death), to which the prisoners are compared through Levi’s 
metaphor.  Although these ideas of the ant may remain, the physical comparison is fleeting 
at best: soon his scientific background allows him to identify that the nausea he feels rises 
from the praecordia – a part of the anatomy which we do not share with insects. In his 
‘shapeless’ dreams, Levi imagines himself not into the form of an ant but rather into his idea 
of what these creatures signify. 
 As shown, insect metaphors and similes are quite common in Holocaust testimonies 
to describe people en masse, as insects such as ants individually form part of a much larger 
colony. Another type of insect which is sometimes used to evoke large numbers is the fly. 
However, unlike the examples of ant metaphors above, flies seem most often to be used in 
the turn of phrase ‘they died like flies’. For example, Louis de Wijze describes the high death 
rate of prisoners as winter comes: ‘Our ranks are rapidly getting thinner. The first victims of 
the bitter cold are from Mediterranean countries. Not used to this extreme weather, they 
fall like flies, dozens at a time’.26 Similarly, Paul Trepman uses the fly simile to evoke a 
succession of quick deaths in Majdanek due to the extreme measures of its acting 
commander: 
 
Within six months, Anton Tuman had killed off 65,000 Russian prisoners. This is 
how he had done it: He had them fed with special “soups” consisting entirely of 
grass, water, and great amounts of salt. After drinking this brew, the prisoners 
got so thirsty that they drank huge quantities of cold water. The result was that 
before long they contracted dysentery and died like flies.27 
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Whereas the examples of ants in figurative language each highlight different qualities one 
may attach to their idea of an ant, the fly simile is less abstract. To die or to ‘drop like flies’ is 
a common phrase, used to describe anything dying quickly and in large numbers. It refers 
simply to the short lifespan of flies and this is used directly to describe the physical 
transience of others. Whereas being orderly or disorderly, significant or insignificant, are 
judgements people may attach to ants as they choose, the lifespan of a fly is a more 
concrete measurement and as such the simile is relatively straightforward. As is clear, both 
of the above examples are used for this purpose. However, although the simile seems to be 
little more than a turn of phrase, its context suggests a deeper reading. It is possible that de 
Wijze and Trepman employ it both in order to convey the vast number of deaths and also 
the triviality of each one. In particular, Trepman writes that 65,000 prisoners died within 
half a year, which already shows both the high death rate and the quick succession of these 
deaths. If the phrase’s only function is to reiterate these facts then it is tautological. It is 
probable, therefore, that Trepman uses the phrase to highlight how normal these deaths 
became and therefore how the human value of prisoners was negated in Majdanek. 
 Nearing the end of her testimony, Guiliana Tedeschi uses another insect simile to 
describe the hunger and exhaustion felt by women who had been led on a long march 
without sustenance. Although her simile is not a turn of phrase like the above example, it 
too is used primarily to describe the physical state of these women: 
 
Bodies collapsed exhausted on the stony earth or damp soft grass, shivering 
from the cold and fever. Every hope of being fed was gone and the women got 
down like grasshoppers on the edge of the fields where small tender broccoli 
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plants were growing or in the meadows where already-blooming sunflowers 
offered their leaves and the hearts of their buds. 
 But even after ten days of fasting, marching, and cold, lifting a clod to take a 
seed potato was still a crime of such gravity that a Posten might simply finish you 
off with a bullet in the head.28 
 
The grasshopper simile is used to describe the shape of the women’s bodies as they crouch 
by the fields. Their small size and thin, angular legs reflect the starving frames of these 
women. However, unlike the ant or fly similes above, there seems to be no abstract 
connection between the grasshopper and these prisoners: the simile simply evokes the 
creature’s physical appearance. At most, there is a grim irony inherent in the simile: 
whereas grasshoppers are known to eat vast amounts of vegetation (the locust, for 
example), these women are forbidden to eat even a seed potato. 
 In the examples above, survivors use insects figuratively to invoke both the idea of 
that insect (what they signify to the author) and the physicality of the insects (what they 
look like or how they live). Whereas it seems ants are used more for their abstract qualities, 
perhaps because they live in colonies, flies are often used in a turn of phrase, and other 
specific insects may simply be employed to highlight a physical state. However, insect 
metaphors are often nonspecific, such as in the following examples: 
 
In the melee with Hans, my basic instinct for survival had somehow made it 
possible for me to summon both the physical and emotional fortitude necessary 
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to overcome him. For that moment, brutalized by the circumstances, I had been 
more animal than human. Now, with Hans no longer around to pose a threat to 
me, I felt more “human.” During the day, I was able to move about the camp 
without fear of a confrontation in which Hans would crush me like an insect, in 
the way I’d seen him beat others to death in similar situations.29 
 
Every movement of the shovel and every stroke of the puck was pointless and 
machinelike; like an insect trapped between smooth surfaces, your spirit slipped 
down and down, finding no hold, nothing stable.30 
 
Like miserable, defenseless insects dimly outlined in the mist, the women take 
their places, bending down along a line lost in the fog at both ends. [...] Those 
who scream are not the insects. Insects are mute. [...] 
Daylight on the marsh where insects with eyes full of terror labor to the point of 
exhaustion. 
The spade grows increasingly heavier. 
The carriers bear the handbarrow lower and lower. 
It is day on the marsh where insects in human form die.31 
 
Due to the nonspecificity of ‘insect’, it would be fair to suppose that the most common use 
of the comparison is in an abstract sense. Nonetheless, both Deutsch’s and Tedeschi’s 
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similes seem to be based on the physical properties of insects: to crush someone like an 
insect implies small size and physical weakness, and ‘an insect trapped between smooth 
surfaces’ could refer to any number of insects who cannot get a grip on glass, for instance, 
and try endlessly to find a way up. However, similar to the phrase ‘to drop like flies’, 
crushing someone like an insect can refer not only to the physical ease of killing insects but 
also the moral ease. Insects are plentiful, they are small and often they are considered 
pests. Whereas there are organisations supporting the prevention of cruelty to animals, 
there are no such recognised protests against cruelty to insects. To crush someone like an 
insect implies that the act requires no retribution. Deutsch killed Hans primarily in order to 
keep himself alive, but in recalling his act and its brutality it re-enables him to live as a 
conscious being, aware of more than simply life and death: ‘Now, with Hans no longer 
around to pose a threat to me, I felt more “human.”’ Similarly, Tedeschi’s quotation is not 
making a simple comparison between the physical qualities of insects and people. Rather, 
she uses a physical description of an insect in order to convey her far more abstract feelings 
of despair. The fact that insects cannot despair is irrelevant as she is referring to the 
symbolism of the insect’s fall, rather than the fall itself. 
 Of all the figurative depictions, however, Delbo’s exhibits the most complex 
relationship between the physical and the symbolic. Insects may be comparably defenceless 
compared to other, larger forms of life, but they cannot be ‘miserable’. Moreover, they are 
not mute although many have calls too faint for human ears to pick up. It is also hard to 
imagine an insect’s eyes being ‘full of terror’, as they are so often small, black and 
expressionless. Therefore, Delbo’s extended metaphor seems not to refer to insects as such 
but rather to insects as symbolic. However, the nonspecificity of these life-forms not only 
highlights their distance from living things, but also creates an uncanny effect as the women 
34 
 
have become ‘insects in human form’: like Gregor Samsa in Kafka’s The Metamorphosis, the 
distinction between the physical and the symbolic is effaced. 
 In his diary and testimony from Bergen-Belsen, Abel J. Herzberg contemplates the 
values of humanity in the face of the atrocities he has witnessed. Regarding the evident 
pride of an SS man who leads defenceless women and children to their deaths as though 
they were already insentient, Herzberg uses animals figuratively to describe the feelings of 
prisoners towards such perpetrators: 
 
Here we see this man, face to face, in his true light. We – and I believe this to be 
our historical, our eternal, experience – encounter him in his nakedness, far 
away from the path of civilisation, there where he feels no embarrassment. He 
gives rein to his passions. He does what his heart desires, he pursues the lust of 
his soul, and we are his spoils and his sacrifice. We Jews see man in the crevices 
and depths of his true nature. We see him as the fly sees the spider, as a roe 
deer sees the panther. 
  And we even managed not to hate him. Instead, out of a most profound 
love for mankind and out of a vital urge and a philosophy of life, that could not 
be surpassed or tempered, we gave him a rule of life. Out of an all too great 
mercy for mankind we gave him the principle of accountability and retribution 
so that he might control himself. 
  However, it was made into a kind of ‘love’ and ‘mercy’ which, from a 
psychological point of view, meant the enfeebling of accountability – and 
therefore became acceptable to him. 
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  And when one sees how men, big strong men, send women and 
children on transport, shouting, cursing, raging, or when one has seen just once 
how the SS man transports corpses with a cigarette in his snout, unmoved as if 
he is transporting manure – no, worse – as if he is transporting bricks, then one 
knows: this is man. Ecce homo!32 
 
Herzberg’s account of this man and many like him leads him to contemplate the 
philosophical nature of life and the difference between man and animal. He explicitly refers 
to some life forms: the fly and the spider, the roe and the panther, and these represent the 
predator-prey relationships which have been uprooted from nature and performed in Nazi 
camps between perpetrators and victims. Starting with the relationship between the fly and 
the spider Herzberg shows how, although an analysis of insect metaphors helps to elucidate 
some thoughts and feelings specific to the symbolism and physicality of insects, these life 
forms still belong in the philosophical sphere of ‘the other’, inclusive of all animals. Herzberg 
works his way up the animal kingdom from the fly to the spider, to the roe to the panther, 
and finally – in Bergen Belsen – to the human. Terence des Pres recalls a lecture given by 
Hannah Arendt, in which she speaks of the accountability of killing: 
 
In a lecture at the New School (New York, 1974), Hannah Arendt remarked that 
it is easier to kill a dog than a man, easier yet to kill a rat or frog, and no problem 
at all to kill insects – “It is in the glance, in the eyes.” She means that the 
perception of subjective being in the victim sparks some degree of identification 
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in the assailant, and makes his act difficult in proportion to the capacity for 
suffering and resistance he perceives. Inhibited by pity and guilt, the act of 
murder becomes harder to perform and results in greater psychic damage to the 
killer himself.33 
 
Insect metaphors best represent the lack of identification between the victim and the 
perpetrator. Insects are so completely ‘other’ that it is hard to recognise anything of 
ourselves within them. As shown, when authors of Holocaust testimony refer to themselves 
as insects, it is often to present the physical and symbolic metamorphosis that they 
underwent: they became thinner, weaker and less easy to tell apart. This SS man with the 
‘cigarette in his snout’ seems so unfazed by their murder it is as though they were less than 
insects, less even than manure (which might evoke some revulsion), but bricks. The 
relationship between people breaks down as people are killed like prey and perpetrators kill 
as though they were predators. 
 However, despite the fact that insect metaphors are used to degrade humans, there 
is something more compelling about Herzberg’s comparison between perpetrators and 
prisoners to a panther, dog, spider and fly: this pantheon at once highlights the difference 
between humans to these creatures, and it highlights their similarities by linking them 
together in a predator-prey analogy. Similarly, Arendt’s argument that it is easier to kill 
insects than it is to kill humans might not only be an observation but a challenge: if killing an 
insect is one step easier than killing a frog, and killing a frog is one step behind killing a dog, 
and finally if killing a dog is one step away from killing a human, perhaps all are linked 
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through being graded in a system of ease of killing, from one to the other. Indeed, despite 
the fact that this chapter continues to move through different species of animal metaphors 
in Holocaust literature, each of which introduces new connotations and implications, some 
tropes such as vulnerability and degradation prove common to each species and, indeed, 
the humans to whom they relate. 
 
Vermin 
  Vermin metaphors are far less common in Holocaust testimonies than insect 
metaphors, although when they do appear they are used in illuminating ways. Robert 
Antelme, for example, uses vermin metaphors in his testimony The Human Race to present 
his perpetrators’ vision of their prisoners. He uses them to imaginatively enter into the 
mindset of a Nazi and explain the mechanisms of dehumanisation that underpinned this 
ideology. However, matters are complicated by the way Antelme’s vermin metaphors blur 
the line between oppressor and victim; between what the SS may have been thinking and 
what Antelme himself projects onto his animal symbols. Accordingly, the vermin metaphor 
has key elements in common with the way people might regard animals symbolically: 
Antelme transfers his ideas onto how he imagines the SS to think, just as people in general 
transfer their stereotyped ideas of animals onto individual animals – vermin as pestilential, 
mice as frightened, cats as predatory. In this section, a discussion of Antelme’s vermin 
metaphors leads into an exploration of mouse symbolism in Holocaust testimonies. 
 Robert Antelme documents a conversation between a Hitler Youth and a member of 
the SS, where the boy can understand neither how Antelme and other political prisoners 
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could be considered enemies of the state, nor why they should be kept alive when they 
appear subhuman: 
 
What reasons can the Führer have for leaving such ugly guys alive? When there’s 
a pail of soup in the middle of the courtyard, they all jump on it, they holler, they 
push each other. Scheisse, Scheisse! When men aren’t any more disciplined than 
that, how can you argue that they deserve to live? Enemies of Germany, these 
guys? They’re not enemies, they’re vermin. Germany can’t have enemies like 
that. Do they think anything? The SS man makes a face when I ask him about 
them, sometimes he laughs. And he answers Scheisse.34 
 
Despite the fact that Antelme was deported and imprisoned due to his involvement in the 
French Resistance, this youth cannot identify him as an enemy of Germany due to his 
changed appearance and desperation for food. The irony that they were imprisoned due to 
being enemies of Germany, and this imprisonment is the reason for their changed 
appearance, is lost on the boy, who denies their identity as either political prisoners or 
human beings. Rather, the youth sees him and other political prisoners as vermin, by which 
he means subhuman and pestilential. The youth even wonders whether the prisoners can 
think: a question which implies he does not see them as cognizant. His choice of animal 
metaphor, ‘vermin’, is unspecific. Instead of calling them rats or mice (or any other animal 
considered vermin), it refers to his earlier comment on lack of discipline: vermin are 
considered pests which are hard to control. 
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 In a chapter entitled ‘The Uniqueness and Normality of the Holocaust’, Zygmunt 
Bauman compares the Nazi’s elimination process to a gardener’s vision for a perfect garden. 
Bauman’s focus on the importance of order and beauty makes his analogy particularly 
applicable to this youth: 
 
Some gardeners hate the weeds that spoil their design – that ugliness in the 
midst of beauty, litter in the midst of serene order. Some others are quite 
unemotional about them: just a problem to be solved, an extra job to be done. 
Not that it makes a difference to the weeds; both gardeners exterminate them. 
If asked or given a chance to pause and ponder, both would agree; weeds must 
die not so much because of what they are, as because of what the beautiful, 
orderly garden ought to be.35 
 
Bauman’s analogy is appropriate for two reasons: weeds in a garden spoil a preconceived, 
ordered idea of beauty, which is similar to the Hitler Youth’s conception of the prisoners as 
ugly and undisciplined; furthermore, both use figurative language to explain or excuse a 
process of extermination. Whereas Bauman explains the mindset behind modern genocide 
using a gardening analogy, wherein a gardener rids his terrain from weeds, the youth 
considers the prisoners as vermin and therefore excuses his ideas of extermination by 
dehumanising them. This supports Bauman’s analogy because it sees extermination as a 
creative rather than destructive process: the youth wants not to rid Germany of her 
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(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989), pp.91-92. 
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enemies, but rid her of ugliness and disorder – qualities which he projects onto the idea of 
vermin. 
 This is the first mention of prisoners as vermin in The Human Race but, within only 
twenty-two pages, Antelme uses the vermin metaphor a further three, separate times. 
However, rather than imagining them from a perpetrator’s perspective, as above, Antelme 
shifts his narrative voice. In the following two examples, he writes in the second person 
narrative: 
 
The SS man watches us, his legs straddled, his calves tensed, his riding crop in his 
hand, the death’s-head cap above his eyes. 
  “Poor asshole. You don’t see a thing. If right now I could take you by 
the scruff of the neck and shake you, the first thing I would want you to get into 
your head is that I, me, I have a bed at home, that I have a door I can lock, and if 
anyone wants to see me he rings the door-bell. [...] And those are girls, like 
German girls, for whom men would have been willing to die, whose images have 
been fixed on photographs that are right now being looked at in warm houses – 
girls who are now old women in zebra outfits, just like this vermin that you see 
before you.36 
 
Were we to go and find an SS and show Jacques to him, to him we could say: 
“Have a look, you have turned him into this rotting, yellowish creature. You have 
succeeded in making him what you think he is by nature: waste, offal. Well, [...] 
                                                             
36 Antelme, The Human Race, pp.78-79 
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you have enabled him to make of himself the strongest, the most complete of 
men, the surest of his powers, of the resources of his conscience, of the scope of 
his actions. [...] With Jacques you never won. You wanted him to steal. He didn’t 
steal. You wanted him to kiss the kapos’ asses in order to eat. He wouldn’t do it. 
You wanted him to laugh in order to look good when a Meister was beating 
some guy up. He didn’t laugh. [...] Your conscience is at rest. ‘We were right, just 
look at them.’ No one is so deluded as you, and you’re deluded by us, who are 
leading you to the very end of your error. [...] We’ll let ourselves be taken the 
whole way to death, and you’ll only see the vermin who are dying.37 
 
In both quotations, Antelme adopts an accusatory tone, imagining what he would say to a 
member of the SS were he not to be killed for speaking out. Throughout the quotations, he 
imagines how he could show his perpetrators the individuality of prisoners and prove to 
them how each one deserves to be treated with respect. The repetition in ‘I, me, I’ shows 
Antelme affirming himself as unique rather than as a faceless prisoner amongst the masses. 
Similarly, Antelme contrasts the physical appearance of Jacques to his sense of morality: 
where the SS would not expect a ‘rotting, yellowing creature’ to retain any ethical 
standards, Jacques is proof that treating someone as less than human may make them 
appear less than human, but it does not always succeed in making them act in what he 
perceives as being a subhuman manner (but what is actually, as proven by limit cases such 
as the Holocaust, indeed a human manner). 
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 In both examples it seems as though Antelme’s defiant, private monologues 
celebrate a thriving humanity behind the transformed faces of prisoners. It seems as though 
the energy of his desires to shake an SS by the scruff of the neck surpass the exhaustion of 
his body. Indeed, until Antelme reaches his ‘vermin’ metaphors, it seems as though his 
testimony celebrates individual examples of resistance against the SS. However, in both 
cases the ‘vermin’ metaphor creates a sense of bathos, which reminds readers of the 
prisoners’ futile situation. The metaphor serves to highlight that, even if the hypothetical 
resistance were to take place, the prisoners would still be seen as vermin by the SS. In the 
first example, the girls for whom men would die remain vermin to their captors; in the 
second, any sense that the prisoners have deluded the SS and as such any sense that they 
retain the power to choose their fate, is rendered obsolete as they die in their masses, and 
the SS – deluded or not – see only vermin dying. Therefore, in these examples, ‘vermin’ is 
used in direct contrast to the humanity previously presented. It encapsulates ideas of 
anonymity, physical ugliness, and the lack of individuality. 
 Aside from one example where Antelme uses ‘vermin’ in its literal sense – to 
describe the lice in prisoners’ beds – the final appearance of the word is when Antelme 
describes his factory Meister’s contrasting attitude towards prisoners who speak his 
language and those who do not.38 Here, Antelme comments on how the Meister, Bortlick, 
speaks to the Vorarbeiter, a Polish prisoner who uses his time to make toys for Bortlick’s 
children: 
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Bortlick is speaking with the one who speaks his language and whose hands are 
skilled. Such a man cannot have anything in common with the slaves who do not 
speak his language, whose hands are not skilled, who are thin. They are nothing 
but vermin, though vermin of a prized variety, the vermin that they pursued for 
years, that they never until now have had such a close view of, vermin that’s 
right here, in this factory, that they live in close proximity with, that they 
preserve, a treasure of evil.39 
 
Similar to the Hitler’s Youth, above, Bortlick defines what is worthy of human life in strange 
terms. The man with whom he can hold a conversation, who uses his skills to make toys for 
Bortlick’s children, is not considered vermin, in contrast to the other prisoners. Unlike the 
Hitler’s Youth example, however, this is not a transcription of a conversation or even an 
imagined conversation. This is an example of Antelme imagining the Meister’s point of view. 
He imagines himself through the eyes of the Meister, as vermin. The tense in which he 
writes is conditional: ‘such a man cannot have anything in common with the slaves who do 
not speak his language’ (my italics), which implies that Antelme goes so far as to imagine the 
Meister’s justification for his actions: Bortlick defines humanity on his own terms so as to 
draw a line between his favoured prisoner and the others en masse, who appear to him as 
‘vermin’. 
 This attitude was not uncommon in Nazi Germany, and in fact Himmler’s speech at 
Posen on 4 October 1943 draws attention to the probability that Germans were likely to find 
an exception to the common enemy, in this case ‘the Jew’: 
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It’s one of those things it is easy to talk about – ‘The Jewish race is being 
exterminated’,  says one party member, that’s quite clear, it’s in our program – 
elimination of the Jews, and we’re doing it, exterminating them’. And then they 
come, 80 Million worthy Germans, and each one has his decent Jew. Of course, 
the others are vermin, but this one is an A1 Jew. Not one of all those who talk 
this way has witnessed it, not one of them has been through it. Most of you 
know what it means when 100 corpses are lying side by side, or 500, or 1000. To 
have stuck it out and at the same time to have remained decent fellows, that is 
what has made us hard.40 
 
Like the Meister in Antelme’s testimony, who favours the Vorarbeiter due to his personal 
connections with the man but sees the rest of the workers as ‘vermin’, Himmler identifies 
the Jews en masse as ‘vermin’, but understands how Germans may feel a particular affinity 
to individual Jews, and how they may consider them separate to the others. However, also 
like Antelme’s example, Himmler shows how the Jews-as-vermin metaphor can become 
unstuck: whereas Antelme imagines Bortlick convincing himself that the other prisoners 
‘cannot’ be like the Vorbeiter by attaching more moral significance to language and skills 
than he does to simply being human, Himmler shows how the Nazis wanted to consider the 
Jews en masse as ‘vermin’ but still recognised the impossibility of anyone facing 1000 
human bodies (regardless of race) and remaining unfazed. If these people were vermin, 
then there would be little problem of extermination on this mass scale. As it was, many 
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Nazis found the extermination process harrowing. Over a year before he gave this speech, 
even Himmler was said to be suffering ‘from visions in connection with the shootings of 
Jews that he himself had led’.41 
 Antelme further draws attention to this contradiction. By repeating ‘vermin’ four 
times in quick succession, it seems as though he imagines the Meister convincing himself 
that these prisoners are less than human. After all, if the vermin metaphor was accurate, it 
would imply that the prisoners were pests, but here the prisoners are working for the SS 
rather than against them. They are kept as trophies of the strength of the Nazi party, and 
therefore they should symbolise power and oppression: two qualities which one does not 
typically associate with vermin. Moreover, the final four words (or in the original Spanish, 
three: ‘tesoro del Mal’), are telling in their ambiguity: it is unclear as to whether the 
prisoners are the evil or the treasure. If they are ‘evil’ then evil’s treasure must be the skills 
they supply, but the ambiguity is such that the evil referred to may be the evil of the SS: the 
prisoners are the treasure belonging to evil. If this is the case, perhaps Antelme shifts from 
imagining the Meister’s thoughts back to his own judgement of the situation. This would 
highlight the impossibility of fully understanding another’s perspective; an impossibility 
which is parallel to humans using animal metaphors as if to suggest they understand the 
natural thoughts of different species (as discussed with regard to insects, above, this 
thought process immediately reminds one that they are a human thinking their way into 
another’s body). Otherwise, Antelme continues to imagine Bortlick’s thought process, and 
this would suggest that he thinks the perpetrators understand that they are not culling 
vermin as though they are weeds, but exterminating humans as though they are vermin. 
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This is in direct opposition to Antelme’s earlier use of the ‘vermin’ metaphor, where he 
captured the futility of prisoners resisting their dehumanisation. Instead, his final use of 
vermin metaphors ends on an ambiguity which ironically foregrounds his unambiguous 
resolution in The Human Race: ‘there is no ambiguity: we’re still men, and we shall not end 
otherwise than as men’.42 
 Antelme’s extended vermin metaphor makes his testimony exceptional. He 
transcribes how he imagines his perpetrators to think, and therefore the metaphor is 
repeated to show how he believes they consider their victims. Although this is speculative, 
the metaphor is not random, but historically appropriate due to the fact that Nazis’ 
adversaries were often depicted as vermin in propaganda. This is especially relevant for 
Jews, though of course Antelme is not included in this category.  The most striking of these 
is the “documentary” ‘The Eternal Jew’, which, as described by Art Spiegelman: 
 
portrayed Jews in a ghetto swarming in tight quarters, bearded caftaned 
creatures, and then cut to Jews as mice – or rather rats – swarming in a sewer, 
with a title card that said “Jews are the rats” or the “vermin of mankind”.43 
 
Such propaganda was used to dehumanise Jews in order to make them appear dirty, 
pestilential and exterminable: the qualities we attach to the idea of ‘vermin’. However, most 
testimonies are less conjectural, therefore apart from referring to literal vermin such as lice 
and rats, the metaphor is not common. Instead, some survivors use animal metaphors 
specific to animals one may associate with vermin, such as mice. More examples will follow, 
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but this first quotation begins in the retelling of a story told to Trude Levi by her friend Alice, 
a persecuted Hungarian Jew, after the Second World War had ended. They worked together 
in an office. The boy in the story is the son of a man who took his life, and Levi worries that 
Alice felt herself too involved in the fiction: 
 
One day his little son was sitting on the kerbside with a friend and said that 
before his father had died he had told him an exciting oriental story about a little 
mouse. The mouse lived with his family and was very happy except for one 
thing. Whenever he saw birds flying he too wanted to fly. His wish was granted 
and suddenly he could fly. He was so happy! He flew among the birds and saw all 
the wonderful things that birds see high in the sky – the cities, cathedrals, 
forests and castles. It was marvellous, but it became rather lonely. So the mouse 
learned the language of the birds in order to be able to converse with them. But 
even though he could now speak to the birds, he was obviously not really a bird 
and, unintentionally, the birds made him feel that he was not really one of them. 
The mouse now became homesick and thought how lovely it would be if he 
could tell all the other mice of all the wonderful things he had seen. And so he 
went home and the mice were happy to see him, but he soon felt that he was no 
longer really one of them. And he felt very sad. 
 Alice became quite involved with this story, kept telling everyone about it and 
somehow re-enacting it as if she were principally involved. I became worried 
about her. [...] I had a premonition that something had happened to her, and 
this seemed to be confirmed when the following day she did not come to the 
office. About half-way through the morning the telephone rang and I 
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instinctively knew that it was news of Alice. She had opened the gas-tap and was 
dead. I was very distressed but not surprised. Once again the Holocaust had 
taken its toll. Alice, a Jewess, born in Hungary, because of persecution, felt 
unwanted there. She emigrated to Paris, but could not feel at home there either, 
like the little mouse.44 
 
This metafiction within Levi’s testimony takes on the qualities of a fable in both length and 
character, as many fables feature animals. However, unlike most fables, there is no clear 
lesson to be learned. The mouse in the story seems to love his family, to be grateful for his 
granted wish, to be hard-working (he learns the language of the birds), and to be true to his 
roots (after he has felt the exhilaration of flying, he wants only to share the story with his 
family). As such, there is no moral reason for his feelings of rejection at the end. Alice feels 
involved in this story, and Levi connects it to her suicide. Although her friend was never 
tortured in a concentration camp, her race meant that her family was persecuted and felt 
the need to uproot themselves in order to avoid an even more dreadful fate. Although 
unmentioned in Levi’s narrative, it is more than likely that many of Alice’s extended family 
were fatally persecuted, due to the wide-reaching effects of the Nazi extermination process. 
As such, like the mouse, Levi imagines that Alice must have felt isolated and misunderstood. 
Such feelings are common amongst Holocaust survivors, and Primo Levi recounts a 
nightmare where he returns home from Auschwitz to tell everyone his story, only for them 
to disbelieve him or even show their disinterest. Once awake, his friend Alberto confides 
that ‘it is also his dream and the dream of many others, perhaps of everyone’.45 Dreams 
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often have fabulous qualities, but – like the story of the mouse – it does not mean that they 
do not affect people in sometimes cruel and personal ways. Camp life was so unimaginable 
that survivors were genuinely worried that they would not be believed. Indeed, Trude Levi 
admits that her testimony was doubted by many who heard it.46 Therefore, when she 
compares her friend to the little mouse, the connection between the two is more than 
fabulous. Her friend may have felt akin to the mouse in ways which are associated with its 
species: its smallness and its fear of larger predators, for example. And yet she may also feel 
connected with the mouse in ways which are more specific to the story: her feelings of 
rootlessness, the unfairness of her fate and the fact that she can find no meaning for her 
past. The Holocaust, like the fable, bore no lessons for its victims. 
 Although mice are often considered vermin, it is clear from this fable that stories or 
metaphors about individual mice do not always pertain to this classification. Rather, 
‘vermin’ connotes a negative human relationship with the species: mice become vermin 
when they are considered pests to humans. In the story, however, the mouse has no 
relationship with humans. Moreover, as it is has fabulous qualities, only the physical form of 
the animal is a mouse, whereas the mouse itself harbours feelings akin to a person’s. 
Therefore, ‘vermin’ is used in a derogatory sense, hence its lack of mention in most survivor 
testimonies, whereas individual animals like mice are commonly presented outside of this 
identification bracket. Illustrating this are more quotations about mice: 
 
I keep still as a mouse.47 
                                                             
46 Levi writes of a time when she gave a talk about her experiences in Auschwitz to a Jewish audience in South 
Africa, when responses included one woman who said: “My poor dear girl, I am sure you had a hard time but 
surely your imagination has run away with you a bit?” – Trude Levi, A Cat Called Adolf, p.98. 
47 De Wijze, Only My Life, p. 149. 
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Whole families were deprived of their citizenship rights and hid out in dark 
corners like frightened mice.48 
 
The pogrom sounds drew closer, moved away again, came from right under my 
window, and once more echoed from a distance. It was as though someone was 
playing a cat-and-mouse game with me.49 
 
Let her go in peace and if by any chance 
there is incarnation which she did not believe in 
to be a spoilt cat would have been her wish. 
A cat with its independent nature, sleek 
handsome and playful but not a hunter 
that catches birds and mice, 
just curled up in someone’s lap, beloved 
She would even oblige by purring her thanks.50 
 
These quotations use mice as either metaphors or similes in order to convey qualities one 
associates with these animals. Mice are small, less predatory than rats, and even less so 
than cats. Therefore, the fact that survivors use them to convey their own feelings of fear, 
smallness and victimisation is unsurprising. De Wijze keeps ‘still as a mouse’ in order that 
the Nazis do not notice that he is attempting to stay behind on their death march 
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50 Levi, A Cat Called Adolf, p.167. 
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(unfortunately this does not work). He is therefore acting as prey avoiding its predators. 
Similarly, Trepman sees families huddled together, their physical positions remind him of 
small animals backed into a corner and their hopeless situation remind him of prey hiding 
from its predator. This predator-prey relationship is made even more explicit when 
Weinberg is hoping not to be attacked during Kristallnacht, as Nazis march through his town 
destroying the shops and homes of fellow Jews. The ‘cat-and-mouse game’ may be a turn of 
phrase, but its meaning does not deter too far from its roots in the animal kingdom, where 
cats are considered the typical predator to mice. This cat-mouse relationship is used once 
more as the final words in Trude Levi’s testimony, as her poem documents her desire to live 
as a cat, without cares and in a loving home, though specifically not a cat-as-predator, 
simply a cat-as-pet. Knowing Alice who felt so akin to the mouse in her father’s tale, and 
being a victim of the Holocaust herself, it is obvious why Levi would not want to be the sort 
of cat which kills mice. 
 Trude Levi wants to live like a cat, but her definition of a cat denies the predatory 
part of the animal’s nature: the same part which is explicitly used to highlight Weinberg’s 
feelings of victimisation in the previous quotation. Similarly, mice are often considered 
vermin, but in all of these examples it is not the qualities of vermin which are expressed, but 
the physical quality of being small metaphorically used to connote helplessness, or the 
natural order of mice-as-prey used to connote feelings of victimisation. Analysing vermin 
and specific types of vermin therefore allows one to understand the duality involved in 
using animal metaphors: they at once pertain to our relationship with these animals and the 
characteristics we perceive these animals as having, far more even than the actual qualities 
of that animal. No one can possibly understand the feelings of a mouse trapped in a corner 
facing a cat, though we imagine that feeling to be akin to our understanding of fear. It is this 
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distance between humans and animals, and the lack of understanding shared between our 
species, which makes them so easy to use as figures onto which we may press our own 
ideas and definitions. This highlights one of many reasons why dehumanisation in an 
abstract sense is so dangerous: if perpetrators start to see their victims as animals, then 
they too might begin to understand them by their own definitions. However, as shown with 
Himmler’s Posten speech and Antelme’s understanding of his Meister’s relationship with 
individual prisoners, this desired effect of an extermination regime cannot be entirely 
successful when, outside of abstractions, perpetrators know that their victims are human. 
 
Dogs 
 
 Dog metaphors are used in Holocaust survivor testimonies to describe both the 
victims and their perpetrators. Holocaust survivors, treated as slaves, perhaps refer to the 
idea of a dog as a domesticated creature, whereas for perpetrators the metaphor alludes to 
their inhumane treatment of prisoners. At other times, the metaphor refers to a more 
abstract idea, such as when Primo Levi describes his memories before camp attacking him 
like a dog. In every case the metaphor is further pertinent due to the fact that SS worked 
alongside their dogs and often set these animals on prisoners for punishment, to maintain 
order or simply for entertainment. 
 Both Abel Herzberg and Robert Antelme use dogs figuratively, but with different 
effect. After writing that a camp commandant is a ‘bitch’ for having forbidden laundry to be 
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allowed to dry – using an animal metaphor as a standard insult – Herzberg refers to the 
prisoners’ situation through the analogy of a dog:51 
 
 The women are desperate. Where is one meant to hang the nappies and the 
children’s laundry, now that it is winter and it pours with rain every day? 
 And most of them have diarrhoea and keep soiling themselves. Oh, the gloom, 
the darkness, the intolerable filth in the huts. People lying the whole day in a 
dark hovel where one would not leave a dog.52 
 
Herzberg does not directly compare the prisoners to dogs, but rather shows how their 
treatment is inhumane by alluding to the treatment one might expect to give a dog. The 
prisoners are presented as human with human needs and wishes – the wish to hang laundry 
out to dry – but it is in the nonfulfilment of these wishes that they are denied basic, humane 
treatment. As this quotation comes shortly after calling the camp commandant a ‘bitch’, it is 
made further clear how, by treating the prisoners with less respect than dogs, it may still be 
the perpetrators who are comparable to animals, rather than the prisoners they treat as 
such. 
Robert Antelme’s simile also refers to dogs kept by humans, but he uses the simile to 
highlight the prisoners’ feelings of anticipation at the prospect of receiving more food for 
Christmas: ‘we become excited, we start taking liberties, like dogs on loosened leashes’.53 
                                                             
51 Jack Santross, who translated Herzberg’s diary into the English version published and sold today, shared the 
same train journey with Herzberg and claims he ‘felt all the pain and had experienced every torment described 
in [his] diary’. He also claims to ‘have followed the original Dutch text as closely as possible’. For these reasons, 
it is fair to assume that ‘bitch’ is an accurate translation and can therefore be analysed alongside other dog 
metaphors in the text (Jack Santross, in: Herzberg, Between Two Streams, p.vii). 
52 Herzberg, Between Two Streams, p.166. 
53 Antelme, The Human Race, p.101. 
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Unlike Herzberg’s analogy, this simile directly compares the prisoners to domesticated 
animals. Moreover, Antelme uses an animal simile to express prisoners in a relatively 
positive mood. So entrenched are feelings of powerlessness that the most freedom they can 
experience is comparable to a domesticated dog on a loosened leash. In both cases, the 
survivors use domesticated dogs figuratively to describe their treatment, but whereas 
Herzberg’s analogy does not present the prisoners as animalistic despite their inhumane 
treatment, Antelme’s simile directly compares prisoners to dogs despite the possibility of 
relatively humane treatment. The survivors therefore use dogs figuratively to opposite 
effect. This may be because of dual associations we have of dogs: as animals and therefore 
‘inhuman’, but also as pets and therefore domesticated. 
 
 Like Antelme, Primo Levi uses an animal simile specifically with regard to 
domesticated dogs. Levi compares his working companion, Null Achtzehn – named after his 
concentration camp number even by fellow prisoners because he seems to have lost all 
traces of humanity – to a sledge dog which dies from exhaustion: 
 
He has not even the rudimentary astuteness of a draught-horse, which stops 
pulling a little before it reaches exhaustion: he pulls or carries or pushes as long 
as his strength allows him, then he gives way at once, without a word of 
warning, without lifting his sad, opaque eyes from the ground. He made me 
think of the sledge-dogs in London’s books, who slave until the last breath and 
die on the track.54 
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Here, Levi’s description begins by highlighting not only how Null Achtzen’s reactions seem 
less than human, but how he seems less astute even than some animals, specifically the 
draught-horse. Something ‘rudimentary’ has been lost from this prisoner: whereas even 
animals would stop before reaching their physical limits, Null Achtzen works to the point 
where his body can stand no more. The sledge dogs to which Levi compares his companion 
are fictional: they are specifically the dogs in Call of the Wild and White Fang by Jack 
London.55 In the first of these novels, a domesticated dog is made to adapt to the wild, 
where the second is the story of a wild dog’s journey to domestication. These are dogs 
whose instincts have been tamed, which perhaps explains why Levi compares Null Achtzen 
to these over real dogs. These fictional dogs have been written by a human into a story 
where they are tamed by humans. Similarly, Null Achtzen has been imprisoned and his 
name has been taken from him. He works to the point of utter exhaustion for those who 
stripped him of his humanity, and his story as prisoner will be remembered only in a 
testimony which refers to him not by his name but as a number. On one occasion, Levi 
works with Null Achtzen and, as they are forced to stop working to let wagons pass, he has a 
few moments to let his thoughts escape from the immediate demands of concentration 
camp life. Once the wagons have passed, his situation and his incognizant partner remind 
him once more: ‘We are only tired beasts’.56 Perhaps here is where Levi confirms that Null 
Achtzen’s inhumanity is a direct result from his situation, and that he too is part of this 
process of dehumanisation. 
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 Levi compares Null Achtzen to a dog, but one which is fictional. Similarly, he later 
compares himself and other prisoners to dogs but shows how his simile is dichotomous. 
Here, he describes the end of a lunch break in winter, when prisoners dread their return to 
work in pitiless conditions: 
 
Oh, if one could only cry! Oh, if one could only affront the wind as we once used 
to, on equal terms, and not as we do here, like cringing dogs. 
  We are outside and everyone picks up his lever. Resnyk drops his head 
between his shoulders, pulls his beret over his ears and lifts his face up to the 
low grey sky where the inexorable snow whirls around: ‘Si j’avey une chien, je ne 
le chasse pas dehors.’57 
 
Resnyk is Levi’s Polish bed companion who speaks very good French despite it not being his 
first language. His sentence roughly translates to: ‘If I had a dog, I would not chase it 
outdoors’, and presumably refers to the fact that the prisoners have been forced outside in 
extremely cold and relentless weather.58 Therefore, although Levi compares the prisoners to 
‘cringing dogs’, Resnyk shows how most humans would not treat their dogs in such a cruel 
manner. As such, the dogs to which Levi refers are not necessarily dogs per se, but the dog 
as symbol of something lesser than humankind. Humans, who can choose to face the wind 
‘on their own terms’ or leave it to be warm inside, have the advantage over dogs which are 
expelled to the elements, but Resnyk confirms that it would take a cruel dog-owner to 
subject his pet to such conditions. As such, Levi shows how the prisoners are not to the 
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Nazis as dogs are to men, but rather how they are treated with even less regard for 
compassion. 
 Although Levi compares himself and other prisoners to animals in order to evoke 
their degradation or inhumanity, other examples show how the animal comparison is not 
necessarily demeaning, but rather evocative of simpler times. For example, Charlotte Delbo 
describes the final struggles of one prisoner by recalling memories of other deaths, dignified 
despite the fact that those dying or dead were animals; these presumably being the only 
instances of death experienced by a younger Delbo, before she became saturated in it 
through her time in Birkenau: 
 
Her back hunches, shoulder blades protruding through the worn fabric of her 
coat. It’s a yellow coat, like that of our dog Flac which had grown thin after being 
ill, and whose whole body curved, just before he died, looking like the skeleton 
of a bird in the Museum of Natural History. This woman is going to die. 
 She no longer looks at us. She is huddling in the snow. His backbone arched, 
Flac is going to die – the first creature I ever saw die.59 
 
Delbo focuses on the physical aspects of this woman’s suffering when she compares her to 
the dog Flac: her back, the shape of her body, her protruding bones. The coat she wears 
seems to jolt Delbo’s memory of her dog, but it is more likely this woman’s condition before 
death which recalls the image. The animal metaphor is two-fold: Delbo remembers the 
                                                             
59 Delbo, Auschwitz and After, p.27. 
58 
 
death of her dog, which she had thought – perhaps at the time – made him seem like the 
skeleton of a bird. This prisoner, therefore, is reduced to the physical remains of one who is 
dead. The metaphor is not specific to Flac, as it first seems, but to dead animal matter. 
Death as equaliser is conveyed in the last two sentences, where the image of her huddled in 
the snow is immediately followed by the death of the dog. The final remark ‘- the first 
creature I ever saw die’ seems to relate simultaneously to this woman and to Flac. In dying, 
she has become the dog that had become the bird. 
 There is sadness in this quotation, but what renders it unique is its separation from 
the Holocaust. Of course, this woman’s imminent death is due to the cruel conditions in 
which she has lived, but Delbo’s description, in its generalisation, seems almost peaceful: an 
anonymous obituary. In a world governed by death, Delbo writes of an individual death as 
though it equates to all others; as such she seems to pay her respects to every death 
through this one, and to this one through every death. Although she identifies this woman 
with animals, it is this process of identification which renders her humane: whereas the SS 
killed millions in order that they be forgotten, Delbo memorialises this death along with 
countless others. She bears her death until such a time as she can write it down, which is to 
remember it. There is little to suggest that Delbo expected she would live to write down her 
memories (early in her testimony she writes that ‘Madness must have been the final hope 
of those who entered there’), but in finally doing so she expresses a very humane sense of 
mourning for this woman and others like her.60 The motif of returning resounds through 
Delbo’s Testimony (‘None of Us Will Return’), but through this memory she returns 
momentarily to a time before the camp when her dog died, and a time before that – before 
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she was born – when a bird memorialised in a museum also died. In this sense, she 
identifies the prisoner with animals not to degrade her, where the animal would be a 
symbol for a lesser, more exterminable, thing, but rather to remember her, where the 
animals are not symbols but memories of real, living things. 
 Another example of a survivor recounting an incident where she was called a dog 
comes from the story of Martha W, when she was rounded up with other Sinti people 
before being deported to Belzec: 
 
Die Polizisten, die zur Bewachung mit uns gekommen waren, die standen wie die 
begossenen Pudel da, als sie die SS sahen und wie sie hörten, wie der SS-
Kommandant, das war so ein kleiner Mann, der stand mit der Peitsche da und 
schrie gleich "Wenn ihr nicht gehorcht!". Ach, was er alles gesagt hat. Er hat 
gesagt, wir wären wie Hunde und so werden wir auch behandelt. Das war so 
schrecklich. 
 
[Translated reads:] 
 
The policemen who were guarding us stood like poodles when they saw the SS 
and heard the SS commandant, a small man standing there with a whip in his 
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hand, shouting: “If you do not obey!” Oh, and what else did he say? He called us 
dogs and we were treated as such. That was so terrible.61 
 
Martha uses two dog similes, but to different effect. Whereas she recalls the SS 
commandant calling her a dog, she compares the policemen to a specific breed of dog – the 
poodle. The insult is general because the commandant uses it to demean prisoners. In 
calling them dogs they became easier to treat as such. However, one does not typically treat 
a dog with such cruelty. Therefore, the dog to which the commandant refers is symbolic as 
that which is less than human. Conversely, Martha describes the policemen as poodles, 
which refers to their relative meekness next to the commandant: poodles are 
stereotypically mild and effeminate. They look very different to the Nazis’ favoured dog, the 
German Shepherd. Therefore, whereas the commandant uses the dog simile as an 
unspecific insult used to degrade prisoners, Martha uses the dog simile to recall a specific 
characteristic of the policemen. 
In Metaphors We Live By, Lakoff and Johnson explain how figurative language not only 
reveals certain aspects of the comparative object, but also conceals other aspects: 
 
The very systematicity that allows us to comprehend one aspect of a concept in 
terms of another [...] will necessarily hide other aspects of the concept. In 
allowing us to focus on one aspect of a concept […], a metaphorical concept can 
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keep us from focusing on other aspects of the concept that are inconsistent with 
that metaphor.62 
 
Having previously shown how metaphors are used to highlight particular qualities, Lakoff 
and Johnson here show how the chosen metaphor can also hide other qualities due to the 
fact that our interpretation is skewed towards the metaphorical object rather than the 
object of comparison. In this sense, the commandant may compare the prisoners to dogs in 
order to fit them with his conception of an animal. It highlights their insubordination but 
conceals their humanity, which encourages him to treat them in accordance with the 
simile’s boundaries. On the other hand, calling the policemen poodles highlights their 
meekness but may conceal many other qualities, such as those which might distinguish one 
policeman from the other. This is not to say that the simile is ineffective. Rather, it helps 
convey the scene as Martha remembers it: it happened many years ago and, as Martha 
herself says elsewhere in her testimony, and as quoted above, ‘I do not remember myself 
properly’.  
 Other survivors also refer to their captors as dogs, both to describe and also to 
deride them. For these different uses, the metaphors highlight and conceal relative 
characteristics. In the following examples, dog metaphors are used to describe the tone of 
orders given by SS: 
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The guard rants and raves like a rabid dog.63 
 
They’re speaking German, everything’s okay. This time the guy won’t get 
punched. The Meister’s barks are already turning into growls.64 
 
Against that handshake there was nothing that could prevail, neither the barking 
of thousands of SS troops nor the whole apparatus of ovens, dogs, and barbed 
wire, nor famine, nor lice.65 
 
In the examples from de Wijze and Antelme’s testimonies, the chosen language refers to the 
manner in which their perpetrators communicate with prisoners. For de Wijze, the simile 
directly compares the guard to a dog – specifically one which is rabid – whereas in both of 
Antelme’s examples the perpetrators are not compared to dogs as such, but their voice is 
referred to as a ‘bark’. This implies that orders given are animalistic, either in tone or 
meaning (owing to language in camps being Babelesque). In both cases, the figurative 
language refers to how the language used was not understandable: de Wijze’s Meister 
spoke not only like a dog – already inferring that he was incoherent – but a dog which is 
rabid: a diseased state which brings about violence and madness. In the first example from 
The Human Race, Antelme describes the Meister’s angry shouts as barks and he is relieved 
when they turn to scowls or – figuratively – growls. Here, the metaphor is embedded within 
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the words ‘bark’ and ‘growl’. The Meister’s anger is different to the shouts of those outside 
of camp and in a civilised community because – as with a mad dog – the anger of 
perpetrators did not have to be controlled due to social conventions. It could be unleashed 
on prisoners without reason or justification. Similarly, Antelme describes the contrast 
between the Reinelander who shook his hand and other members of the Lager who treated 
him with contempt. In that handshake was a level of respect. It acknowledged Antelme as a 
human being, for a moment at least on an equal level with the Lager. Antelme believes that 
the Reinelander approached him with the sole purpose of shaking his hand: ‘That morning 
he had obviously had to come to us to shake hands; he’d arranged to do it as soon as he’d 
got to the factory’.66 Antelme continues: 
 
He hadn’t so much come to encourage us as to share in our power. ... Any 
human relationship a German were to enter into with one of us was the sign 
itself of a deliberate rebellion against the whole of the SS order. One could not 
do what the Rhinelander had done – could not, that is, behave as a man towards 
one of us – without thereby classifying oneself historically. By denying us as men 
the SS had made us historical objects that could no longer in any way be the 
objects of ordinary human relations. These relations could have such 
consequences, so impossible was it just to think of establishing them without 
being aware of the enormous prohibition against which once had to rebel in 
order to do so.67 
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The handshake was not merely a sign of equality, but of superiority, because it symbolised 
rebellion against tyranny. In creating relationships which crossed over from the Lager to the 
prisoners, the hierarchy was overturned and common humanity overrode distinctions based 
on race or other arbitrary categorisation. Therefore, Antelme sees this handshake in direct 
opposition to the ‘barking of thousands of SS troops’ because, by sharing in it, he felt 
empowered. Through this action, he feels more humane than the troops who bark their 
orders like dogs. 
 The above descriptions are more descriptive than derogatory, but in his short 
testimony, Mr. Brukarz refers to perpetrators as dogs numerous times, each highlighting 
their inhumanity: 
 
Such an unhappy experience as this torture happened to me, when after 
gruelling work I fell unconscious. I was brought before the dog Grunewald 
(commandant) and asked why I had refused to work. To this nonsensical 
question I could give no answer, and so he pronounced sentence – 
“Treehanging’.68 
 
[Herr Wachtmeister] asked me why I had come to him. “Because you called me” 
was my answer. “You lie”, he said, and gave me a blow, which knocked me 
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backwards into the pit. “Now out of it” he bellowed. I sprang out in haste. […] 
Yet this performance was put about ten times: like a fool I jumped in and out – 
and this hound grinned.69 
 
We were stone-breaking when he was ordered by a “Death-headman” to run to 
him. What he asked him I could not hear but I heard his bellowing command: 
“March, march”. My friend obeyed the command and the cowardly dog shot a 
bullet into his head. The excuse, - attempting to escape. Comment, - 
superfluous.70 
 
Yet another horrible sight is to be seen. A column passes by – broken men – they 
carry a band on the arm which is written (bloed) “insane”. They carry a heavy 
burden of stone, one follows the other; they can hardly move it. No pity – a 
“Death-Head” moves amongst them and cruelly whips them forward. Can one 
liken these dogs to men? No – and again No.71 
 
Twice Brukarz refers to the perpetrators simply as ‘dogs’, once ‘cowardly dog’ and once 
specifically a ‘hound’. Brukarz’s testimony is short: it is not written as a novel but written, 
presumably, just to bear witness to atrocity. As such, Brukarz is repetitive and his anger 
exhibits itself in the text. ‘Dog’ here is simply an expression of contempt at cruel and 
                                                             
69 Brukarz, ‘My Experience’, p.3. 
70 Brukarz, ‘My Experience’, p.3. 
71 Brukarz, ‘My Experience’, p.4. 
66 
 
cowardly behaviour. Brukarz explicitly uses it to mark the difference between men and 
beasts, who punish for no reason and torture even the insane. The one time when he is 
more specific in his description, when he calls Herr Wachtmeister a ‘hound’, may refer to a 
hound’s hunting ability, or the fact that a notable breed is the blood-hound. Overall, 
however, the comparison of these perpetrators to dogs is on a symbolic plane rather than a 
comparison to the animals as such: it is used simply to display what could be perceived as 
their inhumanity. 
 Dogs are used both to describe prisoners and to describe the SS, and also used from 
one side to the other in the manner of insults. However, Primo Levi also uses a dog simile in 
order to communicate a more abstract thought. When he is recovering in Ka-be he is 
thankful that he does not have to work tirelessly outdoors, but shows how this short period 
of relative relief allows him to recall times outside of the camp, and his physical exhaustion 
while working is replaced by the mental exhaustion of remembering once more what it is to 
be a man: ‘the pain of remembering, the old ferocious suffering of feeling myself a man 
again, which attacks me like a dog the moment my conscience comes out of this gloom’.72 It 
is ironic how the memory of being a man is described as attacking Levi like a dog: so 
entrenched is he in the inhumanity of the SS and the inhumane treatment of the prisoners, 
that memories of times before his imprisonment have been suppressed out of disbelief or 
exhaustion. Given time to relax, they surface and attack him with a sense of nostalgia and 
mourning. The memories do not seem to be offering relief or hope, but conversely anger 
and hopelessness. On such an abstract plane it could be presumed that the dog is symbolic, 
but the image suggests otherwise: the pain of remembering seems comparable to the pain 
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of a dog’s attack, as it is so often that one must turn to figurative sayings in order to 
describe pain – an idea to which I return in Chapter Two. 
 Dogs are used to highlight specific qualities in fellow prisoners, such as their 
mistreatment, and also used to describe the cruelty of SS. They are also paraphrased by 
survivors from the abuse they received at the hands of their perpetrators, when they were 
called dogs in order to feel dehumanised. Sometimes, the metaphor is more specific to a 
breed of dog, such as the poodle to describe meekness, or the hound to represent 
bloodthirstiness and the ability to hunt. Primo Levi also uses a dog simile to represent his 
mental anguish at remembering a time before he was treated like a dog by those who are 
also comparable to dogs (where the former implies degradation and the latter inhumanity). 
Levi’s simile is made further pertinent by the fact that he was at a constant threat of being 
attacked by dogs, as it was common for SS to set their dogs on the prisoners. For example, 
Giuliana Tedeschi describes one such attack on her fellow prisoner: ‘when her arms get 
tired, they bend. The Posten sets the dog on her: “Hoch! Hoch!” Presumably, the sound 
made is the dog attacking the prisoner, but Tedeschi writes it such that the sound is 
ambiguous. It could either be the dog or the Posten shouting orders for the dog to attack. 
This best displays the breakdown of humanity in the camps, and how it is translated into 
testimony through animal metaphors. Yet, the “inhumanity” of guards and the 
depersonalisation experienced by prisoners may well be evoked by using dog metaphors, 
but as is implied through the sheer number these figurative comparisons, these traits are 
common enough to assume that they are not inhuman at all, but on the contrary that they 
are displayed amongst human beings who are pushed – and who push – to their limits. In 
this sense, they display less an inhumanity than a human capacity for what ostensibly may 
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be referred to as ‘animality’, if that term is to imply bestial characteristics either rising to the 
fore in Nazi guards, or being exposed in prisoners. As such, comparisons to dogs reciprocally 
evoke animality and humanity and, therefore, one might argue that the two are not so far 
apart. As with the ambiguity highlighted by Tedeschi, the viciousness displayed by camp 
dogs chiefly serves to mirror the vicious commands of their human owners. 
 
Pigs 
 Pig metaphors are used by Nazis to insult their prisoners. Owing to the stereotype of 
pigs as dirty, the metaphor is often used to highlight the difference in appearance from the 
well-dressed SS and unwashed prisoners. Other stereotypes attached to the pig are laziness 
and greed. Nazis used pigs to describe prisoners who were not working hard enough, 
though in Holocaust testimonies the hypocrisy of such insults is also shown, owing to the 
exhausting labour undergone by prisoners instead of their Nazi overseers. As such, ‘lazy pig’ 
is also used by prisoners to describe Nazis, though never to their faces. Comparing prisoners 
to pigs to highlight their greed is most often used between prisoners, as it would be not only 
hypocritical but absurd for Nazis to call prisoners ‘greedy pigs’ when they are offering such 
insufficient portions of food. The insult is specifically degrading when it is used to describe 
Jewish prisoners, as pork is non-kosher. Therefore, in such cases, ‘pig’ also has connotations 
of impurity. Although these are the most common uses of pig metaphors, this section also 
highlights exceptions where they are used in other, singular occurances. 
 Trude Levi writes of her first days at Hessisch-Lichtenau , an outcamp of Buchenwald, 
where at first conditions were relatively ‘marvellous’. However, these conditions soon 
changed: 
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We were given clean clothes, even underwear, which we did not have until then. 
There was a bathroom with clean bowls and plugs. Unfortunately, some in-
mates could not resist taking the soap and the plugs with them and did not keep 
the bathroom very clean. As a result the camp commandant decided that we 
were pigs and shut off first the warm water and later the bathroom as well most 
of the time.73 
 
Prisoners may have been transferred to this camp from one which had far less concern for 
prisoner hygiene, and stole soap and plugs perhaps to keep in order to trade for food. Such 
behaviour was not allowed in camps, but it kept prisoners alive and continued nonetheless. 
Therefore, although these prisoners were treated comparatively well, they stole what they 
could in case conditions turned. Therefore, although Levi writes that water was turned off 
and they were considered pigs ‘as a result’ of stealing soap and subsequently leaving the 
bathrooms messy, this in turn was probably as a result of being treated as less than human 
by SS elsewhere. Interestingly, this order of blame is brought out in Levi’s earlier notes for 
her testimony, when she went by the name of Gertrud Deak: 
 
During the first four days we could sleep, eat and wash and sing to our hearts’ 
content. Life seemed to be a paradise. On the fifth day the shower-rooms were 
locked and we were told that as we are pigs, we did not keep them clean enough 
and we therefore did not deserve to have showers at all.74 
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Whereas her published material implies that the prisoners were considered pigs because 
they did not keep the bathroom clean, here she supposes that the SS thought they did not 
keep the bathroom clean because they were pigs. The extract from A Cat Called Adolf infers 
that it was their dirty behaviour which incurred punishment, but her notes suggest that it 
was the prejudice of camp commandants against Jews which were, to their minds, proved 
correct by the dirtiness of the shower-rooms. 
 As well as her experience in camp, Levi documents her first experience of being 
compared to a pig in an incident when she was a young child and other children treated her 
with hatred: 
 
They immediately began to call me ‘dirty Jewish pig’ and pelted me with stones. 
By the time my father came out I was bleeding and weeping. I did not 
understand why I had been attacked because I knew I was not dirty, nor was I a 
pig. A pig was an animal. What did the word Jewish mean? When Father 
explained about a people who were often hunted and not always tolerated in 
many lands, I declared I was going to be Jewish from then onward.75 
 
It is such prejudice as this which foregrounds the concentration and death camps, and also 
the conditions within them. These conditions forced prisoners to steal soap and confirmed 
to the minds of SS that the showers were kept unclean because Jews were indeed ‘dirty 
pigs’. Unable to understand how a pig could be used as an insult on an abstract plane, a 
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younger Levi simply knew that she was not an animal and therefore should not be treated 
as one. Moreover, she did not even identify herself as Jewish and yet she was attacked for 
her race and its stereotype. Little changed later on when she was incarcerated on the same 
grounds. 
 This highlights how, although ‘pig’ is often used as an insult to imply dirtiness, the 
prejudice against Jews presupposed their condition: they may have been called ‘pig’ 
because they were dirty, but they were dirty because of the conditions in which they were 
kept, and they were kept in such conditions because of prejudice based on no more than 
racist hatred. Conditions were such that food provided was often, in the words of Eugene 
Heimler, ‘not fit for pigs’, and it is clear that prisoners were treated inhumanely: another 
reason as to why some began to physically appear as less than human.76 
Robert Antelme describes a scene in which a fellow prisoner is called a pig and treated 
as less. Antelme’s use of scare quotes shows how he finds the insult not only inappropriate 
but also ironic as, through their inhumanity, the perpetrators are the ones adopting bestial 
behaviour: 
 
One of the police has seen him. “That pig over there! Get up! Clean it up!” The 
guy who’s crouching doesn’t move, he just moans; [...] his pants have remained 
on the ground, and they drag in the shit. There aren’t any tears in his eyes, but 
his face is crying. The policeman, who has cheeks, and a club, stands over the 
“pig,” who has no cheeks. The “pig” clutches his stomach and crouches again; 
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but the other guy’s hand isn’t there anymore, and he falls back into the shit. [...] 
The guy who has fallen into the shit is dragged out of it by the policeman. 
“Go wash yourself, you pig.” 
The “pig” leans against the wall, his head lying on his shoulder.77 
 
Although the victim is dirty, this is because he does not have the strength to lift himself out 
of the filth. The SS calls him a pig, but whereas pigs are typically fat, here the victim has a 
sunken face and the perpetrator is described as the one ‘who has cheeks’. Through this 
contrasting depiction of the perpetrator, and by his use of scare quotes, Antelme points out 
how little this prisoner resembles a pig. He shows that the insult is based on prejudice, but 
also how – through such prejudice – this man has been reduced to falling into his own 
faeces: an act which pigs may stereotypically enjoy, but which reduces this man if not to 
tears then to a state of shame and sadness - ‘there aren’t any tears in his eyes, but his face 
is crying’. 
 Pigs are stereotypically dirty animals, but other traits one may associate with them 
are greed and laziness because of their large size, both of which are also alluded to in 
survivor testimonies. Pigs are also considered greedy because they are not fussy over what 
to eat, hence why the prisoners’ food is often compared to pigswill.78 In a couple of 
reported incidents, prisoners call one another greedy pigs because of how one has stolen 
food from the other: 
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“Damn it, that pig is eating all our soup!” Ranting and raving, my comrades 
storm at me. I’m being pushed and shoved. Their clenched fists are right in front 
of my eyes. Somebody spits in my face. Full of shame, I stay back.79 
 
It is disgusting that the decent rations provided by the SS should be stolen by 
these swine [the Blockaltester]. 
The other became enraged. ‘O you ape, you big imbecile!...’ 80 
 
And, in a rare instance where the ‘swine’ metaphor is not used in an entirely derogatory 
sense: 
 
Later that evening, Altschul received a nice piece of cake from Lehman, ate most 
of it on the spot, walked over to Lehman again and asked him, with a broad 
smile, “Could I have another piece, please?” Lehman looked at him, and half-
jokingly said, “You swine, don’t you ever have enough…”81 
 
In de Wijze’s case, stealing other prisoners’ food makes him comparable, in their opinion, to 
a pig not only because he has eaten above his share but also because he has acted in 
accordance with his hunger over his sense of morality. De Wijze feels ‘full of shame’ over 
what he has done, showing how he has retained some ethical standards, but there is no 
doubt that his act is considered abhorrent in an environment which makes food 
synonymous with life. Nonetheless, comparing him to a pig seems ironic when such a 
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metaphor is usually used to infer overeating and de Wijze’s act was a direct result of 
starvation. Heimler, on the other hand, writes of a prisoner who believes that it is the 
Blockaltester rather than the SS which leave them with insufficient food. Still unaware of the 
extent to which the SS threaten their destruction, he chooses to believe instead that 
prisoners of higher rank are responsible for their starvation. They are ‘swine’ because – to 
his mind – they are eating not only their own ‘decent rations’ but also others’. A more 
experienced prisoner insults his naiveté, calling him an ‘ape’ – implying a lower level of 
intelligence than a human being. Gross’ account of a prisoner receiving cake from one in 
favour with the SS is more of a friendly jibe than an insult, though it still keeps its roots in 
the stereotype of pigs being greedy, hence Lehman calls Altschul a ‘swine’ for his insatiable 
appetite. 
 With regard to laziness, both victims and perpetrators compare each other to pigs, 
but it seems more common for SS to use metaphor, compared to similes used by victims to 
describe the SS. For example, Louis de Wijze notes three separate occasions when he and 
other prisoners were called ‘lazy pigs’.82 On the other hand, Abel Herzberg writes that der 
Röte Muller is ‘a sort of dressed up piglet, lazy as a pig on a hot day’ and comments that the 
SS en masse are ‘first and foremost lazy, lazy as pigs’.83 Whereas in a simile the comparison 
is made explicitly, a metaphor makes the comparison implicit. Both infer that pigs are lazy 
(as a species, pigs are not lazy; the fact that they are stereotypically so is an example of 
humans anthropomorphising animals), but the difference is that where prisoners explicitly 
compare the SS’s behaviour to that of pigs, the SS imply that there is something of a pig 
implicit in a Jew’s laziness. Moreover, as with the comparison of prisoners to dirty pigs, 
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where the comparison is often undermined by irony or hypocrisy, the metaphor ‘lazy pigs’ 
seems tautological: here, if the pig is a symbol for laziness, then why call someone a ‘lazy 
pig’? This implies that it is not merely the Jews’ laziness which is considered implicitly pig-
like, but the Jewish people themselves. The simile ‘lazy as pigs’ only emphasizes the SS’ 
laziness, but ‘lazy pigs’ infers that the prisoners are both lazy and pig-like. 
 This dual nature of the pig metaphor is what makes it so insulting and therefore 
common in Holocaust testimony. Not only does calling someone a pig or swine imply that 
they are subhuman, but it also implies that they are dirty, smelly, lazy or greedy. 
Furthermore, as pigs are not a kosher animal, using the insult on Jewish prisoners makes it 
even crueller. Although there are many examples where ‘pig’ has been used as an insult 
against prisoners, the following three highlight how it can be used when the insult is not 
specific to particular stereotypes of a pig, such as dirtiness, greediness or laziness as 
outlined above: 
 
“You have committed a great sin. You pigs have desecrated the bodies of your 
own dead brothers. You have exploited their death for your own profit, to 
smuggle food into the camp. Where are your morals, your sacred teachings, you 
children of the Bible?”84 
 
On the instructions of Wiedemann, I had to construct shelves for car tyres in the 
cellar and to do this I had to use wooden planks which were 15cm. longer than 
the height of the room. There was nothing I could do, but to saw off the surplus 
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15cm. […] Suddenly Wiedemann came into the cellar and saw how the ends 
were being sawn off. He became furious and went for me with his fists and feet, 
lifted one of the shelves up and hit me on the head, arms and back. I only heard 
the words: “You Swine can’t you erect the planks as they are?”85 
 
Just as the Kapo in charge and the German guard were getting ready to give 
Bernard a thorough thrashing, the German carpenter in charge of the whole 
operation saw what was coming. He ran over quickly, yelling, “I want that cursed 
Jew for myself! This is my territory and my responsibility and I want to teach this 
swine a lesson he will never forget. Rest assured he will never steal again!” A 
heavy knobbed branch in his hand, he grabbed Bernard and pulled him into a 
nearby shed, locking the door behind him. Quietly he said, “Scream as loud as 
you possibly can.” Then he proceeded to hit everything in sight, ripped Bernard’s 
shirt and pants, told him to cry and crawl out on all fours. It worked like a charm. 
His skin was saved. It could be done! All one needed was to come across a man 
where there were so few men!86 
 
Paul Trepman describes the behaviour of Anton Tuman. This commandant oversaw how the 
prisoners were starved and yet, when they used the bodies of those already killed by the 
Nazis to harbour food, he calls them pigs for desecrating their comrades’ corpses. The 
hypocrisy seems lost on Tuman, who then uses this excuse to torture the supposedly guilty 
prisoners: he starved them for three days and nights, making them stand outside, before 
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chucking them in ice cold water and pushing their heads beneath until they died. Calling the 
prisoners ‘pigs’ implies that they are acting unethically, but also against their nature owing 
to the status of pork as non-kosher. However, his evil methods of control and punishment 
earned him the nickname ‘the Beast of Majdanek’, where ostensibly ‘beast’ separates him 
from mankind owing to his blatant disregard for morality, but also from usual animal 
metaphors owing to his cognizant desire to commit such evil acts. Whereas Tuman’s insult 
seems considered, chosen as being the animal which would cause most offence for Jewish 
prisoners, Wiedemann calls his victim ‘swine’ in a fit of rage.87 In this sense, the insult is 
used simply to insult and degrade. His anger is unprovoked, as Moses Sapir confirms that he 
had been set an impossible task and did the best he could with the materials to hand: he 
could not erect the planks as they were and therefore the insult was not only extreme but 
unwarranted. It was accompanied with violence against Sapir and it seems that in this case – 
as in many others – ‘swine’ is simply the first insult which came to mind. Perhaps for all of 
the above reasons, the German carpenter in Gross’ testimony calls Bernard ‘swine’. It is a 
common enough insult, yet its implications make it particularly forceful and degrading. In an 
effort to emulate the anger of SS so as he can save Bernard, the carpenter uses an insult 
which would mask his humane intentions from the Kapo and guard. 
 So far, this section outlines the main uses of pig metaphors in Holocaust literature. 
Mostly, the pig metaphor is used to insult Jewish prisoners because of the stereotype of pigs 
being dirty, lazy and greedy, or because pig meat is considered impure. However, there are 
some examples which do not fit into these categories. For example, Louis de Wijze recalls a 
time when he smuggled a watch into camp by hiding it in his anus. Later, this could be used 
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as a bargaining tool to earn more food or to be set to less demanding work. The watch 
made him walk unnaturally: ‘With my buttocks squeezed together, I walk by them, in an 
effeminate manner. “Look,” one guard says to the other, “that one walks like a scorched 
pig.”’88 Here, the insult is perhaps more degrading because it is spoken between guards 
rather than directly to de Wijze, which implies that the pig comparison is deeply entrenched 
and not simply used to deride prisoners but also to describe them. However, this may 
simply be a case of de Wijze’s odd gait and have little to do with de Wijze’s Jewishness. 
Another example which stands out from more common comparisons is where Naftali 
Deutsch turns against Hans – a sadistic criminal who had previously whipped him – and 
describes the sound when he attacks his oppressor as being like a squealing pig: 
 
Hans tripped and fell down on his face and that I’d thrown a large pot of boiling 
water or soup over his head, causing him to squeal like a pig. I remember how 
Hans was squealing and I remember grabbing a meat axe and whacking Hans 
with it. I’d “made him one head shorter.” I knew he would not experience the 
miracle of resurrection.89 
 
Here, Deutsch seems to focus on the sound as he remembers Hans’ screams and then the 
act of grabbing and using a meat axe, as if the memories are not only connected by the 
order of events but also by association between the pig and the butchering. The panic 
subsides as Deutsch follows this memory with his black humour. In the short time it took for 
Deutsch to kill Hans, he reduced the criminal to a pig, probably for the simple reason that 
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Hans’ shouts sounded like squeals, but perhaps also because, in his fear, he managed to kill 
a man with such little thought, it was as if it was not a man but an animal. 
Although the insult ‘pigs’ or ‘swine’ is far more common from perpetrators towards 
their victims, here follow two examples where the victims insult their perpetrators with the 
same metaphor: 
 
“They’ve gassed two hundred men in the Sonderkommando, the damned pigs! 
[…]”90 (GT, 140]). 
‘a German plane has opened fire on us. […] “you swine!” I shout, shaking my 
impotent fist’.91 
 
Unlike examples where perpetrators call their victims ‘pigs’, often to degrade or assert 
authority over them, here the insults are given out of earshot of their targets. Tedeschi’s 
example calls them ‘damned pigs’, where ‘damned’ has metaphysical overtones and, unlike 
prisoners called pigs, at immediate danger of being treated as one, here there is no threat 
made on the life of the perpetrators. Similarly, Schnur describes his fist as ‘impotent’ 
because neither his insult nor his gesture could be noted by the pilot. In these cases, ‘pig’ 
seems simply to be an insult implying base morality and inhumane treatment. 
 As pigs are stereotypically dirty, lazy and greedy, and as they are a non-kosher 
animal, they are commonly used in Holocaust testimonies, most often when relaying stories 
of individual insults from perpetrators to their victims, but also between prisoners and 
                                                             
90 Tedeschi, There is a Place on Earth, p. 140. 
91 Harry C. Schnur, ‘Bombs and Barbed Wire’, Pegasus Devocatus (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1992), 
p.197. 
80 
 
sometimes even from victim to perpetrator. Unlike insects metaphors, or even vermin and 
dog metaphors, pig metaphors are not commonly used in a self-reflective sense. This is 
probably because the testimonies are written predominantly by Jewish people who would 
not simply compare themselves to an animal they reject from their culture. As this is the 
case, pigs are perhaps the best example of using the animal as such to highlight different, 
physical qualities of those being compared, rather than using the animal as a concept for 
more abstract feelings, such as loneliness. Perhaps this is also because pigs are not small 
creatures like insects or vermin – which are often used to convey feelings of helplessness – 
and nor are they household pets such as dogs, which are often used in an abstract sense 
because of the close relationships humans forge with these animals in particular. Instead, 
pigs are repeatedly used as a common insult, and this sometimes means that it is hard to 
decipher whether or not it is used thoughtlessly or with specific intent. 
 
Group metaphors: Flocks and Herds 
 
 Although animal metaphors are usually specific to one species, the most common of 
which are explored above, survivors also use group metaphors to describe prisoners en 
masse. Of these, testimonies usually refer to flocks or herds of prisoners, as if referring to 
sheep or cattle. Although sometimes sheep and cattle are specified, there are also many 
instances where they are not, and these suggest that prisoners feel they have lost any sense 
of individuality within a group. Unlike specific animal metaphors, describing a group as a 
herd or a flock does not suggest many particular character or physical traits, such as 
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dirtiness for pigs, but rather highlights a group sense of domesticity, and comments on 
behaviour and treatment of prisoners en masse rather than selecting individual cases. 
 
‘A flock of huddling beasts’ 
 
 Giuliana Tedeschi recalls a time when she and other prisoners were forced to watch 
two girls hanged for playing a part in the destruction of a crematorium and gas chamber: ‘A 
woman soldier, those unnatural beings that Nazi Germany had bred, herded us forward with 
threats and shouts like a flock of refractory sheep’ (GT, 170). Primo Levi too writes about the 
hanging of a man who took part in such sabotage.92 Levi describes himself and other 
prisoners as an ‘abject flock’, assenting to this man’s execution through doing nothing to 
protest it.93 The man calls out before he is hanged: ‘Kamaraden, ich bin der Letz!’ 
(Comrades, I am the last one!)’ and indeed, walking past the man’s body, Levi feels strongly 
that ‘there are no longer any strong men among us, the last one is now hanging above our 
heads’. He damns his perpetrators for causing this docility within the flock: 
 
To destroy a man is difficult, almost as difficult as to create one: it has not been 
easy, nor quick, but you Germans have succeeded. Here we are, docile under 
your gaze; from our side you have nothing more to fear; no acts of violence, no 
words of defiance, not even a look of judgement.94 
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Both Tedeschi and Levi refer to themselves as part of a flock, which implies that they have 
lost their individuality. However, whereas Tedeschi describes herself as being part of ‘a flock 
of refractory sheep’, Levi chooses to describe his group as an ‘abject flock’. The difference 
here implies that Tedeschi and the female prisoners objected to being herded forward, but 
Levi feels so depersonalised that he acts in accordance with his orders and does not protest 
or pass noticeable judgement on the atrocity. This is supported further by the lexical context 
of the quotation: ‘I like to think that from the midst of us, an abject flock, a voice rose, a 
murmur, a sign of assent. But nothing happened’. Levi’s choice of ‘assent’ rather than 
‘dissent’ is interesting, as he would not like to think that a prisoner would approve of the 
hanging. Rather, it could mean that he would like to think of someone assenting to feelings 
of humanity. Instead, they are ‘abject’ which can mean something outside of the body. 
Similarly, Levi gives in to the fact that he and prisoners are docile under the ‘gaze’ of the 
Germans, not able even to pass ‘a look of judgement’. To Levi, the prisoners are like 
animals, forever under the gaze of humans. Although Tedeschi’s reaction seems less orderly, 
the refractory prisoners are still compared to sheep, which implies that despite their 
unwillingness to step into line, they still did not offer any signs of moral outrage. 
 Levi next uses a sheep metaphor for when sick prisoners decide whether to stay in 
Auschwitz or leave with the others on a march. Convinced that he would be killed were he 
to stay, Levi wants to follow his instincts of fear, only feels too sick to do so: ‘I would 
probably also have followed the instinct of the flock if I had not felt so weak; fear is 
supremely contagious, and its immediate reaction is to make one try to run away’.95 Here, 
Levi shows how the flock metaphor chiefly alludes to feelings of fear. A flock of sheep stay 
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together in order to find protection in numbers, but it is this same sense of fear which 
allows them to acquiesce to orders from their masters. Just so, prisoners stay together so as 
not to appear solitary, which could lead to being singled out for punishment. In this sense, 
prisoners were not simply drawn together into one unified mass by their perpetrators, but 
also chose to do so in order to avoid further persecution. Losing one’s individuality and 
often one’s humanity in the camps was a defence tactic caused by feelings of fear, and yet 
this is what many argue to be a chief reason for their being led to their mass deaths. 
 In his diary from 1942, Emanuel Ringelblum questioned how it was that the Jews 
‘went like lambs to the slaughter’ without rebelling against their fate. Ringelblum concludes 
that their exhaustion had ‘defeat[ed] the will to struggle’.96 This serves as a reminder that it 
is not only writers of fiction, literary criticism or even testimony which have this resource, 
but also historians. The quotation implies that resistance against evil is human rather than 
animal-like and further suggests that, in losing the energy to resist, Holocaust victims were 
comparable to animals. However, this is contradicted by the quotation from Levi, as he 
insists that it was his exhaustion which actually stopped him from following the flock. Far 
from losing the energy to resist, it was losing the energy to comply which led to Levi staying 
where he was - with the other sick prisoners: an act which ultimately saved him from the 
death march which killed so many others. 
 Other victims refer more directly to this idea of being led to slaughter. Gerda Klein’s 
answer lies not in the animality of prisoners, but rather the inhumanity of the Nazis: ‘Why 
did we walk like meek sheep to the slaughter-house? Why did we not fight back? [...] 
Because we had faith in humanity. Because we did not really think that human beings were 
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capable of committing such crimes’.97 Although Klein refers to herself and fellow prisoners 
as ‘meek sheep’, her ‘faith in humanity’ undermines the animal metaphor because it implies 
an ethical conscience which had not escaped prisoners despite their dreadful treatment; it 
implies equality at least on a species level between victims and perpetrators. Trude Levi 
resists the metaphor even further due to her quiet resistance with other prisoners in her 
factory when they worked together to make sure that they produced faulty weapons for the 
Germans: ‘Because of these activities, I resent the allegations that we Jews went like lambs 
to the slaughter’.98 Clearly, it was not always in stereotypically heroic ways that victims 
resisted their fate. As shown by Primo Levi’s account of fear causing prisoners to flock 
together, if there are few accounts of prisoners breaking from their orders it is because 
doing so would have stood them apart from other prisoners and subsequently led them to 
an almost certain death. Rather, many prisoners worked together in small ways, risking their 
lives nonetheless, to resist. Once more, not giving in to feelings of fear, Trude Levi asserts 
her individuality and can claim that she did not lose any elements of what she might 
consider her humanity. Such individual acts stand her outside of ‘the flock’. 
 For some victims, the fact that they did not resist was because they could not resist. 
In this sense, being herded into a single flock was inevitable owing to the regime of terror 
inflicted by the Nazis. In her testimony, Eugene Himmler recognises one of her sister’s 
friends being sexually abused by a Kapo. Once a happy young girl, Marta now appears 
diseased, desperate, ‘something half-way between a human being and a beast’.99 Himmler 
recalls Marta’s tragedy, when she was taken with her father and mother for investigation by 
Nazis, who tortured them for details of hidden property, which resulted in her mother’s 
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death and her own great physical suffering. A converted Christian, her father leans over 
their bodies and overhears a Rabbi speaking: ‘with batons and bayonets, with their twisted 
cross and their crooked laws they will herd us together into a single flock’.100 Although less 
pertinent in Jewish theology than in Christianity, the flock as a religious symbol is here 
inverted, much like the swastika as a twisted cross. The Rabbi insists that it is not their own 
inhumanity which causes them to be herded together like sheep, but rather their humanity: 
that such humanity evident in a religious people will inevitably be upturned through the 
violence and crooked laws of their perpetrators. There is undoubtedly truth in the Rabbi’s 
prediction, for if Jewish people were inferior as one might consider animals to be, then 
there would be no cause for the Nazis to subject them to such degrading and dehumanising 
treatment. 
 It is clear that the flock metaphor is used in many different, albeit similar, ways 
throughout Holocaust testimonies. It refers to feelings of retrospective shame, such as when 
Primo Levi and Giuliana Tedeschi look back to how they offered little or no moral resistance 
to the cruelty of the Nazi party. They considered themselves sheepish: a flock of people 
manipulated by fear into a group of compliant prisoners. Another instance where Tedeschi 
uses a sheep metaphor is early on in her testimony, when she describes prisoners’ feelings 
of disgust at their situation, felt most strongly when they are in the semiconscious state of 
being between sleeping and waking: ‘Nausea at the sight of all that awkward, suffering 
humanity, ragged and dirty, reduced to a flock of huddling beasts’.101 Owing to her 
description of the flock as ‘ragged and dirty, reduced [to] huddling’, it would seem that here 
too the flock is associated with shame. It is also, seemingly paradoxically, used to indicate 
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humanity, such as when Klein insists that her and others’ willingness to follow instructions 
was based on a preconceived understanding of ethics shared between one human and 
another, or when the Rabbi from Himmler’s testimony foresees the coming together of his 
people into a single flock owing to the chaos of the Nazi regime, which overturned all moral 
bases. However, it is also used, albeit rarely, in figures of speech, and in such cases it is 
probable that these are not unique to testimonies of atrocity but are simply colloquialisms. 
An example of this can be found early on in Trude Levi’s testimony: Describing a time when 
she compulsively laughed at her Grandmother falling over, Trude Levi understands that she 
‘was thought by the family to be a heartless girl and something of a black sheep’ (T.L., p. 35). 
Here, ‘black sheep’ is used in a proverbial sense, where the black sheep is one who stands 
out from her group. Its focus is more on colour than on species and in the context of an 
atrocity fuelled by race logic this could be read as somewhat pertinent, although this is 
unlikely. Nonetheless, it is an example where animal metaphors are used in a comparatively 
less significant sense: an example where they appear in everyday language rather than 
specifically a language pertaining to atrocity. 
 
‘The murky common herd’ 
 
Primo Levi indicates that prisoners’ feelings of fear caused them to ‘flock’ together, and in 
the same account he describes the eyes of two prisoners who would rather risk death on a 
march from Auschwitz than stay behind with the sick few: ‘their eyes were like those of 
terrified cattle’.102 Over time, ‘cattle’ has been used to mean many different things: livestock 
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from sheep to pigs, of or belonging to a stable, or even as a contemptuous name for one’s 
enemy or slave. Although this latter definition would be interesting to analyse, Levi most 
likely uses it to mean domesticated, bovine animals - as this is the most common use of the 
word recently. As such, the simile perhaps compares the two prisoners to two cows apart 
from their herd. This would be appropriate considering the pair’s desperation to join the 
others on the march. Moreover, in accordance with Hannah Arendt’s quotation that it is 
easier to kill smaller animals than larger ones due to the size of their eyes, Levi may choose 
to compare these prisoners to cattle as it is their eyes on which the simile focuses, so 
choosing a group of animals with large eyes conveys their wide-eyed terror. 
 Despite this example and the fact that prisoners often refer to the cattle cars in 
which they were transported, the cattle metaphor is uncommon in testimonies. However, 
when it is used, it is usually to convey feelings of subordination as prisoners are rounded up 
like a herd by their perpetrators. In this sense, the cattle metaphor is used to connote 
domesticity in large numbers: 
 
The SS is herding us like cattle.103 
 
‘a train from Vught pulled in, discharging nothing but women and children. […] 
Tuesday morning the whole shipment was sent to Poland. Here, they were 
dragging themselves in, goaded through the hall like cattle’.104 
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We sat pressed as close as possible to one another, a frozen, scarcely breathing 
mass of refugees whom fate had brought together and was now herding into the 
unknown like so many head of cattle.105 
 
I heard the wild shouts and curses of the Nazi beasts. […] The first attack on the 
ghetto lasted no longer than five minutes; yet it seemed very much longer as the 
Jews scurried about like driven cattle, the Nazi killers in their smart uniforms 
pursuing them like packs of hungry wolves.106 
 
In two of the above examples, the prisoners are ‘herded’, in one they are ‘driven’ and in the 
other they are ‘goaded’, but aside from subtle differences these amount – in these cases – 
to the same thing: they are being controlled. Moreover, due to the domestication of cattle, 
the simile conveys feelings of helplessness. Twice here Trepman uses cattle to describe 
prisoners: they are ‘herded’ by fate ‘like so many head of cattle’, where head refers to the 
traditional farming phrase used to indicate numbers; and they scurry in their group like 
‘driven cattle’ pursued by ‘hungry wolves’, exemplifying a predator-prey relationship. As 
cattle have no understanding of fate, this first comparison highlights the refugees’ feelings 
of confusion and displacement as they are herded by an unknown force further into an 
unknown future. Later in his testimony, the animal metaphor is extended to embrace the 
Nazis who are like a pack of wolves hunting cattle. The idea of cattle scurrying implies that 
here the refugees are more panicked than before, as shapeless fate has been replaced by 
wild animals: a threat to any farm and its livestock. 
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 However, these are rare instances where prisoners’ appearance is compared to 
cattle. More often, and inclusive of two examples above, prisoners refer to themselves as a 
herd, or as being herded by the Nazis: 
 
The miles go by, not a soul in sight apart from our sad herd.107 
 
And yet I have seen people who […] acted differently towards their fellow 
beings. […] When I think of them, I see them as people rising high above the 
murky common herd.108 
 
‘Again, we are herded together. Now it’s our turn to be loaded on the trucks’.109 
‘They herded us onto the ramp at the station’.110 
‘Once a week, usually on Wednesdays, they herd us to the bath house’.111 
‘At five o’clock we were herded to roll-call’.112 
‘The sentries push us forward, herd us together’.113 
‘herded into railway cattle-trucks’.114 
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‘herded out into the dark’.115 
‘on the third day we were all, herded together and were told that we were going 
to be taken to another camp’.116 
 
Even without using ‘cattle’, the word ‘herd’ is associated with animals. However, it is not 
bound so tightly to the idea of one type of animal, and this is highlighted when Tedeschi 
personifies the herd by her use of the word ‘sad’. Moreover, Herzberg describes prisoners 
en masse as a ‘murky common herd’, but insists that some prisoners rise from that 
categorisation. This implies that ‘herd’ is used to connote a lack of moral understanding and 
individuality: something which some prisoners managed to avoid - despite conditions which 
drove many to depersonalisation. These few assert themselves as retaining a sense of their 
humanity through acts of kindness and selflessness. Furthermore, ‘herd’ connotes a mass 
identified by its group rather than by individuals within it. When the word shifts from herd 
to ‘herded’, it implies subordination – that someone is taking charge – unlike ‘crowding’ 
which suggests individuals choosing to group together. In this sense, ‘herding’ is most 
appropriate, as victims were under threats to carry out orders. ‘Herding’ therefore implies a 
relationship between the group and its master: the relationship between prisoners and their 
captors is made clear within the word, and it is compared – indirectly or otherwise – to the 
relationship between a farmer and his livestock. 
 ‘Herding’ also implies that the prisoners are being moved, and this is true for many 
uses of the word. In particular, it attaches a commercial value to the prisoners: as livestock 
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are to farmers, here prisoners are to their perpetrators. Therefore, when they are being 
transported, it is as though they are animals on the way to be slaughtered: 
 
‘Patients of all degrees were herded together and pushed, packed and crammed 
into cattle wagons. Uncontrollable cases were doped with an injection and then 
pressed into the jumble inside the cattle wagon’.117 
 
‘It was here that the transport wagons stopped, that their human cargo herded 
together from all over Europe was unloaded’.118 
They drove people out of the cars with whips and rifle butts. The cars had doors 
a meter above the ground, and all those being herded out, young and old, had to 
jump. They broke arms and legs during this, having to jump to the ground’.119 
 
These examples, as well as the quotation from Kruskal’s testimony, above, use words such 
as ‘uncontrollable cases’, ‘shipment’ and ‘cargo’ to describe the prisoners indirectly, 
referring to them in commercial terms rather than humane ones. ‘Human cargo’ is almost 
an oxymoron because ‘human’ is used as an adjective and ‘cargo’ is the noun: one implies 
life and the other lifelessness. It is as though they appear human but are, essentially, 
incognizant. Moreover, the description of young and old prisoners jumping out of the cattle 
cars and breaking bones is remarkably similar to the realities of livestock being pushed out 
of cattle cars and trampled over on their way to slaughterhouses. 
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 Although describing prisoners in commercial terms is inhumane, in many ways it 
overestimates the value of the victims to their perpetrators. Whereas cargo is shipped as 
part of a commercial exchange, resulting in material profit, prisoners were shipped to death 
camps for no reason other than their destruction. Robert Antelme describes what he 
imagines the SS to be thinking when he sees the straw prisoners must sleep on. Antelme 
imagines that it is thought of as too good for them, because it is meant for livestock: 
 
The SS man surveys the damage – contemplates the straw. It was plentiful, 
honest, meant for German cows on the neighbouring German farm, cows that 
give milk for German children – a correct German circuit. We have brought a 
pestilence into this straw; during the orgy we have laughed.120 
 
The idea of Jews enjoying the comparable luxury of the straw distresses the SS man, as he 
‘surveys the damage’ of prisoners using for comfort what should be put to more practical 
use. Jews contravene the idea of a ‘correct German circuit’ where livestock are an essential 
part of its upkeep. In this sense, Antelme does not feel further degraded by having to live in 
the same conditions as a cow, but rather he describes it as a relative privilege. In a similar 
vein, Werner Weinberg offers a unique account of his journey in a cattle car: 
 
At the ramp itself, a surprise was to underline our privileged status when we 
heard the order: “Fifty prisoners to a box car!” Normally, on transport, that 
number was eighty to a hundred. This difference meant that we would be able 
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to sit on the floor and – taking turns – even stretch out. ‘(The use of the term 
“cattle cars” in much of the Holocaust literature unnecessarily conveys the idea 
of additional degradation. A prisoner with any transport experience preferred 
box cars to passenger cars because wooden benches and baggage nets, far from 
being a convenience, became instruments of torture in the shoving and turmoil 
and uninhibited scramble for self-preservation)’.121 
 
Like the straw in Antelme’s testimony – insufficient and degrading in normal circumstances 
but preferable to sleeping arrangements in the camps – Weinberg notes that, with the 
cramped and degrading conditions being what they were, travelling in a cattle car was 
preferable to being herded into a passenger car. In these instances, the question is not 
whether the circumstances are degrading (as that is irrefutable), but whether they are 
practical or even relatively respectable. Therefore, in these instances, being treated as an 
animal is better than being treated as a prisoner. 
 Indeed, in a personal report on his flight from Holland to England at the close of the 
Second World War, Harry Schnur testifies to his appalling treatment at the hands of an 
English Colonol, who associated Nazis and German Jews as the same, common enemy. This 
example shows how, although Holocaust testimonies are saturated in animal metaphors, 
these metaphors are also used to convey feelings of degradation and subjugation more 
generally. Here, Schnur considers his situation and concludes that he is being treated with 
even less respect than cattle: 
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The hold is dimly lit by a feeble bulb. We are lying on the bare iron floor, vainly 
trying to make our couch a little softer with the aid of some old sacks and scraps 
of canvas. I do not mind it much for myself, my heart is bleeding for the Old and 
Infirm, the women and children, locked up here like cattle. Like cattle? Cattle are 
better off than Jewish refugees: cattle represents a certain economic value and 
is protected by humane laws for the prevention of cruelty to animals.122 
 
Having survived the Holocaust, Schnur finds himself in a similarly horrific situation as a 
German prisoner. Along with other prisoners, Jews and Gentiles, he is placed in a ‘hold’: the 
part of a ship usually reserved for cargo. This, along with the bare iron floor and generally 
inhumane conditions, prompts Schnur to compare his captivity to that of cattle. However, 
for similar reasons as discussed above, he corrects himself, understanding that cattle have a 
commercial value and are therefore treated with more respect than the prisoners. Perhaps 
he made the initial comparison in a symbolic sense, where cattle symbolises something 
subhuman or incognizant, but when he checks his comparison he finds that it is inadequate. 
Cattle may indeed be symbols of domestication, inhumanity or incognizance, but in real life 
they are treated with more dignity than him. He realises that cattle are protected by 
humane laws which force people to treat them according to at least some of their own 
ethical standards. 
 As with flock metaphors, ‘herd’ implies a group of similar, domesticated animals, and 
its use in Holocaust testimonies often implies a lack of individuality and a group sense of 
subjugation. ‘Herded’, on the other hand, is used most often to describe prisoners following 
                                                             
122 Harry C. Schnur, ‘Bombs and Barbed Wire’, p. 201. 
95 
 
the orders of their perpetrators, as they move together to avoid being singled out for 
punishment. In this sense, the relationship between ‘herd’ and ‘herded’ is similar to ‘flock’ 
and ‘flocked’, though where flock specifically infers sheep, herd is more ambiguous: a group 
noun or a verb which connotes domesticated animals forced together. In a similar vein, 
‘cattle’ is more ambiguous than ‘sheep’, though usually it refers to bovine animals. 
Nonetheless, it also more heavily connotes domestication and is therefore more 
appropriate when describing unspecific feelings of subjugation and inhumanity. 
 
Conclusion 
 When Holocaust survivors use animal metaphors in their testimonies it can be for 
many reasons, among which some of the most common are: to describe their emotional 
state, to describe their conditions, in paraphrasing their perpetrators who have compared 
them to an animal, to compare their perpetrators to an animal, or simply in a common 
phrase such as when Tedeschi refers to herself as the ‘black sheep’ of her family. As well as 
the shifting contexts, the species of animal used changes the meaning of the metaphor: as 
shown, many of the traits connoted by insects are quite different from those of pigs. 
However, although the associations attached to different species dictate the metaphors’ 
implications, there are some aspects of animal metaphors which are similar to one another. 
For example, metaphors imply a base connection between the two compared, whereas 
similes only tend to highlight specific traits. Therefore, when prisoners are called dogs, traits 
of dogs may be inferred but the insult is essentially that they are subhuman. This is similar 
for any animal, though it is true that some animals are selected over others due to their 
perceived inferiority (such as smaller animals like mice) or their cultural implications (such 
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as pigs for Jewish prisoners). On the other hand, similes are usually less degrading because 
they are based on aspects of the person being similar to that which one may perceive in an 
animal: if someone is dirty as vermin, then that limits the insult to one aspect – dirtiness – 
but does not necessarily infer a base connection between the animal and the human. 
Moreover, often these similes are as a result of anthropomorphising, such as the idea of 
pigs being greedy, so saying that someone is greedy as a pig may be little more than a stock-
phrase insult. 
 Forced into cattle cars and transported to their deaths, there are some instances 
where prisoners find genuine reasons to compare themselves to animals on a literal plane 
(what I have elsewhere referred to as ‘animals as such’). Often, these comparisons are then 
denied, as survivors make the connection between their treatment and the treatment of 
animals only to undermine them, such as when de Wijze compares Buna to an ant-hill but 
understands that his working conditions are harsher because he is working against his 
nature, or when Weinberg compares his treatment to that of cattle being transported in a 
ship’s hold but claims that, as cattle have a commercial value, they are shown more 
humanity. Nonetheless, these are the sort of comparisons which are alluded to in texts 
comparing the Holocaust to animal cruelty: a topic which I shall draw upon further in 
Chapter Four. For the moment, however, it is important to keep in mind the fact that these 
comparisons are usually undermined in an ethical – if not a practical – sense. More often, 
prisoners compare themselves or others to animals on a conceptual plane, where animals 
are used as symbols for such ideas as pestilence or filth. In these cases, survivors may 
employ animal stereotypes to convey inhumane treatment or conditions, or they push 
further and allude to animals because it is impossible to convey the extent of their 
experiences using human language. This is applicable when Delbo writes: ‘It is this day on 
97 
 
the marsh where insects in human form die’. Although this chapter’s focus is analysis of 
metaphors, the questions raised concerning the incommunicability of suffering, and the 
difficult realities of putting oneself in place of the other (either Holocaust survivors or 
animals, in this case), are central to the theoretical implications of this thesis and indeed 
guide much of the theory in the following chapters. 
 However, the main implication of this chapter has not been, as one might 
suppose, that humans were treated like animals and, as such, lost their humanity; nor is it 
that perpetrators acted in an animalistic manner towards their victims and therefore 
became less human. Rather, the scale of seemingly animalistic characteristics evoked in 
humans during the Holocaust attests to the fact that these characteristics are, in fact, 
implicit in humans. This is highlighted above in many examples, some of which include: 
Herzberg’s analogy, where perpetrators and victims are compared to other predator-prey 
relationships in the animal kingdom; Himmler’s speech at Posen, where killing Jewish people 
is simultaneously compared to killing vermin and considered a morally difficult task; and 
both Delbo’s reciprocal comparison between a dying woman and other dead creatures, and 
Tedeschi’s ambiguity as she describes the attack issued by a Nazi and carried out by a dog. 
In all cases, the boundaries between humans and other animals are unclear. Of course, 
there are differences between humans and other animals (as there are differences between 
those other animals, as highlighted through different sections, above), and this is best 
shown in examples where prisoners have to be dehumanised in order to fit with 
preconceived Nazi ideas of animality (as discussed, there would be no cause for 
dehumanising processes were the victims already inhuman). However, once these victims 
are stripped of individuality, and after perpetrators act in a manner considered inhumane, it 
is important not to lose sight of the fact that these people have not changed from human to 
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animal, but rather that they are testament to what remains when humanity is pushed to its 
limits. To call prisoners animals is to adhere to Nazi ideology, and to consider perpetrators 
animals is to at least partly excuse them of their actions. Instead, comparing both victims 
and perpetrators to animals at once highlights different aspects of their humanity which 
might be reflected in other animals, and suggests that there are elements of our humanity 
which we share with other creatures, such as instinctive behaviour and vulnerable bodies. 
As Herzberg writes when comparing a Nazi to other predators, this perpetrator is not a 
panther nor a spider, but he does indeed share their predatory characteristics: he is in fact a 
‘man in the crevices and depths of his own nature’. It is with this concept of shared 
creatureliness, as outlined in the Introduction, and through similarly literary comparisons 
between humans and other animals, that this thesis continues. 
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Chapter Two 
‘A stage full of stories’: Using Beatrice and Virgil to Compare Two Models of Creatureliness 
 
Introduction 
In On Creaturely Life, Eric Santner offers a different model and application of 
creatureliness from Anat Pick in Creaturely Poetics. Both models offer insight into what it 
could mean to be creaturely or to represent creatureliness in literature, but whereas Pick 
takes her cue from Cora Diamond and focuses more on creatureliness as a shared, bodily 
vulnerability between humans and other animals, Santner’s definition focuses more on the 
human subject, and – in most cases – only includes animals in relation to humans, or 
animals which act against their natural instincts. Even when similarities arise between On 
Creaturely Life and Creaturely Poetics, such as when both highlight the importance of an 
ethicopolitical response to creaturely life, the authors disagree once more on the way that 
this response can be presented in literature. Indeed, Santner uses W. G. Sebald’s oeuvre as 
‘an archive of creaturely life’ but understands that this archive is at once put forward and 
foreclosed by literature:123 
Sebald’s project is above all a literary one, not a political or even an ethical one 
in any straightforward sense. Whatever he achieves unfolds within the 
framework of an aesthetic experience that, though it may have political, ethical, 
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and even religious meanings and consequences, is an “intervention” in the world 
in only a very limited and particular sense.124 
This contrasts to Pick’s understanding of a creaturely poetics as those works of literature or 
film which are aware of their foreclosing interiority and, as such, give an ethicopolitical 
response not only to our treatment of fellow creatures, but also to the function of the arts 
(predominantly literature and film) in disseminating a creaturely agenda beyond deflective 
philosophising. For example, and as I shall explore at further length in Chapter Three, Pick 
draws upon J. M. Coetzee’s ‘The Lives of Animals’ as a novella which does not simply 
promote ‘arguments for or against animal rights, but the possibility that philosophical 
arguments as such are a form of evasion – what Diamond […] calls deflection’.125 This 
difference between the guiding principles of On Creaturely Life and Creaturely Poetics is best 
represented through their titles: whereas Santner’s text offers an intricate portrait on the 
subject of creatureliness, especially through Rilke, Benjamin and Sebald, Pick’s text focuses 
on ways of writing or filming which may themselves impart a creaturely agenda. 
 In this chapter, I shall use both models of creatureliness to analyse Beatrice and 
Virgil by Yann Martel.126 Martel’s novel is a metatextual maze and, as such, I shall outline its 
plot for the purpose of clarification later on: The novel’s protagonist, Henry l’Hôte, is an 
author who tries and fails to get his flip-book about the Holocaust published. Shortly 
afterwards, a taxidermist asks for Henry’s help writing a play called ‘A 20th Century Shirt’. 
This play, which the taxidermist claims is about habitat destruction, features a donkey called 
Beatrice and a howler monkey called Virgil: two animals which are also mounted within the 
                                                             
124 Santner, On Creaturely Life, pp.134-135. 
125 Pick, Creaturely Poetics, p.9. 
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taxidermy. The play is highly symbolic (to the extent that it would be impossible to stage) 
and features scenes in which the two animals discuss how they might begin to explain the 
atrocities that happened to them: atrocities which they call ‘The Horrors’. Henry is intrigued 
and agrees to help the taxidermist with some of the more abstract sequences, such as when 
Beatrice tries to describe Virgil’s howl. Consequently, fragments of the play are interspersed 
throughout Martel’s novel. Henry immediately sees parallels between the subject of ‘A 20th 
Century Shirt’ and the Holocaust, but the taxidermist refuses to admit any hidden meaning. 
After a period of absence from the taxidermy in which Henry’s pets are put down and his 
wife gives birth, Henry returns. The play reaches a violent end and Henry is suspicious that 
the taxidermist concentrates on victimisation with no hint of repentance from the 
perpetrators or retribution for the two murdered animals. Subsequently, Henry believes 
that the taxidermist is a Nazi collaborator whose play masks his own atrocities during the 
Holocaust, and decides to leave the taxidermy for good. The taxidermist stabs Henry and 
burns down the taxidermy with the animals inside. Henry wakes up in hospital to find his 
creative block lifted, and writes his version of events, which we might take to be the same in 
content as Beatrice and Virgil. The novel ends with thirteen ‘games’ which Henry also writes 
in hospital, which take the form of twelve hypothetical situations pertaining to what 
personal choices victims might have had to take during the Holocaust. The final ‘game’ is left 
blank. 
 Martel both uses the Holocaust to approach animal suffering, and uses 
animal suffering to approach the Holocaust. He employs these seemingly reciprocal 
metaphors and, as such, uses his fiction as a medium through which to discuss suffering on a 
large – indeed, an inter-species – plane. Despite the fact that the taxidermist insists his play 
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is about animal extinction, he also writes that his ‘story has no story. It rests on the fact of 
murder’ which, in its non-specificity, suggests that reciprocal metaphors are employed to 
allow comparisons to be drawn between the suffering of humans and animals alike (BV, 
170). As Martel embeds this fragmented play within his novel, he demonstrates the limits of 
fiction – and storytelling in general – in communicating the unspeakable. 
 Furthermore, Martel approaches this unspeakability through allegory, which is ironic 
considering how allegory is conventionally used to clarify rather than mystify. His method is 
further unconventional because of its reciprocity, as is evident from some of the following 
approaches to defining allegory: 
‘The word allegory from allo “other” and agoria “speaking”’.127 
‘The standard definition of “allegory” is to say one thing and mean another. 
Allegory has always demanded that we think otherwise’.128 
‘Allegory is a method of double meanings that organizes utterance (in any 
medium) according to its expression of analogical parallels between different 
networks of iconic likeness’.129 
 ‘On the whole, when we speak of allegory we refer to an enlightening or witty 
analogy between two things, both of some complexity, but one of less 
importance than the other’.130  
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In all cases, above, allegory is defined as that which approaches the other: in its basest 
linguistic translation, ‘other speaking’ implies that, while talking about one subject, another 
is inferred. It is often the case that this ‘other speaking’ uses an Other, such as animals, to 
approach a more urgent subject. This supports da Rimini’s definition of allegory, which 
highlights that, in allegorical stories, one half of the allegory is usually less important than 
the other: often the case will be that the inferred other will be the most important (Animal 
Farm is a good example of such an allegory). However Machosky and Fletcher’s definitions 
are more flexible: they do not imply that allegory is necessarily one-sided. Fletcher in 
particular focuses on ‘parallels’ between the two sides of an allegorical story, the one 
highlighting ‘iconic likeness’ in the other. In this sense, as with metonymy, the chosen 
allegory is not only important as a point of reference (in Animal Farm we understand that 
Napoleon is an allegorical representation of Stalin), but also as a method of displaying 
particular traits and ‘likenesses’ (the stereotype that pigs are greedy may translate to 
Stalin’s rise to power). However, in Animal Farm the political subject matter is clear, and the 
animals seem to take on the role of characters in a fable. To better support Fletcher’s 
reciprocal definition of ‘allegory’, Martel not only draws parallels between animal cruelty 
and the Holocaust in order to approach the Holocaust, he also uses the Holocaust to 
approach animal cruelty. However, Martel breaks down this allegory as he draws these 
subjects together not in order to know more about one or the other, but rather to uncover 
their shared trait of unknowability. 
 This allegorical method makes Beatrice and Virgil an optimal text through which to 
explore Santner and Pick’s models of creatureliness. Indeed, owing to the reciprocal nature 
of Martel’s metaphor, the opening sentence in Creaturely Poetics is likewise applicable to 
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his novel: ‘this is a book neither strictly about humans nor about animals’.131 A play which 
features talking animals, and a taxidermy which displays animal bodies re-formed by 
humans offer two arenas in which human-animal distinctions and power-relations can be 
contested; and the fact that these arenas are situated in a postmodern novel which plays 
with the boundaries of form (as well as subject) implies that Martel invokes literature as 
crucial to the exploration of more material matters. In other words, Beatrice and Virgil may 
contribute to a creaturely poetics as outlined by Pick. 
However, Martel’s novel might also encapsulate Santner’s definition of creatureliness 
which, although not directly opposed to Pick’s, concentrates less on the constant materiality 
of the creature and more on the material aspects of a human creature which might be 
pulled into spectrality during what Santner terms ‘historical fissures’: 
The opacity and recalcitrance that we associate with the materiality of nature – 
the mute “thingness” of nature – is, paradoxically, most palpable where we 
encounter it as a piece of human history that has become an enigmatic ruin 
beyond our capacity to endow it with meaning, to integrate it into our symbolic 
universe. Where a piece of the human world presents itself as a surplus that 
both demands and resists symbolization, that is both inside and outside the 
“symbolic order” – for Benjamin, this is the unnerving point of departure of the 
allegorical imagination – that is where we find ourselves in the midst of “natural 
history.” What I am calling creaturely life is a dimension of human existence 
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called into being at such natural historical fissures or caesuras in the space of 
meaning.132 
Here, Santner refers to Benjamin’s ‘allegorical imagination’, which is key to understanding 
his own concept of creatureliness and, crucially, how this concept fits (or does not fit) with 
Beatrice and Virgil. Bainard Cowan paraphrases Benjamin’s thoughts on allegory as that 
which is ‘pre-eminently a kind of experience [which] arises from an apprehension of the 
world as no longer permanent, as passing out of being […]. Allegory would then be an 
expression of this sudden intuition’.133 Therefore, Benjamin’s understanding of allegory is at 
once experience and the expression of it: it is both the process of transforming experience 
into signs, and it is the signs themselves. Unlike Fletcher’s definition of allegory, above, two 
networks are not pulled together in lieu of their iconic likenesses. Rather, the network is an 
ever-expanding allegory made up of experience, which is itself an iconic likeness of reality: it 
encapsulates the process of signification which accompanies all experience, as experience 
itself is significant. As such, the ‘point of departure’ from this allegorical imagination is when 
experience cannot be signified, perhaps because it falls outside of the network. In many 
ways, this relates to Badiou’s concept of ‘fidelity’ – an idea I discuss in Chapter Four – where 
one must make a moral decision to act upon an unprecedented event, yet because the 
event is unprecedented there are no models of morality upon which you might act. For 
Badiou, your ethical decision at once expands and collapses your preconceived model of 
morality; so too for Benjamin, this ‘historical fissure’ demands and resists symbolisation 
offered by the network of allegorised experience. For Santner, creaturely life is exposed at 
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these moments because they cause our networks of meaning – built as they are on 
preconceived notions of humanity – to collapse. 
In Beatrice and Virgil, Martel’s use of allegory is three-fold: he draws upon fictional 
narratives of the Holocaust and animal atrocity as stories which might allegorise one 
another in the manner outlined by Fletcher; he gestures towards the ‘caesuras in the space 
of meaning’ by writing characters who themselves arrive at ‘an unnerving point of departure 
from the allegorical imagination’, such as when Beatrice and Virgil fail to describe what 
happened to them during ‘The Horrors’; and he also writes about the process of writing 
about this unnerving point of departure, through Henry’s (and, at a further remove, 
Martel’s) metatextual narrativisation. Indeed, later in ‘Walter Benjamin’s Theory of 
Allegory’, Cowan comments on the grammatological function of allegory, whereby 
the very concept of experience – designating as it does “the relationship with a 
presence” – becomes “unwieldy” and must be replaced by a term which gives 
notice that the mind in encountering reality is already writing, even at the zero-
point of the encounter. [Such reasoning] would seem to designate the allegorical 
view of the world as a kind of writing.134 
Therefore, in the sense given by Santner through Benjamin, Martel engages with the 
struggle of writing about encountering reality, where reality departs from the allegorical 
imagination, and where allegorical imagination is itself a kind of writing. This idea underpins 
creaturely poetics as outlined by Pick, where literature engages directly with difficult 
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realities (a concept I explore further in Chapter Three), to the extent that it may be 
considered a difficult reality in and of itself. 
 In this chapter, I explore Santner’s concept of creatureliness through Beatrice and 
Virgil by highlighting how some of the key aspects of On Creaturely Life also apply to 
Martel’s novel. For example, the dimension of undeadness which Santner relates to W. G. 
Sebald’s fiction can also be traced through the taxidermist and his profession, as he takes 
the dead and makes them appear alive. The taxidermist also abuses this power over his 
creaturely subjects and I shall discuss how this might be represented through Virgil’s tail. 
This adheres to Santner’s notion of creatureliness as a process of a master or ‘sovereign’ 
subjecting the creature to a transformative force: in this case, the taxidermist ostensibly 
cuts off but certainly re-attaches Virgil’s tail in order that his master-narrative (the play) 
overwrites the creature’s lived experience. Furthermore, Santner also agrees with Julia 
Lupton’s analysis of The Tempest’s Caliban as a creature who speaks through its 
woundedness and I apply this to Beatrice and Virgil, especially through the motif of Virgil’s 
howl. Finally in this section, I analyse the novel’s frantic climax as an ‘excess of creaturely 
corporeality’: a phrase which Santner uses to describe passages in Sebald’s The Rings of 
Saturn, and which can also be applied here to explore the boundary of human-animal 
worlds through the vulnerable bodies of Henry, the taxidermist and the animals within the 
taxidermy. 
 As this section of the chapter ends with the closing sequences of the novel, so the 
second section begins. Through a creaturely lens, and taking my cue from Anat Pick’s 
Creaturely Poetics, I consider how Henry’s creative imagination unlocks when he is wounded 
in hospital. Like W. G. Sebald’s narrator in The Rings of Saturn, Henry’s exposure to an 
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excess of corporeality leaves him physically exhausted but mentally stimulated, and his 
creative block is lifted. Indeed, this second section focuses more on the narrativisation of 
creatureliness: how Beatrice and Virgil is not simply a novel which engages with 
creatureliness as outlined by Santner, but how it may also contribute to a creaturely poetics. 
Moreover, I consider how Pick’s analysis of creatureliness is similar in important ways to 
Santner’s, but also how it focuses less on a human dimension of creatureliness and more on 
creatureliness as an inherent part of all bare life: human and animal alike. I believe this is an 
important factor when analysing a novel which deals with a reciprocal metaphor between 
humans (the Holocaust) and animals (cruelty and dehabitation), as it allows me to explore 
how the body is represented in literature, irrespective of species. Indeed, there are a few 
ways in which Santner’s model is limited for this thesis as an exploration into reading 
Holocaust literature as a creaturely poetics, so I also use this section to explain why, in 
chapters two and three, I move forward using Pick’s model exclusively. 
 
On Creaturely Life 
 As I outlined in the introduction to this thesis, both the Holocaust and animal 
suffering demand and resist symbolisation. This is partially because, as James Young writes, 
‘it is almost as if violent events – perceived as aberrations or ruptures in the cultural 
continuum – demand their retelling, their narration, back into traditions and structures they 
would otherwise defy’.135 Here, ‘aberrations or ruptures in the cultural continuum’ is 
comparable to the ‘natural historical fissures’ as described by Santner. The history and 
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culture which produced the Holocaust does not have the literary conventions to be able to 
contain the events in language and, moreover, the violent events themselves resist 
symbolisation. Animal suffering similarly resists symbolisation because animals do not use 
language. They are not ‘mute’ – as Santner describes nature – but they are inarticulate. In 
this sense, the animal suffering–Holocaust allegory could be said to adhere both to Fletcher 
and Benjamin’s models, respectively: the two subjects are pulled together through their 
likenesses, where these include shared narratives of violence and an inability to 
communicate atrocity; and they are each used as the transformative sign of the other, as 
the incommunicability of animal suffering is used to signify the incommunicability of the 
Holocaust and vice versa. As allegories are typically used to clarify rather than to draw 
attention to ‘opacity and recalcitrance’, in Beatrice and Virgil it seems it is the ‘unnerving 
point of departure of the allegorical imagination’ that is itself allegorised. 
 Indeed, to take Virgil’s tail as an example: here is a tail which has been cut off from a 
real howler monkey, stitched back on by the taxidermist, and made to represent the tail of a 
howler monkey named Virgil. It at once symbolises a tail and is one, and in this sense, it is 
similar to Benjamin’s model of allegory. Therefore, it may also symbolise the process of 
writing allegory, though this idea adheres more to a creaturely poetics than to an analysis of 
creaturely life as outlined by Santner. Looking in closer detail at Virgil’s tail, it seems at odds 
with the taxidermist’s usual meticulousness that it should be so obviously stitched on, 
exposing ‘a stitch, a suture, that circled the base of the tail’. Henry goes on to describe the 
tail as ‘purple, medical, horrible’ (BV, 153). Usually, the taxidermist works with pride to 
make his mounted creatures seem perfect as if alive, writing that ‘there is no excuse for bad 
work. To ruin an animal with shoddy taxidermy is to forfeit the only true canvas we have on 
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which to represent it, and it condemns us to amnesia, ignorance and incomprehension’ (BV, 
95-96). The work on Virgil’s tail is suspiciously ‘shoddy’, and the taxidermist never offers any 
explanation as to why he imagines it was cut off initially (it would make little sense for the 
scientific team, transporting the monkey from its habitat, to disable their subject). 
Therefore, the taxidermist’s work on Virgil condemns us to ‘amnesia, ignorance and 
incomprehension’ as the bodily evidence suggests an act that may never have taken place in 
the howler monkey’s lifetime. Ostensibly, therefore, the taxidermist cut off the tail himself 
and reattached it to fit with his story of Virgil in ‘A 20th Century Shirt’. 
If this theory is to stand up as more than mere speculation, then an obvious question 
is ‘why’. James Young explains how the destruction of bodies is only the first step in 
destroying a race, where reimagining the past and manipulating memory constitutes the 
final steps: 
The Nazis had intended the destruction of the Jews to be total: they were to 
have been removed from history and memory. […] ending with Hitler’s plans for 
a museum in Prague to the extinct Jewish race, it grows clear that if the first step 
toward the destruction of a people lay in the blotting out of its memory, then 
the last step would lie in its calculated resurrection.136 
When Henry decides that the taxidermist is in fact a Nazi collaborator, he assumes that the 
taxidermist must find some redemption in a job which allows him to ‘take the dead and 
make them look good’. Henry asks, ‘how was that for murderous irrationalism neatly 
packaged and hidden?’ (BV, 190). If we are to agree with Henry, then Virgil’s tail is symbolic 
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of the taxidermist’s effort to justify his evil past. Like Hitler’s plans for a museum of the 
extinct Jewish race, Virgil’s tail – perhaps cut off by, but certainly reattached by the 
taxidermist – serves as a ‘calculated resurrection’ of the past, to justify the taxidermist’s 
actions. And like the museum, which was to contain genuine Jewish relics, Virgil’s tail is the 
genuine tail of the howler monkey, stolen from its habitat by scientists and reformed by the 
taxidermist. In agreement with Young’s assertion that ‘calculated resurrection’ is the final 
step in a process of extermination, Dirk Rupnow explains how the process of 
memorialisation in Prague bore a direct link to the murder of the Jewish race: 
Religious ritual objects were torn from their everyday uses, just as the people 
who used them were torn from their lives. If there has always been an alliance 
between museums and death, it was closer and more immediate in Prague: 
Musealization facilitates murder. […] The relationship between deportation and 
this museum work was not only a metaphor but also a reality: Objects 
accumulated at the Prague museum, such as the eyeglasses and suitcases on 
display in Auschwitz today.137 
The growth of relics reflected the deportation and ultimate deaths of the Jewish people who 
once used them: the museum’s religious objects symbolised the death of Judaism, yet also 
embodied that death because they were collected and displayed by those who carried out 
the deportations and killings; the eyeglasses were at once metaphor for the death of a 
people, and were the literal remains of those who once animated them. In a similar way, 
Virgil’s tail both symbolises the atrocity committed on animals by the humans who 
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exterminate them, and embodies it as it was crudely reattached – if not cut off – by a man 
who understands shoddy taxidermy to be the first step towards ‘amnesia, ignorance and 
incomprehension’. 
 Not only does Virgil’s tail symbolise and embody the reciprocal metaphors for 
atrocity within Martel’s novel, it is also evidence of Virgil’s creatureliness as outlined by 
Santner, where he draws upon Lupton’s essay on Caliban to gesture towards a definition of 
the term “Creature” as ‘not so much the name of a determinate state of being as the 
signifier of an ongoing exposure, of being caught up in the process of becoming creaturely 
through the dictates of divine alterity’.138 In the terms outlined here, Virgil is not a creature 
because he is a vulnerable animal, but because the taxidermist dictates the workings of his 
body and, as such, exposes him to ongoing force. It is this which renders him creaturely. This 
creatureliness is displayed in Beatrice and Virgil both as mounted animals and as characters 
in the play, because in both cases the taxidermist dictates their lives from a position of 
‘divine alterity’, as he has an outside control over their bodies and their stories. These 
bodies – and once again Virgil’s tail is the best example of this – are literally reformed to 
reflect the taxidermist’s master-narrative. 
 In his discussion of annihilation and creatureliness, Eric Santner highlights a passage 
in The Rings of Saturn where bodily evidence is similarly reimagined. The passage describes 
how Rembrandt’s famous painting of the surgeon’s guild includes a distinct, bodily 
irregularity: where the master surgeon exposes the muscles and tissues of a deceased thief 
called Aris Kindt, the subject’s hand is unproportionally large and anatomically inversed. 
Santner quotes the narrator in Sebald’s novel, who suggests that the hand ‘signifies the 
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violence that has been done to Aris Kindt. It is with him, the victim, and not the Guild that 
gave Rembrandt his commission, that the painter identifies’.139 Like the taxidermist, whose 
profession it is to minimise evidence of bodily harm on the animals he receives, Rembrandt 
has been commissioned to paint a scene which is anatomically perfect. Both “fail” to do so. 
Perhaps this is because, as the narrator suggests, the artist wishes to draw attention away 
from viewing the body under a scientific light, and chooses instead to focus on the bodily 
harm being inflicted upon it. This would suggest that Virgil’s tail, like Aris Kindt’s hand, 
signifies the violence that has been done to him. However, and as discussed, unlike the hand 
in Rembrandt’s painting which is only deformed in the painting, Virgil’s tail at once signifies 
and embodies that violence. Santner continues to trace creatureliness in Sebald by 
explaining ‘the shifts in meaning of the word “creature” from denoting the entire domain of 
nature qua God’s creation to what “borders on the monstrous and unnatural”’.140 In this 
case, it is Virgil’s ‘monstrous and unnatural’ tail, ‘purple, medical, horrible’, which renders 
him creaturely (BV, 153). 
 Virgil’s tail is: evidence towards the taxidermist’s search for redemption through his 
profession, symbolic of the process of extermination through musealization, metonymic for 
the abuse carried out on animals by humans, and evidence of Virgil’s ongoing creatureliness. 
Furthermore, as the analogy of animals and Holocaust victims is suggested throughout the 
text, it is metonymic for the abuse carried out on Holocaust victims by other humans. To 
employ metonymy and symbolism in such an interwoven manner makes the analogy 
inscrutable: Virgil’s tail does not merely stand in for abuse of Holocaust victims, it also 
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embodies it. However, whereas metonymy is often used to make something more 
conceivable – in substituting a whole for a more digestible part – here, the uniqueness of 
Virgil’s tail and the ambiguity over how or why it was cut off and reattached means that the 
metonymy is not a simplification device, such as that outlined by George Lakoff: 
Metonymy is one of the basic characteristics of cognition. It is extremely 
common for people to take one well-understood or easy-to-perceive aspect of 
something and use it to stand either for the thing as a whole or for some other 
aspect or part of it.141 
As Virgil’s tail is difficult to understand (both because it is ambiguous when or why it was 
removed and reattached, and because it is a unique physical trait), it does not help us to 
understand animal suffering or Holocaust victimisation. Rather, it highlights our 
unsurpassable gap in comprehension in a way that focusing on Virgil’s eyes or nose might 
not. This is because metonymy is more complex than a mere referential device, as explained 
in a later text by Lakoff and Mark Johnson: Metonymy ‘also serves the function of providing 
understanding. For example, […] there are many parts that can stand for the whole. Which 
part we pick out determines which aspect of the whole we are focusing on’.142 The part on 
which Martel focuses is Virgil’s tail: ‘a tail with a grip like a constrictor’s coil, yet with a 
deftness of touch that allows him to move a pawn on a chessboard with it’; a tail which has 
been cut off, reattached and moulded in such a manner that it both is and is not Virgil’s tail 
(BV, 82). It is the physical part of him which best determines the aspect of the whole Martel 
focuses on: the inconceivability of the suffering body. 
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 Moreover, the tail – and the mounted animals more generally - is the part of 
Beatrice and Virgil which most clearly encapsulates the ‘dimension of undeadness’, which 
Santner describes as ‘the space between real and symbolic death, which [he takes] to mean 
the ultimate domain of creaturely life’.143 To help explain ‘undeadness’, Santner turns to 
Walter Benjamin. On the topic of souvenirs, relics and other symbols which might be taken 
to represent an original object, experience, place or time in history, Benjamin writes: 
The souvenir is the complement to “isolated experience” [des “Erlebnisses”]. In 
it is precipitated the increasing self-estrangement of human beings, whose past 
is inventoried as dead effects. In the nineteenth century, allegory withdrew from 
the world around us to settle in the inner world. The relic comes from the 
cadaver; the souvenir comes from the defunct experience [Erfahrung] which 
thinks of itself, euphemistically, as living [Erlebnis].144 
Similar to the eyeglasses in Holocaust museums, which at once stand in for their owners and 
represent their deaths, Benjamin understands that souvenirs and relics gesture to a real 
experience, but ultimately embody both the passing of that experience, and even its initial 
being-towards-death. The life-like significance that one might attach to that souvenir is what 
makes it ‘undead’. This is applicable to the taxidermy, where the mounted animals appear 
alive. They are not undead simply because they are made to look alive when they are not, 
but because the taxidermist insists that ‘all the animals are alive – it’s time that’s stopped’ 
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(BV, 66). They are undead because they are in a state which Santner, through Benjamin, 
calls ‘petrified unrest’.145 
One characteristic of ‘undeadness’ or the state of ‘petrified unrest’ is that the relic or 
the souvenir itself takes on a different life to the one it represents. For example, if someone 
visits an art gallery in order to take a photograph of an original piece of art, the photograph 
itself is the goal rather than the original, and therefore the art loses its significance. 
Similarly, in the taxidermy, the taxidermist mounts the animals not in order to preserve the 
originals, but to create newer and even more life-like versions. For example, the three 
tigers, which seem to be a family unit, are mounted as though under threat from another 
predator, and in this sense the tableaux is ‘a stage full of stories’ (BV, 61). Yet, the 
taxidermist tells Henry that although the female and cub were sourced from the same 
suppliers, the male was brought in from a zoo (BV, 65). One assumes that museum curators 
harbour an ethical consideration for their profession, so that they arrange items to form a 
story which most accurately reflects an historical period. This way, the period might be 
remembered and, to some degree, understood. In accordance with this theory, the 
taxidermist compares himself to an historian ‘who parses through the material evidence of 
the past in an attempt to reconstruct it and then understand it’ (BV, 96-97). However, where 
animals are involved, the stories are merely speculative: the male tiger, who naturally died 
of a heart attack in a zoo, is here ferocious and ready to fight in a scene which imitates its 
natural habitat. The taxidermist has reconstructed its life so that it appears nothing like the 
original. In a summary of his profession, the taxidermist speaks of treating and mounting 
‘articulated skeletons’: the term given to reconstructed skeletons which are made to move 
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as a body would. This is an effective metaphor for his profession in general, as he rearranges 
the bodies of animals to articulate not their stories, but his own. 
This technique recalls the arrangement of photographs besides text in Austerlitz by 
W. G. Sebald, which seemingly provides evidence for the story being told. For example, one 
photograph shows a young boy and the title character is told that it is a picture of him in 
1939.146 This is a real photograph, but the boy upon whom Austerlitz builds a hazy memory 
of his youth is unknown to Sebald. Indeed, he admits that most of the photographs were 
gathered not from archives but from junk shops and boot sales, and have nothing to do with 
the story except through the significance he attaches to them within his novel.147 As Sue 
Vice argues, such a display ‘constitute[s] a crossover between private and public 
memory’.148 Santner draws upon Marianne Hirsche’s concept of ‘postmemory’ to consider 
the crossover between private and public, or personal and impersonal memory, a term 
which alludes to 
the peculiarities of the memory of events that hover between personal memory 
and impersonal history, events one has not lived through oneself but that, in 
large measure through exposure to the stories of those who did experience 
them, have nonetheless entered into the fabric of the self.149 
 Like Hitler’s plans to build a museum in order to prefigure the nonexistence of the Jewish 
race, these photographs do not only illustrate Sebald’s novel, but seem to justify it – even 
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foreground it – with evidence of its beginnings. Just so, the misappropriated tigers efface 
their life through their undeathly forms, and the tale of Virgil’s end is reconstructed through 
the end of his tail. 
Read in this light, the mounted animals are creaturely in a similar way to 
Frankenstein’s monster, as all are bodies which have been stitched together and reanimated 
(literally in the monster’s case, but through the taxidermist’s stories for the animals). 
Indeed, Frankenstein is referenced within Beatrice and Virgil: whilst Henry looks around the 
taxidermy, he compares the head of an unfinished deer to ‘a cervine version of 
Frankenstein’ (BV, 73). This is interesting not least because of the common misconception 
that Frankenstein is the monster and not its creator: a mistake which one might have 
thought a published author such as Henry would not make. Moreover, the taxidermist might 
identify with the monkey as Rembrandt with the thief, but – unlike Rembrandt – he is also 
the one who works on the body of the victim. This forces a disturbing bond between victim 
and perpetrator, which is supported by the Frankenstein/Frankenstein’s monster confusion. 
This is in keeping with Santner’s concept of creaturely life which, although he insists is 
specifically human dimension, ‘does indeed mark our resemblance to animals, but precisely 
to animals who have themselves been thrown off the rails of their nature’.150 In other 
words, animals can only be creaturely so long as they no longer act instinctively as 
themselves, but are driven to act in ways which are unnatural. Both the taxidermist and his 
mounted animals are thrown off the rails of their nature as he takes control over their 
creation and therefore puts himself into a sovereign role, and they are skinned, stitched and 
fashioned into creatures which resemble their species but are no longer themselves. Martel 
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emphasises the proximity between creator and created, yet this proximity is precisely that 
which isolates them: it is what Santner may call their abandonment to a ‘state of 
exception’.151 
It is not simply in the taxidermy where the taxidermist over-identifies with his 
subjects, but also within ‘A 20th Century Shirt’. Towards the end of the novel, he reads a 
passage where Beatrice describes how she was tortured by a group of men including one 
‘tall, raw-boned man’ who, simply by this description, reminds Henry of the taxidermist (BV, 
175, 181). The link between taxidermist and perpetrator is tenuous, but through Henry’s 
narration we are led to believe that the taxidermist has written himself into the scene. If this 
is indeed the case, one may wonder how the scene relates back to his life and, moreover, 
why he has chosen to write from the victim’s perspective. This is made more complex by the 
fact that it seems Beatrice is tortured for no particular reason: she is arrested, brutally 
tortured by men, insulted, kept in confinement and finally released. No questioning is 
mentioned, nor any reason for her arrest, treatment or release. In this, there seems no 
striking resemblance to common torture practices during the Third Reich, especially as it is 
Virgil who is identified as the subject of speciesism, so the parallel between hatred for 
howler monkeys and anti-Semitism should not apply to Beatrice. Much like the ambiguity 
surrounding Josef K’s case in Kafka’s The Trial, Beatrice’s experiences seem to be unfounded 
and mystifying. However, unlike K, Beatrice does not question her arrest and torture, and 
instead understands that her persecutors ‘were just doing their job’ (BV, 179). This apparent 
lack of hatred towards the men could be because the scene is written by one of them: 
through hearing a victim excuse her perpetrator on account of his lack of overarching 
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responsibility, the taxidermist could be playing out the excuse so often heard with regard to 
Nazi persecution: if I had not done it, someone else would have taken my place.152 
This attitude seems at odds with the idea of the taxidermist abandoned to a state of 
exception because it assumes that he is simply one of the masses. However, as Beatrice 
describes his face, she isolates him from her other torturers. In a discussion on how we 
perceive the masses, Santer uses Rilke’s novel The Notebooks of Malte Laurids Brigge to 
show how distinctions between people of a different social order  breaks down when, for 
example, high society conceptualises the masses but one figure stands outside of this 
generalisation.153 That figure at once demands symbolisation because he is one of his 
people and therefore might represent them, and resists it because one person cannot 
symbolise the multiplicity of the masses. Santner argues that to address this figure means 
that you are aware of your shared creatureliness. Therefore, as the taxidermist writes 
Beatrice’s character, and makes Beatrice address him from a position of shared 
creatureliness, his play offers him the opportunity of ‘redemption without remorse’ (BV, 
189). This is because Santner’s concepts of redemption and creatureliness are in turn guided 
by Benjamin’s, who ‘suggests that redemption can be understood as a passage through and 
beyond the creaturely life materialized in […] cringed bodies’.154 In other words, 
creatureliness is exposed in a suffering body, and it is through this creaturely body that one 
might be redeemed. Therefore, the taxidermist redeems himself by identifying with 
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Beatrice, whose creatureliness is exposed through torture and who, in turn, identifies with 
the taxidermist. 
The ‘cringed bodies’ to which Benjamin refers include the prisoners in Kafka’s Penal 
Colony where, as Santner explains, ‘those in power use an archaic apparatus which engraves 
letters with curlicues on the back of guilty men’.155 It refers to those creaturely subjects 
whose bodies are distorted as a direct response to the powers of the sovereign: those who, 
as with some royalty, have power over their subjects even beyond the scope of the law. In 
Penal Colony, this is at once embodied and symbolised by the prisoners whose bodies 
literally bear the message of their persecutors. As Santner writes elsewhere when he 
describes Musselmanner, but it can also be applied to the ‘cringe’ inherent in some forms of 
creaturely life including the prisoners in Penal Colony: ‘What remains […] at this zero-degree 
of social existence, [is] something like the direct embodiment of signifying stress—the 
becoming flesh of the “state of emergency” of sociosymbolic meaning’.156 In other words, 
their bodies reflect (or, more appropriately, ‘embody’) their subjectification by those whose 
powers exceed the normal capacity of the law. In Beatrice and Virgil, Beatrice is marked by 
her ‘cringe’: her painful neck, which was injured whilst she was tortured (BV, 176-180). 
Moreover, and as a more direct comparison to Penal Colony, Beatrice’s back is also used to 
display a message. However, in Beatrice’s case, the words are not engraved on her back by 
perpetrators (at least not directly, though it could be argued that as the taxidermist writes 
the scene he is responsible for them). Instead, they are written with Virgil’s fingertip (BV, 
147). The words do not symbolise the animals’ subjectification, but in fact make up a list of 
                                                             
155 Santner, On Creaturely Life, p.25. 
156 Eric Santner, ‘Miracles Happen: Benjamin, Rosenzweig, Freud and the Matter of the Neighbor’, in Zizek, 
Slavoj, Eric L. Santner and Kenneth Reinhard, The Neighbor: Three Inquiries in Political Theology (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2005), p.100. 
122 
 
‘items’ which may help the animals talk about what happened to them during ‘The Horrors’. 
This list is called ‘The Horrors Sewing Kit’, which possibly alludes to how communicating 
their experiences might help to heal or at least “patch up” their traumatic pasts. However, 
the words do impart a different message: as it is impossible to read a list drawn on fur by a 
fingertip, this list embodies and symbolises the impossibility of communicating the suffering 
body.  
In the final scene of ‘A 20th Century Shirt’, Beatrice holds out her hoof to Virgil as 
they are being killed, and Virgil’s tail is cut off. Despite the gap between their species the 
pair come together at a moment of intense suffering and share compassion. Elaine Scarry 
argues that the triumph of pain is in its ‘unsharability’, in the fact that it brings about an 
‘absolute split between one’s sense of one’s own reality and the reality of other persons’, 
yet these two share their final moments of intense suffering, understanding not the 
specificity of one another’s pain, but rather aware that the pain of the other is so atrocious 
as to be incomprehensible.157 They share its incomprehensibility and unite to express 
concern and gratitude for one another. They understand the uniqueness of pain, but share 
compassion nonetheless and, as such, Beatrice and Virgil defy their torturers, even as their 
bodies are destroyed. The Horrors’ Sewing Kit on Beatrice’s back was written with the 
knowledge of its effacement, so when it is wiped clean by the boy who kills the animals at 
the end of the play there is nothing lost. In fact, the wordlessness which is left behind as the 
boy walks off stage and carelessly throws Virgil’s tail behind him is embodied in Beatrice, 
who is at once the body of a donkey and a cleaned slate. 
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This scene between the two animals does not depict empathy, as that would assume 
that Beatrice and Virgil know what the other experiences. Rather, it reveals the animals’ 
neighbour love for one another. Santner approaches a definition of ‘neighbor love’ with an 
analysis of one of Freud’s patients whose strange facial expression revealed unconscious 
desires, thoughts or feelings which, for their very ‘otherness’, provoked a feeling of horror in 
the psychologist, yet some understanding that these unconscious driftings were part of 
what made this man as human as Freud himself. ‘Neighbor love’, in this context, involves 
‘the difficult task of turning toward such a face, of becoming responsive, answerable to the 
new ethical material […] it manifests’.158 In a similar way, Beatrice and Virgil turn towards 
one another and reach out to share something of that mutual unshareability because they 
have an ethical responsibility (and desire) to respond to (and love) the other. Santner 
returns to a similar theme in his thesis, where he analyses Sebald’s ‘spectral materialism’ in 
Austerlitz: 
In Sebald’s universe, one’s subjective involvement with another human being is 
not simply a function of some sort of spiritual affinity; it depends, rather, on the 
degree to which one participates, at first unknowingly, in what I have referred to 
as their “spirit world.” We are, as it were, in proximity to the “neighbour” when 
we have entered the enigmatic space of his or her hauntedness. What is at issue 
in such proximity is, in other words, not empathy in the usual sense. One is not 
so much trying to see the world from someone else’s point of view as trying to 
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register the blind spots of that point of view and to unpack the stresses 
condensed in this blindness.159 
This may also be applied to Beatrice and Virgil in the final scene of ‘A 20th Century Shirt’ as 
the inconceivability of the other’s pain might be considered ‘blind spots’ in the narrative. 
Furthermore, the term Santner gives to writing about such neighbourly attention – ‘spectral 
materialism’ – captures the enigmatic drive of the play as a whole: the animals’ desire to 
contain and therefore to talk about their experiences. Indeed, the invisible words on 
Beatrice’s back are material only as a trace of what they signify, and this itself is signified by 
their invisibility, or, their ‘spectrality’. 
Santner identifies something creaturely not only in the plot of Austerlitz but also in 
Sebald’s writing style, which he defines as ‘creaturely expressivity’.160 As Sebald engages 
with the ‘material spectrality’ of neighbourly love within Austerlitz, it may be said that there 
is something in Sebald’s expression – something within the textuality of the novel – which is 
itself creaturely. Similarly in Beatrice and Virgil, Martel’s metanarratives allow the text to 
struggle with its own ‘blind spots’: the taxidermist’s frustration at not being able to describe 
Virgil’s howl, for example, or the frantic dénouement which verges on farcical. Indeed, 
within five pages, Henry comes to the rash decision that the taxidermist is a Nazi 
collaborator, gets stabbed, and the taxidermy goes up in flames with the taxidermist and 
animals inside (BV, 189-193). Without the metatextuality which frames the novel, this 
sequence is melodramatic at best. However, as we later learn that Martel’s novel is itself a 
reframed version of Henry’s post-traumatic memories of events, we may judge it in a new 
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light, accounting for the ‘blind spots’ which may surface in the novel of a man who muddles 
up literary references (Frankenstein/ Frankenstein’s monster) and whose most recent novel 
is considered unpublishable. Comparably, Santner highlights a sequence in The Rings of 
Saturn which documents sea spirits, hogs with a death drive, and a copulating man and 
woman who appear to the narrator as a sea monster. Santner surmises that ‘the entire 
sequence […] seems to trace the migration of an excess vitality that persists at the boundary 
of the animal, human, and spirit world’.161 Sebald’s narrator – like Martel’s – bears 
similarities to the author himself, but his collapse at the beginning of the novel may warn 
readers that he is prone to an excess of emotion. In both cases, the ‘excess’ of vitality and 
creatureliness is itself a gesture towards how a novel might engage with creatureliness. This 
may be the closest Santner gets to grappling with what Anat Pick terms a ‘creaturely 
poetics’, which encapsulates not only the depiction of creatures in literature and film, but 
also how writing or film-making themselves can gesture towards creatureliness. 
 
Creaturely Poetics 
 Of course, Santner does engage with creatureliness through literature: 
creatureliness in Rilke’s poetry and Sebald’s oeuvre are a central concern of his thesis, and 
he wagers that an exploration into creatureliness is ‘most productive when undertaken in 
the company of poets’.162 However, his primary concern is that ‘the site for such 
investigations [into the ‘unconscious mental life’ of the superego] is the threshold where life 
takes on its specific biopolitical intensity, where it assumes the cringed posture of the 
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creature’.163 In other words, Santner’s definition of creatureliness is dependent on the 
unconscious driftings of the superego, as that which is not led by instinct but by drive. This 
also affects how creatureliness may be explored in literature: poets are better able to 
explore creatureliness, argues Santner, because they are more attentive to the unconscious 
and ultimately inaccessible desires of others; they require ‘a kind of heightened sensitivity 
to and preoccupation with the dimension of arresting opacity’.164This is why creatureliness 
for Santner is primarily a human condition and only applies to animals (who are typically led 
by instinct over desire) when they are removed from their natural state and made to act 
against their natures. For Santner, good literature and poetry may include a more truthful 
depiction of pleasurable pain (what Santner terms ‘jouissance’ throughout his text), as those 
unconscious desires which work against instinct. 
 In this, there are similarities to Pick’s creaturely agenda, but there also remains key 
differences. The following passage, taken from the conclusion to Creaturely Poetics, helps to 
outline some of the comparisons I shall draw out between the two texts: 
I focused on works that take up the body as a way of attending (seeing, hearing, 
articulating, and responding to) the inhuman within and without. A creaturely 
poetics is the sum of this attention: the literary and cinematic forms that 
challenge the defensive inventory of humanism (consciousness, language, 
morality, dignity) and the anthropocentric critical idioms it gives rise to. The 
study brought together two distinct but intimately related projects: the 
theoretical refutation of humanism and anthropocentrism as impoverished 
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modes of confronting exposure and an attention to the reality of animal lives as 
the basis of cultural and ethical inquiry (CP, 192-193). 
Like Santner, Pick highlights the importance of attending to others and creaturely otherness. 
She also understands that good poets and authors are well placed to gesture towards 
creaturely opacity in their chosen medium (be that poetry, novels or film). However, she 
builds on this idea by arguing that literary and cinematic forms may not simply reflect 
creatureliness as observed or felt by their authors, but may also challenge readers to 
reapproach these forms in a new, non-anthropocentric way. This differs from Santner’s 
model of creatureliness, which is first and foremost a specifically human way of attending to 
others despite (or indeed because of) their recalcitrant, unconscious drives. Before the 
question of drive or instinct, Pick takes the vulnerable body as her beginning and end point. 
It is to this body which, she argues, a creaturely poetics might attend. 
 Therefore, reading Beatrice and Virgil as a creaturely poetics allows me to draw 
more on how Martel’s literature gestures towards the body. This accounts not only for the 
presentation of the body (as I analysed above with regard to Virgil’s tail) but how the form 
of Martel’s novel shifts attention away from an anthropocentric interpretation of the 
creature in order to gesture towards the creature itself: its body, vulnerability, voice; the 
reality of its life as separate from (but ‘intimately related’ to) the literature which attends it. 
This is not to say that the half of the novel’s reciprocal metaphor which considers the 
Holocaust is irrelevant when analysing through a creaturely prism. Quite the opposite, Pick 
argues that the Holocaust exposed humanity’s essential creatureliness: the vulnerable body 
which was stripped of its identity, worked and starved to death proves that human beings 
are creatures too. Therefore, Pick’s nonanthropocentric study is not dis-anthropic, but 
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simply suggests that poetry/ literature/ film should use its form to engage with all creatures 
(human and animal) on a level field, without a hierarchy of species and, as far as possible, 
with a metatextual awareness of the unavoidably ‘human’ prism through which the form is 
created and viewed. 
Whilst reading Beatrice and Virgil through a creaturely prism as outlined by Santner, 
above, I paid particularly close attention to Virgil’s tail as an aspect of the monkey which 
metonymically exposes the inconceivability of the suffering body. However, Virgil’s howl is 
also metonymic, and exemplifies the difficulty involved in reading a creaturely poetics. This 
is because the howl is closer than the tail to representing the language which issues from 
the creaturely body, which makes it more applicable to Pick’s thesis on creatureliness than 
Santner’s. Virgil’s howl is the reason the taxidermist asks Henry for his help, as the 
taxidermist himself could not describe it effectively. It is a howl which spans time as well as 
distance, ‘recorded more than forty years ago in the jungles of the upper Amazon’ onto an 
old cassette player, meaning that ‘the sound quality isn’t very good’. Indeed, Henry admits, 
‘it’s hard to put into words’ (BV, 83). Nonetheless, Henry tries to describe the howl by 
comparing it to other sounds, such as a herd of panicking swine and the heavy squeak of an 
axle, but nothing is an effective comparison except for ‘the thing itself, in its raw purity’: he 
ends the description, ‘hearing is believing’ (BV, 90). 
In a passage which similarly gestures towards the incommunicability of pain, Jean 
Améry attempts to describe the pain he was subjected to at the hands of the Nazis. 
Ultimately, he concedes a defeat of language, and writes that the pain he experienced 
exceeded language’s capacity to represent it: 
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It would be totally senseless to try and describe here the pain that was inflicted 
on me. Was it “like a red-hot iron in my shoulders,” and was another “like a dull 
wooden stake that had been driven into the back of my head”? One comparison 
would only stand for the other, and in the end we would be hoaxed by turn on 
the hopeless merry-go-round of figurative speech. The pain was what it was. 
Beyond that there is nothing to say. Qualities of feeling are as incomparable as 
they are indescribable. They mark the limit of the capacity of language to 
communicate.165 
The howler monkey’s cry is not necessarily a sign of its pain or distress but, just as Améry 
concedes that pain is inexpressible, Virgil’s cry can only be approached by making 
comparisons to other sounds, which can never express ‘the thing itself’. For the taxidermist 
it is ‘the limit of the capacity of language to communicate’ and, as such, he includes the 
howl in ‘A 20th Century Shirt’, perhaps to express this sense of incommunicability: 
Virgil: […] Beatrice, how are we going to talk about what happened to us one day 
when it’s over? 
(Pause.) 
Beatrice: I don’t know 
(Letting go of Beatrice’s leg and falling onto all fours, Virgil begins to howl. The 
landscape and stage slowly fade to darkness to the sound of Virgil loudly 
expressing his outrage.) (BV, 112) 
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Virgil asks Beatrice the ‘key question’ of the play (BV, 133), and his response to the inability 
to express himself through words is this primal howl, as he returns to a more natural 
posture of a monkey on all fours. Animality therefore signifies the limits of communication: 
limits which are elsewhere approached through the inability to express physical pain (as 
with Améry). 
 The inability to communicate pain is at once symbolised by the animal’s cry and 
embodied by it, as Virgil cannot communicate the pain he went through during the Horrors 
using language. Even though he is given the capacity to talk in ‘A 20th Century Shirt’ – a 
quality which moves the play outside of the boundaries imposed by Realism – he is still 
restricted by the boundaries of art and language to express physical pain. Elaine Scarry 
argues that this is because physical ‘pain does not simply resist language but actively 
destroys it, bringing about an immediate reversion to a state anterior to language’.166 In 
order to express his outrage and pain, Virgil reverts back to ‘a state anterior to language’ 
and howls. As a talking animal, Virgil’s howl is at once symbolic (it symbolises the 
destruction of language) and realistic (the monkey howls). Reality supercedes language: as 
Henry admits, it is impossible to capture the essence of this howl in words. It is as though 
the taxidermist gives Virgil a voice in order to strip him of it. 
 Virgil’s howl is comparable to a scene in William Golding’s The Inheritors, which Anat 
Pick analyses in Creaturely Poetics. Pick summarises Golding’s second novel as follows: 
Recounting the final days of a group of Neanderthals on the eve of their 
extinction at the hands of Cro-Magnon man, The Inheritors is quite literally a 
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story about ecology and evolution. The novel’s central character is Lok, who with 
the rest of his tribe comes across a strange group of “new people.” The 
encounter proves deadly. One by one the people are killed, until only Lok, the 
last of his kind, remains.167 
Similarities between The Inheritors and Beatrice and Virgil include tropes of violence and the 
threat of extinction, as well as unclear boundaries between humans and other animals. One 
extract which encapsulates these similarities is when Lok stoops and howls to mourn the 
loss of his partner. This bears obvious similarities to Virgil’s howl in Beatrice and Virgil: 
Lok began to bend. His knees touched the ground, his hands reached down and 
took his weight slowly, and with all his strength he clutched himself into the 
earth. […] The sound of mourning burst out of his mouth, prolonged, harsh, 
pain-sound, man-sound’.168 
Pick focuses on this final description of the howl as ‘man-sound’. Although Lok assumes an 
animalistic position and ejects a wordless noise, Golding uses this as evidence not of his 
distance from humanity but rather of his proximity to it. Pick argues that such ‘man-sounds, 
or animalized speech’ are the Neanderthal expressions through which the entire novel is 
channelled.169 It is evidence of a shared narrative between all creatures which comes to the 
fore at moments of intense suffering or vulnerability. Similarly, Virgil’s usual lucid speech is 
animalised as he howls, which at once reminds the audience that he is a howler monkey and 
taps into their perceived sense of humanity. ‘The landscape and stage slowly fade to 
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darkness’ as the focus of the play is drawn away from the outside space and towards the 
liminal space shared by all creatures, projected by Virgil’s howl. 
 Towards the end of ‘A 20th Century Shirt’, there is a sudden inclusion of human 
characters. There are people who torture Beatrice; there are people who force women to 
kill themselves and their children; these same people then turn on Beatrice and Virgil to 
brutally murder them. We may liken the perpetrators to animals, but this alleviates some 
agency; we may liken the victims to animals (and indeed two of them are animals), but this 
would seem to belittle their deaths. Instead, we might consider all characters creaturely. 
This reading is supported by Virgil’s howl, as it is at once animalised speech and ‘man-
sound’, and also by Henry’s reaction to his wife giving birth to their son: 
[S]he was reduced to a mucky animal who, after many pants, whimpers 
and screams, excreted from her body a pound of flesh, as the expression 
goes, that was red, wrinkled and slimy. The event couldn’t have been more 
animal-like if the two of them had been in a muddy pen grunting. The 
thing produced, weakly gesticulating, looked half simian, half-alien. Yet the 
call to Henry’s humanity couldn’t have been louder or more radical (BV, 
168).  
 
Giving birth is a primitive event, common to both animal and man, and it produces the same 
speechless newborn. Henry’s wife ‘pants, whimpers and screams’ in agony, unable to 
formulate language. Yet this ‘mucky... animal-like’ scene fiercely pulls on what Henry 
believes is his humanity. He believes that the tenderness he feels toward his wife and 
newborn is something beyond animal capacity, and perhaps it is, but still this feeling is 
133 
 
directed towards a creature appearing ‘half simian’, more monkey than man, with no more 
reason, nor speech, than an animal. Indeed, in returning to Bentham’s famous question, 
‘the question is not Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?’, it is 
apparent that the call to Henry’s humanity, an instinctive protectiveness perhaps, along 
with a more figurative sense of love, can be directed towards a creature little more than ‘a 
pound of flesh’.170 In a novel which so consciously plays with the boundaries between man 
and animal, Martel seems to ask what difference there lies between this child’s life and the 
lives of animals, and whether our sense of humanity should not be based on the elevation of 
man above beast, but rather how we ethically respond to the suffering of all creatures, be 
they man or animal. 
 Indeed, this is why Beatrice and Virgil is not simply a collection of fragments from ‘A 
20th Century Shirt’, where we may infer the predominance of Holocaust or animal tropes, 
but a metatextual maze causing Henry to learn about himself through vulnerability in both 
the human and animal worlds: a creatureliness which saturates his artistic and personal life. 
As explained throughout this thesis, the atrocity experienced by many in the camps was so 
extreme as to ‘outstrip language’s capacity to represent it altogether’.171 Henry is faced with 
the difficulties of representing the Holocaust when, at the beginning of Beatrice and Virgil, 
he is told that his Holocaust flip-book is unpublishable. Having failed to clearly explain what 
his book is about (it is ‘about a new choice of stories’, he had said; it is about addressing ‘the 
needs of ghosts’), he is left feeling frustrated and alone (BV, 15). While sitting in a park, he 
wonders ‘Would anyone care to have a stranger come up to them whispering 
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“Hitlerauschwitzsixmillionincandescentsoulsmygodmygodmygod”?’ (BV, 19). This compact 
word (similar to the ‘one-long-words’ which Beatrice and Virgil later make up to help 
describe what happened to them) emphasises the near impossibility of talking about the 
Holocaust. It is Henry’s attempt to overlay language with the extremity which, at the same 
time, undercuts it. The repetition ‘mygodmygodmygod’ only hints at the omnipotence of 
suffering and atrocity experienced. In a similar vein, Anat Pick continues her study on 
creatureliness by considering Primo Levi’s The Truce, specifically when Levi describes the 
short life and death of an inarticulate, three year old boy – Hurbinek. Hurbinek, a ‘child of 
Auschwitz’, lacks the capacity to speak any known language, and instead makes his own 
sounds which no one understands. Levi notes only the look of desperation in his eyes, ‘a 
stare both savage and human’, as if Hurbinek wishes to speak out against his affliction but 
cannot.172 The boy dies shortly afterwards. 
Although their situations are completely different – Henry is an author with a wide 
vocabulary who lives in comfort and Hurbinek was an inarticulate victim of atrocity – both 
are unable to communicate the effects of the Holocaust through language.  As Pick 
understands, ‘not finding the words is an expression of the kind of creatures we are. It is 
also an expression (and an experience) of our loneliness. In what sense, then,’ she asks, ‘is 
the Holocaust uniquely positioned outside language?’173 It is difficult to put anything into 
words without missing something of the experience itself but, as with understanding 
another’s pain, articulating the unspeakability of the Holocaust is impossible: Levi cannot 
speak for Hurbinek and Henry cannot speak for the millions dead. Instead, Pick suggests, 
‘speaking about the Holocaust is [a matter of] making language open to the excessive reality 
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of the event’.174 Primo Levi achieves this as he bears witness to Hurbinek and allows the 
boy’s silence to permeate his own testimony; Martel achieves this as he places his main 
character at an impasse at the start of his Holocaust novel, and uses the remainder of his 
text to consider not the Holocaust itself but its ‘excessive reality’: a reality which is gestured 
towards in words and howls, and which is traced in the suffering bodies of Beatrice and 
Virgil. Beatrice and Virgil begins with Henry at a mental impasse: his book about the 
Holocaust is unpublishable and he finds himself alone in the park. It ends with Henry at a 
physical impasse: he has been hospitalised after the taxidermist stabs him. However, it is at 
this moment of vulnerability that he finds himself able to write again and, despite the fact 
that he believes the taxidermist was a Nazi sympathiser and his play may have been a way 
to mask his atrocities, it is this play and the story which unfolds around it which frees Henry 
from his creative block and allows him to write. 
This creaturely reading is largely at odds with Laura Petersen’s essay on Beatrice and 
Virgil and Maus, where she offers a similar reading of both texts, and argues that the 
animals are simply used as metaphors by which to approach the Holocaust afresh. Her 
reading is similar to, and indeed draws upon, Henry’s description of how he used animals in 
his preceding novels: 
The use of animals in his novel, he explained, was for reasons of craft rather 
than of sentiment. Speaking before his tribe, naked, he was only human and 
therefore possibly – likely – surely – a liar. But dressed in furs and feathers, he 
became a shaman and spoke a greater truth. We are cynical about our own 
species, but less so about animals, especially wild ones. We might not shelter 
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them from habitat destruction, but we do tend to shelter them from excessive 
irony (BV, 29-30). 
Petersen equates this use of animals to Martel’s because of what she considers the novel’s 
‘self-reflexive vein’.175 It is entirely possible that Martel meant for Henry’s earlier use of 
animals to foreshadow his own text but, read in a creaturely (and therefore ultimately a 
self-reflexive) vein, this interpretation is unlikely. Indeed, Pick regards Coetzee’s ‘The Lives 
of Animals’ as a seminal text for showing how one might ‘read through a creaturely prism’ 
because – as discussed in my following chapter – its focal character, Elizabeth Costello, is 
not only moved by animal ethics but physically affected by them, and finds herself sharing 
something of their vulnerability, especially as she ages and becomes increasingly aware of 
her body. Despite the fact that Beatrice and Virgil are only mounted animals, animated 
through a fictional play, Henry forges a relationship with them by the end of the novel, and 
claims that he misses them ‘with an ache that made itself felt even years later’ (BV, 194). 
Like Elizabeth Costello, his feelings towards these creatures are felt physically, and their loss 
pains him. Therefore, there is little doubt that Henry does not use Beatrice and Virgil ‘for 
craft’ but feels sentimental towards the mounted animals by the end of the novel, as he 
admits never again being able to ‘see a donkey without thinking of Beatrice and Virgil and 
feeling grief and misery’ (BV, 195). Moreover, throughout his entire relationship with the 
taxidermist, he often queried the use of animals, suspecting all along that they had a 
metaphoric function and that the taxidermist was lying, or at least hiding something. Finally, 
the irony of this passage is made apparent when the taxidermist insists that ‘A 20th Century 
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Shirt’ is indeed about habitat destruction (BV, 135). Petersen dismisses this reading as, at 
best, a ‘contrived collapse’ of the Holocaust metaphor by Martel but, whether or not the 
taxidermist’s motives for writing his play were entirely false, they still brought issues of 
animal suffering and habitat destruction to the fore. Indeed, I further discuss the issue of 
comparing and contrasting atrocity in Chapter Four, but already it is clear that Martel’s use 
of allegory gives weight to both sides of the comparison. 
 To better understand both how the animal-Holocaust metaphor in Beatrice and 
Virgil may be read as reciprocal (as opposed to a ‘contrived collapse’ of one side towards 
the other), and moreover how this can be represented in literature as a creaturely poetics, it 
is helpful to compare Beatrice and Virgil to Martel’s earlier novel, Life of Pi. Despite nine 
years between their publications, there are many similarities between the two novels, the 
most significant of which is Martel’s use of animals. During The Life of Pi a boy is 
shipwrecked and left alone with an orang-utan and a zebra (perhaps more appealing than a 
howler monkey and donkey), a hyena and a tiger. All except the boy and the tiger are killed. 
However, at the end of the novel, we are offered an alternative story where the animals are 
representations of the human survivors. Pi, who is associated with the tiger, is the only 
survivor left after the group kill and eat each other. Those interviewing Pi consider the 
alternative story to be more realistic but, considering neither story is relevant to their report 
on the shipwreck, they choose to accept the story with animals: 
“In both stories the ship sinks, my entire family dies, and I suffer.” 
“Yes, that’s true.” 
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“So tell me, since it makes no factual difference to you and you can’t prove the 
question either way, which story do you prefer? Which is the better story, the 
story with animals or the story without animals?” 
Mr. Okamoto: “That’s an interesting question...” 
Mr. Chiba: “The story with animals.” 
Mr. Okamoto: “Yes. The story with animals is the better story.” 
Pi Patel: “Thank you. And so it goes with God.”176 
To focus on ‘the better story’ seems to prioritise aesthetic judgement over the truth. Like 
the mounted animals in the taxidermist of Beatrice and Virgil, whose painful or unheroic 
deaths are transformed into fierce montages in order to capture something of life (even if 
not their own), here a traumatic story of murder and cannibalism is possibly disguised by 
wild animals, and cloaked in a veil of exoticism. Jenni Adams, who also quotes from this 
passage in her analysis of Beatrice and Virgil, refers to an earlier passage in Life of Pi when Pi 
considers the imaginative difference between being an atheist and an agnostic, and she 
writes that ‘the novel, in its closing stages, demands to be read one-dimensionally as an 
allegorical or fabular illustration of faith’s workings’.177 Adams finds this comparable to 
Beatrice and Virgil, ‘ultimately orienting its readers in a single interpretive direction with the 
logically challenging revelation of the taxidermist’s guilt’.178 In both novels, Adams argues, 
imagination requires a leap of faith, which rises out of troubled conscience: Pi imagines an 
atheist on his deathbed who finally opens his mind to the possibility of God; a miraculous 
journey with wild animals rises out of the boy’s trauma after possibly killing a man and not 
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saving his mother’s life; and the taxidermist ostensibly writes a play about animals to 
channel his guilt as a Nazi collaborator. The essential truth hidden within a story is as 
evasive as God himself, and we must give ourselves over to the story in an act of faith. 
 Yet, as with my reservations towards Peterson’s analysis of Beatrice and Virgil, I do 
not believe that reading these novels is reductive to a singular dimension. Both novels offer 
alternatives to the animal stories and yet both are framed within fictional space of 
Postmodern literature: texts which recall themselves and their fictionality. Both are about a 
‘choice of stories’ and, in both cases, the supposedly realistic choice is ‘a horrible story’, not 
only for its traumatic content but also for its bleak aesthetics: a magnificent journey with a 
tiger becomes a voyage of ‘solitude’; a play about two animals who find ways to talk about 
their experiences becomes a script about how a Nazi can appease his conscience (BV, 15).179 
However, like in Maus, the animal stories offer a false sense of security, and seem to 
distance readers from atrocity in order that they approach it from a new angle, significantly 
– in the case of Maus and Beatrice and Virgil – without over-identifying with any Holocaust 
victims. Even in Life of Pi, the animal story does not seem to shield Pi from any pain as he 
reminds us that ‘in both stories the ship sinks, my entire family dies, and I suffer’. Including 
animals may seem to deflect reality but, as Pi questions, ‘doesn’t the telling of something 
always become a story?’ In other words, is realism not shattered the moment it is 
channelled into words and, if so, how can one choose between a fable which gestures 
towards the truth and a testimony which leaves much unspoken? In Life of Pi and Beatrice 
and Virgil we are asked to choose between a story with or without animals, but the fictional 
space of Martel’s novels refracts these choices so that there is no clear, singular dimension 
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from which to read. Moreover, as both novels progress, the animals seem less 
anthropomorphised than the characters themselves seem creaturely. The tiger is no longer 
Pi’s companion but a projection of Pi himself; Beatrice and Virgil are not only projections of 
the taxidermist’s guilt, but vulnerable creatures whom Henry grows to love. A one-
dimensional reading of either text risks disengaging with the reciprocal nature of these 
stories and sidestepping a creaturely reading of the texts. 
 Despite Adams’ argument that the reader is channelled into a one-dimensional 
reading of both texts, she is aware of the complications which arise from metatextuality, 
and indeed writes that ‘the novel might be read as itself highlighting the problematic nature 
of such readings’.180 Although she explores these problems, she chooses to deprioritise 
them towards the end of her essay, and focuses instead on a more literal reading of Beatrice 
and Virgil: a reading which might be considered creaturely in that it ignores what Pick 
considers points of ‘deflection’, which might include a study on the difference between a 
story which includes animals and one which does not, as opposed to reading both stories 
through a similar, creaturely lens. Indeed, this is the one time in her essay where Adams 
references Pick. She asks: 
What might a literal reading of Martel’s Beatrice and Virgil look like? Such a 
reading might focus on the novel’s striking and shocking evocations of corporeal 
suffering, particularly in the scene in which Beatrice describes her torture by 
humans. It might read corporeal suffering as not only representation’s endpoint 
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but as a kind of asymbolic excess whose ethical and literary encounter might 
nevertheless result in a reparative sense of shared creatureliness[.]181 
This ‘literal reading’ of Beatrice and Virgil could likewise be applied to Life of Pi, whereby the 
realistic, alternative story – and the readerly complications which arise from there being an 
alternative story – is ignored (as indeed it is ignored in Mr Okamoto’s final report of the 
shipwreck).182 As in Life of Pi, this reading allows us to give ourselves over to the story in an 
act of faith, reading it in order to believe it. However, this is where an integral difference 
between the two novels lies: whereas this reading works well enough for Life of Pi, it misses 
the essential point of Beatrice and Virgil as a work of Holocaust fiction. 
Part of the Postmodernist appeal in Life of Pi is that, although one story seems more 
realistic than the other, both are fiction. This gives gravity to Pi’s argument regarding the 
investigators’ disbelief at his animal story: ‘Love is hard to believe, ask any lover. Life is hard 
to believe, ask any scientist. God is hard to believe, ask any believer. What is your problem 
with hard to believe?’183 We are asked to suspend our usual beliefs and engage with the 
imaginative story as a form of magical realism. However, in Beatrice and Virgil the same 
questions about truth, language and stories are explored, but they are framed by the 
Holocaust: an event which, in its scope of atrocity, is no longer hard to believe, but instead 
hard to imagine. We cannot give ourselves over to our imagination for risk of over-
identification and, as discussed, individual experiences during the Holocaust are impossible 
to contain within language. Therefore, whereas the revelation in Life of Pi challenges 
readers to choose between his/her rational belief or belief in the magical realist world 
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created by Pi, the denouement in Beatrice and Virgil seems absurd and bathetic: the 
ostensibly real subject of the taxidermist’s play is unimaginable as the story of two animals 
trying to talk about ‘The Horrors’, and Henry’s stabbing and the taxidermy going up in 
flames causes the plot to spiral away from any realistic alternative. 
 In short, the distinguishing feature between Life of Pi and Beatrice and Virgil is that 
the latter is a work of Holocaust fiction and must be read as such. To recall Eaglestone, who 
argues that readers must approach Holocaust literature with a range of responsible 
questions in mind, ‘the Holocaust and the texts that refer to it call for a ‘Holocaust reading’, 
an interpretation of cinders, which develops and bears these questions in mind’.184 Moacyr 
Scliar’s Max and the Cats was integral to the inspiration for Life of Pi. The novella tells an 
allegorical story about Nazism in which a Jewish refugee crosses the ocean with a jaguar in 
his boat, yet Martel ignores this crucial element of the story and waits until his following 
novel to attend to the Holocaust. Except as, perhaps, an absent referent, the Holocaust is 
deliberately ignored in Life of Pi, which allows readers to read it one-dimensionally. 
However, it pervades Beatrice and Virgil, to the extent that ‘A 20th Century Shirt’ – far from 
being a separated animal story as in Life of Pi – directly recalls it in a reference to 68 
Nowolipski Street. There are indeed numerous similarities between the two novels: animal 
stories, metatextuality, more specifically the characters’ insistence that they offer 
potentially corrupt evidence for their stories (the meerkat bones in Life of Pi and Virgil’s tail 
in Beatrice and Virgil); moreover, the fact that both texts place a responsibility on their 
readers by offering a choice of stories. However, it is the reciprocity between animal and 
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human suffering in Beatrice and Virgil which both distinguishes it from its successful 
precursor, and calls more urgently for a creaturely reading of the text. 
 
Conclusion 
The key point of departure from Santner’s definition of creatureliness to Pick’s is the 
latter’s refutation that anthropocentrism must be the primary mode through which to 
access a creaturely poetics. Indeed, whereas Santner encounters ‘the opacity and 
recalcitrance that we associate with the materiality of nature’ through human history, and 
attends to the natural world through a process of symbolisation drawn out by humans, Pick 
attempts to gesture towards this opacity by turning away from the human gaze which 
integrates it into our symbolic universe.185 The main difficulty in doing this stems from the 
fact that any work of art which attempts to display the creature is necessarily created and 
viewed through a human lens. To give a simple example: we cannot escape humanity when 
reading a text in our language. However, Pick challenges this hurdle as she suggests that a 
creaturely poetics must highlight such limitations, such as in Elizabeth Costello where the 
protagonist suggests that primates used for research purposes might follow their own sets 
of logic to complete tasks, rather than the ones we interpret them as following (EC, 72-74). 
The point being, here, is that a creaturely poetics as outlined by Pick allows for the 
possibility that our process of symbolisation is not only ethically flawed but also deflects 
reality. This gives rise to another aspect of a creaturely poetics: that the impossibility of 
turning away from a human gaze might itself reflect the opacity of nature. 
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I have explored both models of creatureliness through Beatrice and Virgil by Yann 
Martel, and the best sites of comparison are Virgil’s tail and his howl. Despite Pick’s focus on 
the body and Santner’s preoccupation with unconscious drives and expressions, I felt it 
would be more effective to use Santner’s model of creatureliness to analyse the tail (body) 
and Pick’s model to analyse the howl (voice). This is because Virgil’s tail undergoes a more 
acute process of symbolisation within the novel, as it both belongs to the monkey but marks 
the process of symbolisation undergone through the process of taxidermy. On the other 
hand, Virgil’s howl is an expression of his inability to communicate suffering through 
language, and therefore gestures towards the limitations of symbolisation. Clearly, both 
models have allowed me to explore creatureliness in Beatrice and Virgil and each has 
offered its own points of interest: shifting between two definitions of creatureliness, one of 
which accepts anthropocentricism in literature and the other which devalues it, has given 
me the opportunity to test how ingrained humanism is as a mode of confronting animal 
bodies, and question whether or not there is an alternative mode which allows the body to 
speak. 
To help answer this question, it is useful to analyse these aspects of the novel, 
briefly, by using the opposite models of creatureliness: Pick’s for the tail and Santner’s for 
the howl. Whereas Santner’s anthropocentric model allowed me to conclude that Virgil’s 
creatureliness is a direct result of the taxidermist’s force (physical and symbolic) over his 
body, Pick may start from the understanding that Virgil is a vulnerable creature simply for 
existing within such a body. However, she may go further. As she defines ‘creature’ as ‘first 
and foremost a living body – material, temporal, and vulnerable’, the dead, mounted and 
named figure of Virgil may no longer fit this specification (CP, 5). Instead, Virgil might 
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symbolise the humanist mode of interpretation, where his body (in the taxidermy) and story 
(in the play) are moulded to fit into a human gaze. This is similar to the primate in Elizabeth 
Costello whose actions are interpreted by scientists to fit an anthropocentric gaze, except 
for the fact that whereas Sultan maintains his creatureliness as a living body, Virgil’s 
creatureliness died with him, as did the possibility of representing this creatureliness 
beyond the humanist mode of symbolisation (EC, 72-74). Virgil’s tail, in this case, is the trace 
of his creatureliness. It is evidence that he was once a vulnerable body, and that no amount 
of meticulous taxidermy (or, so far as the metaphor goes: meticulous symbolisation) can 
deny the authority of that body to speak for itself. 
Virgil’s howl – the closest thing to his body ‘speaking for itself’ – as explored through 
Santner’s model of creatureliness, also demands a new interpretation. Previously, I used this 
howl as evidence of a shared narrative of suffering which exists between all creatures. Using 
Pick’s model, I explained how the sound of a body in pain is common to all creatures and 
that, ironically perhaps, the howler monkey’s natural voice ties him most closely with the 
humans who interpret his body and otherwise force him to bear language. When I analysed 
Virgil’s tail through Pick’s model, directly above, I concluded that – through Pick – Virgil’s 
body was not evidence of his creatureliness at all. Similarly, through Santner’s 
anthropocentric model, Virgil’s howl is perhaps the one part of his character which gestures 
towards the impossibility of symbolisation into a human order and, by that logic, it would 
also deny him a creaturely interpretation, were it not for the fact that it is written within an 
allegorical novel. This is because Santner applies creatureliness to animals where they are 
outside of their natural order and therefore resort to acting through drives rather than 
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instinct. As Virgil instinctively howls, this is not the moment which best displays his 
creatureliness through Santner’s model. 
In this regard, a better example of Virgil’s creatureliness might be at the end of the 
play, where he lists items on the ‘Horrors Sewing Kit’ to distract from the fact that the boy is 
about to murder both him and Beatrice (BV, 182, 183). Whereas instinct might tell him to 
run, hide or howl, he is driven to hide within an excess of symbolic language. An aspect of 
Santner’s model which may help to clarify this is his description of the creaturely dimension 
of the neighbour. This is the idea that we must respond to others despite the fact that their 
unconscious drives are outside of our powers of interpretation. Here, Santner defines his 
use of the term ‘neighbor’, through Franz Rosenzweig’s text, The Star of Redemption: 
As I understand it, Rosenzweig’s work suggests that the only way to truly 
understand the concept of love of neighbor is to grasp what it means that he or 
she has an unconscious […]. The being whose proximity we are enjoined to 
inhabit and open to according to the imperative of neighbor love is always a 
subject at odds with itself, split by thoughts, desires, fantasies, and pleasures it 
can never fully claim as its own and that in some sense both do and do not 
belong to it.186 
According to this definition, a neighbour is someone whose desires we cannot access, and 
love of neighbour is the ethical decision to turn towards and respond ethically to that 
person. The reason the final scene of the play fits this concept of the creaturely dimension 
of the neighbour, and suggests ‘the awakening to the answerability to the neighbor [and] to 
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acts of neighbor love’, is that Beatrice and Virgil formulate a language which is symbolic of 
their inability to express the horrors, and paradoxically use it as a language of 
compassion.187 This is because it symbolises the idea that, despite their differences, they 
should engage in neighbourly love until the moment they die. 
This paradox is useful to explore further, because it highlights a subtle difference 
between the two models of creatureliness explored in this chapter. There is something of an 
impasse between two important quotations which relate to the topic of the suffering body, 
which the concept of creatureliness helps to enlighten. One is Jeremy Bentham’s dictum, 
concerning animals, ‘the question is not, Can they reason? nor Can they talk? but Can they 
suffer?’188 As Derrida writes, and Pick recalls, the answer is an “undeniable” yes.189 As 
Bentham moves the debate away from empathising with animals on a moral or intelligible 
plane towards an empathy of suffering, Derrida’s emphatic answer suggests that he does 
not go far enough. Indeed, perhaps it is misguided to even pose this as a question. It is 
possible to debate the nature of their suffering: a Heideggerian may consider an animal’s 
suffering lesser as they are not included in concepts of Dasein, being-towards-death, and 
may not be able to self-reflect on their pains, but these are the sort of debates which, Pick 
would argue, deflect from the point: it is undeniably true that animals physically suffer. The 
other quotation which interests me, though it not explicitly linked to Animal Studies, comes 
from Elaine Scarry’s study on physical suffering: The Body in Pain. Scarry considers the 
unsharability of pain, musing on the fact that one cannot ever grasp what it feels like for 
someone else to be in pain: 
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When one speaks about “one’s own physical pain” and about “another person’s 
physical pain,” one might almost appear to be speaking about to wholly distinct 
orders of events. For the person whose pain it is, it is “effortlessly” grasped (that 
is, even with the most heroic effort it cannot not be grasped); while for the 
person outside the sufferer’s body, what is “effortless” is not grasping it […]. So, 
for the person in pain, so incontestably and unnegotiably present is it that 
“having pain” may come to be thought of as the most vibrant example of what it 
is to “have certainty,” while for the other person it is so elusive that “hearing 
about pain” may exist as the primary model of what it is “to have doubt”.190 
Scarry argues that being in pain is so personal, it cannot be comprehended in that moment 
by anyone except the person in pain. Here, her argument is similar to Derrida’s evaluation of 
the question ‘Can they suffer?’ He argues that ‘Can’ implies a being-able: the question is 
asking whether or not is it possible for an animal to be able to suffer; yet Derrida points out 
that suffering is an inability: ‘“Can they suffer” amounts to asking “Can they not be able?”’191 
Whereas Derrida highlights the inability of animals not to suffer, Scarry also focuses on the 
inability of others to understand another’s suffering. However, to return to the point of 
Bentham’s dictum, he asks us to consider animals outside of a moral sphere: his question 
asks us to empathise with them for our shared vulnerability. The impasse is such that pain 
is, by its nature, unsharable. Scarry argues that hearing about another’s pain is to have 
doubt, whereas Derrida insists that animals undeniably suffer. We are being asked to 
empathise with animals in the one manner that denies our empathy: our unique 
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experiences of pain. For want of a better term, and owing to the paradoxical nature of these 
ideas, I define this shared experience of the unsharable as ‘tangential empathy’. 
Now, as Santner’s model of creatureliness is based on drive rather than instinct, 
tangential empathy – displayed by Beatrice and Virgil at the end of ‘A 20th Century Shirt’ – 
must still be accessed through a process of symbolisation and therefore in a humanist 
mode, which somewhat undercuts the idea that we might empathise on a more 
multidirectional or ‘tangential’ plane. However, Pick’s concept of creatureliness is one way 
of moving beyond the impasse: it is the shared vulnerability of animals and humans, which 
accounts for our not-being-able, that unites us as creaturely beings. In this respect, it was 
enlightening to analyse Beatrice and Virgil through Santner’s model of creatureliness 
because it reminded me to consider how the intricate work of symbolisation, which Martel 
builds in metatextual layers, are inherently humanist. However, Pick’s model inspired me to 
better explore the essential reciprocity between the animal / Holocaust metaphor within 
Beatrice and Virgil. This is because her model refutes the mode of reading the animal body 
through an anthropocentric prism, and as such might encourage authors of Holocaust 
literature and Animal Studies to engage with the creaturely bodies similar to us all. This not 
only constitutes an ethical turn because it attends to animals as real, vulnerable bodies as 
opposed to literary devices or the subjects of philosophical deflections on humanity; it also 
forms the basis of a cultural inquiry into representations of creaturely life – including our 
own – more widely, because it asks us to engage with the inhuman side to our humanity: 
the side which was exposed during the Holocaust, and that which we also share with other 
animals. It is for these reasons that I move forward using Pick’s model of creatureliness to 
inform my thesis into reading Holocaust literature as a creaturely poetics. 
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Chapter Three 
‘The authority of the suffering body’: Creatureliness in Two Novels by J. M. Coetzee 
 
Introduction 
This chapter offers creaturely readings of J. M. Coetzee’s novels Disgrace and 
Elizabeth Costello. Although it is only in Elizabeth Costello that Coetzee directly compares 
animal cruelty to the Holocaust, his oeuvre fixates on creatureliness and draws upon 
atrocity, such as torture and Apartheid, to evoke a heightened understanding of 
vulnerability within his protagonists: from the Magistrate in Waiting for the Barbarians who 
empathises with the barbarians once he has been treated as one, to David Lurie in Disgrace 
who experiences a sort of secular grace working with the corpses of dogs only once he has 
been publically disgraced and then attacked in post-Apartheid South Africa. In both texts, 
the protagonists’ empathy towards creatures is associated with their own fall into 
vulnerability from a position of relative power and safety. This is mirrored in Elizabeth 
Costello through the protagonist’s age. Costello feels closer to animals the more she feels 
her body shutting down, growing tired and fragile, and this culminates in her controversial 
talk comparing the treatment of animals to the treatment of Jews in Nazi Germany.  
However, in Anat Pick’s discussion of creatureliness and the Holocaust, Pick not only 
considers animals and humans as sharing vulnerability, but as being intrinsically joined by it. 
Therefore, Coetzee’s protagonists do not simply become closer to animals the more they fall 
into disgrace, but also become more aware of their humanity. Pick’s first chapter, ‘Humanity 
Unraveled, Humanity Regained’, examines the ‘unravelling of the human’ during the 
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Holocaust, yet it is not contradictory to link that unravelling – that denouement of the 
human – with a greater understanding of what it is to be human.192 As in the denouement of 
a novel, the plot becomes clearer as it unfolds. Indeed, David Lurie is not a fully reformed 
character by the end of Disgrace (for example, he still feels inappropriate sexual yearnings 
towards a young girl). His experiences have not enlightened him – they have not made him 
“more human” – but they have encouraged him to act more humanely towards fellow 
victims, including animals. This chapter considers how victimisation in Coetzee’s oeuvre 
lends itself to a creaturely reading, and how this creatureliness is mirrored in Holocaust 
literature such as – explicitly – Elizabeth Costello but also, through allusions and motifs, 
Disgrace. 
Taking my cue from Anat Pick, whose Creaturely Poetics opens with a quotation by 
Simone Weil and draws on her throughout, I apply Weil’s writing on ‘Human Personality’ to 
Coetzee’s novels, especially Disgrace. In this essay, Weil considers what it is about ourselves 
which remains fundamentally sacred despite hardship and cruelty. She argues that those 
who experience great levels of inexplicable cruelty can become afflicted unless they turn 
their faces heavenward. In another example of her writing, taken from Gravity and Grace, 
she considers ideas of the self and how oneself must be given up to God in order to bear 
affliction. Inexplicable cruelty, affliction and a loss of identity are themes which can be 
applied to Holocaust Literature, but Weil might seem a strange choice to apply to an essay 
on creatureliness as she writes predominantly on humans and largely disregards animals. 
However, as Cora Diamond agrees in her essay on ‘Injustice and Animals’: 
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Just as Weil’s language responds to her sense of the life of human beings, and of 
the connection between that life and the Good, so the communicative pressure 
to extend talk of injustice to animals responds to a sense of their life, and a 
seeing of a connection between their lives and the Good. In both cases, the idea 
is that attention to these lives, seeing their connection with the Good, is capable 
of stopping us from treating them as props in our show.193 
In this essay, Diamond argues that the lives of animals is an important issue when one 
considers ideas of justice and injustice, because giving animals loving attention means that 
one acts out of compassion rather than responding to a demand for rights. Simone Weil 
writes extensively on justice and injustice in comparison to rights in ‘Human Personality’, 
and Diamond argues that Weil’s message can and should be applied to animals because 
‘those who most often have occasion to feel that evil is being done to them are those who 
are least trained in the art of speech’.194 Just because animals cannot speak and therefore 
cannot demand their rights, they should not be treated ‘as props in our show’ but should 
become limit cases to our ideas on acting out of a sense of justice. 
These ideas and themes are explored at length in Coetzee’s oeuvre, but especially in 
Disgrace and Elizabeth Costello. In Disgrace, David Lurie loses his profession, honour and 
dignity, and becomes ever more vulnerable to the play of force in post-Apartheid South 
Africa. Eventually, he learns to bear affliction and live like a dog. Gradually, through this 
process of disgrace, he empathises with animals and learns to give them loving attention as 
vulnerable beings. In Elizabeth Costello, Coetzee’s title character argues against having to 
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make a case for animal rights and chooses instead to appeal to her audience’s sympathetic 
imagination: to imagine oneself into the life of another creature and, as such, to sympathise 
with it and treat it with kindness. This level of sympathy and kindness can be interpreted as 
attention, a key subject on which Weil writes in her consideration of justice and injustice. 
Texts such as Disgrace and Elizabeth Costello are an important addition to studies on 
atrocities such as Apartheid or the Holocaust because they demand we turn our attention to 
vulnerable beings. Moreover, they explore the fact that giving our attention to afflicted 
beings is – although urgent – difficult and painful. I engage with this difficult reality as 
explored by Coetzee and, especially with regard to Elizabeth Costello, consider the role of 
literature in unravelling the paradox of a creaturely poetics: where creatureliness, or the 
reality of vulnerable, suffering bodies, is explored through the medium of fiction. 
 
Creatureliness in Disgrace 
I 
Set in post-Apartheid South Africa, Disgrace (1999) is a novel which draws upon a 
history of oppression against humans considered racially inferior and, in many senses, sub-
human by white perpetrators.195 Although Apartheid laws were passed under the premise 
that both black and white people would benefit from keeping within their racial group, it is 
clear that black people were given less rights than white people, little to no political 
recognition and access to inadequate public services. When the African National Congress 
brought an end to Apartheid in 1994, much work had to be done to unite a divided country. 
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The Truth and Reconciliation Commission, or the TRC, was a political strategy which 
attempted to acknowledge past sufferings of the Apartheid, whilst promoting a future based 
on the concerns of forgiveness, social justice, and a movement toward equality. It offered 
complete amnesty for perpetrators if they told the truth about their crimes against 
humanity, but maintained that the perpetrators faced criminal prosecution if they refused 
to speak up. It also offered victims the chance to speak about how they had suffered under 
the Apartheid regime. The chairman of the TRC was Archbishop Desmond Tutu, whose book 
No Future without Forgiveness (also 1999) echoes the founding principles of the 
commission. How indeed could there be hope of forgiveness, or reconciliation, without 
victims hearing the truth and apologies from those who oppressed their families for 
decades? 
Apartheid, like the Holocaust, was a regime which utilised dehumanisation as a 
method of persecution. It stands to reason that, as black people were given less human 
rights than white people, they were considered and indeed treated as subhuman. In a 
sense, the TRC was a strategy of re-humanising the oppressed black majority: its religious 
rhetoric attempted to make sense of the suffering which was endured, by asking victims to 
speak out and claim back dignity, compensation, and offer forgiveness in return. However, 
in Creaturely Poetics, Anat Pick draws upon Simone Weil to consider the difference between 
suffering as pain which makes sense and affliction as pain which does not. Moreover, Weil 
argues that affliction cannot be articulated. When read through a creaturely prism, these 
ideas challenge the foundations of the TRC as a method of moving forward through 
communication and reconciliation, towards re-humanising the afflicted in post-Apartheid 
South Africa: 
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‘affliction is something apart, specific, and irreducible. It is quite a different thing 
from simple suffering. It takes possession of the soul and marks it through and 
through with its own particular mark, the mark of slavery’.196 
‘Affliction is by its nature inarticulate. The afflicted silently beseech to be given 
words, but ill-chosen ones, because those who choose them know nothing of 
the affliction they would interpret’.197 
‘There is a natural alliance between truth and affliction, because both of them 
are mute suppliants, eternally condemned to stand speechless in our 
presence’.198 
Anat Pick writes that ‘affliction is by far Weil’s most suggestive contribution to the field of 
Holocaust studies’ and I posit that this could be extended to include studies on atrocity 
more widely, including perpetration during the Apartheid.199 In both cases, testimony is 
urgent yet both Holocaust and Apartheid testimonies are littered with lacunae where words 
cannot gesture towards the bare reality of the atrocities. 
Taken from a testimony given at the TRC, a woman speaks out about the loss of a 
loved one: ‘This inside me... fights my tongue. It destroys... words. Before he was blown up, 
they cut off his hands so he could not be fingerprinted... So how do I say this? – this 
trouble... I want his hands back’.200 Marked by ellipses, her speech is helpless in the face of 
such a physical loss. She cannot put into words what these hands – ‘mute suppliants’ 
                                                             
196 Simone Weil, ‘The Love of God and Affliction’, Waiting on God (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), p.38. 
197 Simone Weil, ‘Human Personality’, An Anthology, p.85. 
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marked with affliction – could testify. Furthermore, she faces the challenge of being able to 
fit a truthful and unique account of suffering into the conventions of a story. ‘People do not 
make up stories by themselves’, writes Arthur Frank, ‘storytellers have learned formal 
structures of narrative, conventional metaphors and imagery, and standards of what is and 
is not appropriate to tell.’201 How can any victim keep a ‘formal structure’ when pain is, by 
its very nature, interruptive and uncontrolled? How can ‘conventional metaphors’ suffice? 
How can victims of Apartheid South Africa keep a ‘standard of what is and is not appropriate 
to tell’ when their treatment at the hands of much of the white community kept no moral 
‘standard’ and fell unspeakably below the levels of what could be deemed ‘appropriate’? 
Indeed, ‘to locate these experiences in some familiar narrative, to ‘mediate’ or even 
normalize the atrocity’ is not suitable. 202 The act of fitting an account of suffering into the 
generic conventions of a story, so as the public can understand them, almost makes the 
abuse unexceptional. Primo Levi takes this further, writing, ‘perhaps what happened (The 
Holocaust) cannot be understood, because to understand is almost to justify’.203 Affliction is 
senseless and, as a result, it is unjustifiable (‘to become affliction, suffering must cease to 
make sense, writes Pick).204 In organising public hearings so as victims and perpetrators of 
abuse could share their stories, the TRC aimed to promote a future based on understanding, 
justice through amnesty and forgiveness, and perhaps even grace. However, moving 
forward was never going to be easy when the real victims – those who died due to the 
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Apartheid regime – are absent; when stories cannot give form to the silence of the absence 
of bodies. 
It is affliction and the creatureliness of bodies which I explore in Disgrace, by 
analysing how Coetzee’s novel tropes: spiritual and bodily ramifications of the TRC, and 
response and responsibility towards animal bodies. Both human and animal bodies are 
presented as creaturely in Disgrace, through vulnerability, affliction, and subsequently 
through inarticulacy (‘affliction is by its nature inarticulate’) and impersonality. 
Impersonality is explored by Weil in her essay ‘Human Personality’: the same essay in which 
she sets out the limits of affliction. Defined by Weil, ‘everything which is impersonal in man 
is sacred, and nothing else’.205 The impersonal includes notions of the ‘good’: beauty, truth 
and justice; but never art, science and rights, respectively. Similar to the concept of Platonic 
ideals, art, science and rights can only ever aspire towards the higher forms of beauty, truth 
and justice, and this is why they can never be considered sacred. Weil links this to the idea 
of affliction by stipulating that the most impersonal (and therefore sacred) characteristic in 
every human being is the expectation ‘that good and not evil will be done to him’.206 If this is 
defied by unjust persecution, the place in one’s heart or soul which nursed this expectation 
will cry out, causing great suffering. Weil continues: 
In those who have suffered too many blows, in slaves for example, that place in 
the heart from which the infliction of evil evokes a cry of surprise may seem to 
be dead. But it is never quite dead; it is simply unable to cry out any more. It has 
sunk into a state of dumb and ceaseless lamentation.207 
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It is these people who have been unjustly persecuted so often as to turn away from the 
sacred expectation that good and not evil will be done to them that we might consider to be 
afflicted. These people might include the Musselmanner who permeate Holocaust 
testimonies, who no longer resist their unjust suffering; those who cannot move forward in 
a spirit of reconciliation from the suffering they experienced during Apartheid; and – I argue 
– David Lurie by the end of Disgrace. 
Moreover, although Weil explicitly focuses on ‘Human Personality’ (my emphasis 
added), Pick locates affliction in animals too, citing Weil who writes that ‘those who most 
often have occasion to feel that evil is being done to them are those who are least trained in 
the art of speech’.208 In Disgrace animals are abused because no sense of justice is afforded 
them, so dogs are killed simply for being alive, and a goat is kept alive despite its agony 
simply for being the property of its human owner (D, 83). Yet, Lurie offers an example for 
how an animal can also understand, on the same basic level as a human, just and unjust 
suffering: ‘One can punish a dog […] for an offence like chewing a slipper. A dog will accept 
the justice of that: a beating for a chewing [but] no animal will accept the justice of being 
punished for following its instincts’ (D, 90). Therefore, I shall apply Weil’s understanding of 
affliction to all creatures whereby, recalling Pick, ‘the creature […] is first and foremost a 
living body – material, temporal, and vulnerable’.209 As well as offering one important, albeit 
indirect, comparison between animal suffering and the Holocaust (which I explore in further 
detail, below), a creaturely reading of Disgrace sets the tone for this chapter on Holocaust 
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metaphors in Animal Studies because it is the novel in which Coetzee best explores human 
and animal relations against a backdrop of atrocity and mutual affliction. 
 
II 
Disgrace follows David Lurie, ‘professor of communications’ (D, 3) at a University in 
Cape Town. White, fifty-two years old and twice divorced, he has a rash affair with one of 
his students, Melanie, renamed by Lurie as ‘the dark one’ (D, 18), in which, at least once, his 
sexual advances borders on rape. The news gets out and he is summoned under an article 
which deals with ‘victimization or harassment on grounds of race, ethnic group, religion, 
gender, sexual preference, or physical disability’ (D, 39). He is called to a hearing, chaired by 
the Professor of Religious Studies (D, 47), where a committee attempts to drag from him not 
a legal plea of guilt, but rather a public confession or statement of his wrongdoing. One 
member, Desmond Swarts, is particularly pressing on this point (D, 51-54). Lurie’s answers 
do not please the committee and he is asked to resign from his profession. Lurie leaves Cape 
Town and stays with his daughter, Lucy, in the countryside, where he agrees to help out on 
the land and in an animal welfare clinic. Before too long, Lurie and Lucy are attacked by a 
gang of black men. Lurie is set alight and locked in the bathroom while his daughter is raped 
and her dogs shot. Lucy refuses to tell the police of the sexual assault, despite her father’s 
protests. She is left pregnant. As Lucy’s black neighbours gain more power, her father feels 
stripped of his social standing. He becomes tied to the animal welfare clinic, helping to put 
down stray dogs and dispose of their corpses. He becomes the dog-man. The novel closes as 
Lurie puts down a dog which he has grown, perhaps, to love. 
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 Immediately, one can find many allusions to the TRC, not least in Lurie’s hearing 
where the chairman as Professor of Religious Studies can be seen as a parallel to Archbishop 
Desmond Tutu. One member of the committee, Desmond Swartz, shares the Archbishop’s 
Christian name and, spoken aloud, his surname means ‘black’, reminding readers of a 
black/white dichotomy of which Lurie finds himself a part. The article under which Lurie is 
summoned deals with victimising others of a different sex or race, and although Lurie’s deed 
falls more heavily under a victimisation due to sex, the fact that Melanie is darker skinned 
does not go unnoticed by the committee, who remind Lurie of the case’s ‘overtones’ in such 
a time, and ‘the long history of exploitation’ which precedes him (D, 50, 53). 
 Excepting these specific details, a larger issue ties Lurie’s case to the TRC, concerning 
the question of how he should be judged. The TRC was formed as a compromise to many 
parties’ more extreme post-Apartheid wishes. The rising African National Congress would 
probably have preferred a Nuremburg type trial, whilst the ruling National Party would have 
preferred total amnesty for fear of retribution after their 46 year reign of racist 
oppression.210 Archbishop Tutu’s approach seemed to combine the two, offering amnesty 
for those who wished to humble themselves for forgiveness, their public confessions a 
contentious fusion of the sacred and the secular. In a situation where every slave-owner 
was in the wrong, pleading guilty or not guilty was not the problem: the question was of 
remorse. Ultimately, the aim was to move forward in a spirit of forgiveness, both from the 
victims of Apartheid and from God. 
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In Disgrace, Coetzee shows how these concerns do not easily unite; rather than the 
secular and sacred working together, Lurie’s hearing seems to pull in two opposing 
directions. The committee at once advises Lurie to seek the help of a lawyer and a priest (D, 
49). They do not accept his plea of guilt, but rather want an admission of wrongdoing which 
Lurie refuses to give because it would be ‘beyond the scope of the law’ (D, 55). At the same 
time, they only accept his challenge to the makeup of the committee in a legal sense, and 
wish not to concern themselves with what Lurie calls his ‘philosophical reservations’ (D, 47). 
Most strikingly, they want him to make a statement of contrition (where ‘contrition’ has 
decidedly Catholic connotations) by which they hope, from the words he uses, to ‘divine 
whether it comes from [his] heart’ (D, 54). The use of ‘divine’ is, of course, ironic. It is 
impossible for a human to ‘divine’ such a thing. This is in accordance with Anthony Holiday’s 
critique of the TRC, as he too argues that its Christian and judicial elements were 
contradictory.211 The essence of confession lies in the confession booth, or in the prayer. As 
such, supposing that one can identify the spirit of repentance is almost hubristic. As Lurie 
reasons: 
 
I appeared before an officially constituted tribunal, before a branch of the law. 
Before that secular tribunal I pleaded guilty, a secular plea. That plea should 
suffice. Repentance is neither here nor there. Repentance belongs to another 
world, to another universe of discourse (D, 58). 
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There can be little doubt that Lurie has done something wrong by sleeping with his student, 
but although he acknowledges his guilt in a legal sense, he does not confess a personal 
sense of guilt. Indeed, if it is personal, it cannot be publically confessed. If a public 
confession is called for, there can be no guarantee that the statement is from the heart. 
 However, Anat Pick argues that ‘articulating the encounter between these two 
incommensurable levels [the material world and the sacred] is the defining gesture of a 
creaturely poetics’ (CP, 186). Therefore, ostensibly Coetzee highlights Lurie’s contempt for 
religion in what the character believes should be secular proceedings, in order to encourage 
a creaturely reading of Disgrace. Although the gravity of his crimes are indisputably greater 
than Lurie’s, for the sake of a creaturely reading it is interesting to compare Adolf 
Eichmann’s trial for crimes against humanity with the character’s tribunal. In her report on 
the trial, Hannah Arendt writes that Eichmann: 
stood accused on fifteen counts: “together with others” he had committed 
crimes against the Jewish people, crimes against humanity, and war crimes 
during the whole period of the Nazi regime and especially during the period of 
the Second World War. The Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law of 
1950, under which he was tried, provides that “a person who has committed 
one of these … offenses … is liable to the death penalty.” To each count 
Eichmann pleaded: “Not guilty in the sense of the indictment.” 
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 In what sense then did he think he was guilty? […] His lawyer, Robert Servatius 
of Cologne, […] answered the question in a press interview: “Eichmann feels 
guilty before God, not before the law”.212 
Both Lurie and Eichmann do not recognise religion’s place in a court of law. However, 
contrary to Lurie, Servatius insists that Eichmann feels guilty in a sacred sense rather than in 
a judicial one. Both admit that they are guilty before one or the other, but neither 
understands that there is a significant encounter between the sacred and the secular in 
their trials. Both Eichmann’s defense and Lurie defy their prosecutors on grounds including 
rights and art, respectively: ‘under the then existing Nazi legal system he [Eichmann] had 
not done anything wrong’; Romantics Professor Lurie defends himself on the grounds that 
he ‘became a servant of Eros’ (D, 52).213 Both rights and art can only gesture towards what 
Weil deems the ‘impersonal’, as outlined above: justice and truth. Weil writes that one of 
the results of holding such faculties as art, science and rights above God, truth and justice ‘is 
summed up in Blake’s horrible saying: ‘Sooner murder an infant in its cradle than nurse 
unacted desires”: a quotation which Lurie himself uses in support of his actions against 
Melanie, in the first half of Disgrace (D, 69).214 
 To best outline this discrepancy between rights and justice, Pick once more draws 
upon Weil to conclude that ‘since rights […] are a euphemism for power, they can only yield 
victor’s justice’ (CP, 43). Accordingly, Servatius admits that Eichmann had committed acts 
“for which you are decorated if you win and go to the gallows if you lose”.215 This ‘victor’s 
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justice’, secular and mechanistic, contrasts to impersonal justice, which is sacred if not 
godly. Impersonal justice is based on the concept of obligations above rights. In ‘The Needs 
of the Soul’ – the first section of the longer work The Need for Roots – Simone Weil writes 
that: 
a man left alone in the universe would have no rights whatsoever, but he would 
have obligations. […] Rights are always found to be related to certain conditions. 
Obligations alone remain independent of conditions. They belong to a realm 
situated above all conditions, because it is situated above this world.216 
Eichmann was obligated not to commit crimes against humanity even if he acted in 
accordance with his rights; Lurie is obligated to repent even if he does not believe in the 
conditions set out by his tribunal. Acting in accordance with one’s rights may mean that you 
can avoid punishment, but acting in accordance with one’s obligations means that – 
whether or not you are rewarded or punished for doing so – you have acted with an 
impersonal sense of justice. 
 One of the ‘conditions’ which accompanies rights is force. To recall Pick’s quotation: 
‘rights are a euphemism for power’. Two further quotations by Pick and Weil, respectively, 
elucidate how this applies to Eichmann and Lurie: 
‘When, in the sway of force, one meets with weak or no resistance, it is easy to 
forget one’s own essential vulnerability’ (CP, 46). 
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“when someone does not have the capacity to refuse, one is not going to look 
for a way of obtaining his consent” is not just Machiavellian but describes 
precisely the workings of interspecies justice (CP, 43). 
Arendt writes that Eichmann ‘would have killed his own father if he had received an order to 
that effect’.217 He was a weak-willed man who played a key role in genocide in order to gain 
power and, more significantly, because those with more power than him told him to do so. 
In Lurie’s case, the interplay of power and vulnerability is just as interesting. His crime 
against Melanie is never defined as rape, but it is clear that Lurie exerted force over a young 
woman who did not refuse, though clearly wished to. Whether or not this act would stand 
up in a court as rape, Lurie had an obligation not to commit it: 
She does not resist. All she does is avert herself: avert her lips, avert her 
eyes. She lets him lay her out on the bed and undress her: she even helps him, 
raising her arms and then her hips. Little shivers of cold run through her; as soon 
as she is bare, she slips under the quilted counterpane like a mole burrowing, 
and turns her back on him. 
Not rape, not quite that, but undesired nevertheless, undesired to the 
core. As though she had decided to go slack, die within herself for the duration, 
like a rabbit when the jaws of the fox close on its neck. So that everything done 
to her might be done, as it were, far away (D, 25). 
Explicitly, Lurie narrates that he was met ‘with no resistance’ and so he has sex with her, 
forgetting that acting upon the force of his desire – as ‘a servant of Eros’ – leaves them both 
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vulnerable. Perhaps Melanie has the capacity to refuse but, whether it is because Lurie is 
her professor or for any number of other ‘conditions’, she feels unable to do so. Instead, she 
goes slack and lets Lurie exert his power over her. It is most telling that he compares her to 
animals: a mole, and then a rabbit at the mercy of a fox; later, to a bird (D, 32, 34). Even 
Melanie’s averted gaze recalls Rainer Maria Rilke’s eighth Duino Elegy: the poem which 
opens Eric Santner’s study On Creaturely Life: 
With all its eyes the natural world [die Kreatur] looks out 
into the Open. 
[…] 
Or someone dies and is it. 
For, nearing death, one doesn’t see death; but stares 
beyond perhaps with an animal’s vast gaze.218 
This open gaze, mirrored in Melanie’s averted eyes and mental distance from her body, 
evokes the creature: sensory, vulnerable. These creatures are unable to refuse the power 
exerted on them by predators, such as humans, because they do not have voices. This is the 
sense of ‘interspecies justice’ of which Pick writes. Unlike impersonal justice, it relies on the 
condition that one may exert his force over another, simply because he can. 
 It is with something closer to a sense of impersonal justice that Lurie goes to visit 
Melanie’s father towards the end of Disgrace. As a religious man, Mr Isaacs invites Lurie to 
                                                             
218 Rainer Maria Rilke, Duino Elegies & The Sonnets to Orpheus, trans. and ed. Stephen Mitchell (New York: 
Vintage Books, 2009), p.49. 
167 
 
his home in order to ‘break bread’ with his family (D, 167). After the dinner, and despite the 
clear discomfort of his wife and youngest daughter, Mr Isaacs encourages Lurie to speak 
further about his affair with Melanie, and eventually receives the apology for which he had 
been waiting (D, 171). Mr Isaacs pushes Lurie to ask himself what God wants from him, and 
Lurie replies: 
As for God, I am not a believer, so I will have to translate what you call God and 
God’s wishes into my own terms. In my own terms, I am being punished for 
what happened between myself and your daughter. I am sunk into a state of 
disgrace from which it will not be easy to lift myself. It is not a punishment I have 
refused. I do not murmur against it. On the contrary, I am living it out from day 
to day, trying to accept disgrace as my state of being (D, 172). 
Despite Lurie’s previously condescending attitude towards the comingling of the religious 
and the secular in his tribunal, here he speaks of godlessness in sacred terms: punishment 
and the acceptance of disgrace. He is ‘articulating the encounter between these two 
incommensurable levels’ (the material world and the sacred), in what Pick agrees ‘is the 
defining gesture of a creaturely poetics’ (CP, 186). Lurie acknowledges that his behaviour 
towards Melanie was sacrilegious and therefore deserving of punishment, even though he 
has no belief in God. Indeed, his disbelief in God is what makes his gesture so creaturely: he 
acts not in order to save his soul, but rather because he has come to believe that the body 
itself is sacred; that in using force against Melanie’s vulnerable body, he acted disgracefully. 
Moreover, the force of his desire made him aware of his own vulnerability: a vulnerability 
which resurfaces when he sees and desires her younger sister. Indeed, after speaking to Mr 
Isaacs, Lurie prostrates himself in front of Mrs Isaacs and the schoolgirl: 
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With careful ceremony he gets to his knees and touches his forehead to the 
floor. 
Is that enough? he thinks. Will that do? If not, what more? […] 
He meets the mother’s eyes, then the daughter’s, and again the current leaps, 
the current of desire (D, 173). 
Weil’s idea that ‘to define force – it is that x that turns anybody who is subjected to it into a 
thing’ is most appropriate in Lurie’s case.219 He is no reformed soul – he still yearns to take 
control of this young woman – but he hands power over to the women even as he seeks to 
force himself upon the most vulnerable of them. By supplicating himself, he acknowledges 
his vulnerability – his thingliness – despite (or perhaps because of) the force which compels 
his desire. In this sense, he remains constantly attuned to his own vulnerability and 
therefore respects the vulnerability of others. In other words, he relinquishes power in the 
moment that he feels forced (that forcefield around ‘the current of desire’) to exert it. 
 
III 
Many factors have contributed to Lurie’s respect for the vulnerable body, including 
the attack on Lucy’s farm when he was powerless to help his daughter, as he was set alight 
and locked in a toilet. However, a true sense of impersonal justice is not when one is unable 
to exert his power on vulnerable bodies but rather when one is able and chooses not to do 
so. Weil discusses this in her essay on The Iliad, in which she describes the epic as ‘the poem 
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of force’. In it, she considers the force that men use over other men and, inescapably, the 
same force which bears upon them. The old saying ‘he that takes the sword, will perish by 
the sword’ is rarely more apt than in the Iliad, where force lays everyone bare.220 In her 
analysis of Weil’s essay, Pick notes that: 
Justice is possible only in the form of a disturbance to the crushing impulses of 
power. This disturbance consists in the recognition of the reality of vulnerability 
and its relation to the sacred – a religious recognition. It alone can deliver justice 
or liberty that are not a mere reshuffling of power (CP, 46). 
Here, Pick argues that it is in moments of reflection – reflection upon the fact that power is 
a double-edged-sword which at once turns others and yourself into a vulnerable body – that 
one can act with a sense of justice. This is why Lurie acts justly when he prostrates himself 
before Desiree: he reflects upon his desire for her but chooses instead to give up his power. 
For similar reasons, this is why Lurie acts justly when he takes care of the animals at Bev 
Shaw’s clinic. Even when force has turned live dogs into things (they have become corpses), 
Lurie acts out of a sense of obligation and tends to these powerless bodies. 
 The process by which Lurie and Bev Shaw euthanize the dogs is creaturely, even 
though it exerts force over them. This is because they act out of love, which once more 
suggests that they treat these vulnerable bodies in a sacred manner, despite Lurie not 
believing in God: 
Sunday has come again. He and Bev Shaw are engaged in one of their sessions of 
Lösung. One by one he brings in the cats, then the dogs: the old, the blind, the 
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halt, the crippled, the maimed, but also the young, the sound – all those whose 
term has come. One by one Bev touches them, speaks to them, comforts them, 
and puts them away, then stands back and watches while he seals up the 
remains in a black plastic shroud. 
 He and Bev do not speak. He has learned by now, from her, to concentrate all 
his attention on the animal they are killing, giving it what he no longer has 
difficulty in calling by its proper name: love (D, 218-219). 
Christian connotation saturates the text: the sessions are held on the Lord’s day; the litany 
of animals brought in reads like a pantheon of suffering people waiting to be blessed by 
Christ; indeed, Bev Shaw ‘touches them’ one by one in a manner which seems as though she 
is looking to heal rather than to put to rest; the disposal bags are dignified with the term 
‘shroud’. The imagery does not stop with the dogs: there is a stoic and suffering goat which 
is evocative of the scapegoat (D, 82-83); Lurie wants to ‘ask for forgiveness’ after eating the 
flesh of Petrus’ sheep, though he never specifies from whom (D, 131); elsewhere, Lurie 
describes Bev Shaw as ‘not a veterinarian but a priestess’ (D, 84). Therefore, it is no great 
leap to compare this above scene with Simone Weil’s description of how only God’s love can 
soothe afflicted souls: 
Only by the supernatural working of grace can a soul pass through its own 
annihilation to the place where alone it can get the sort of attention which can 
attend to truth and to affliction. It is the same attention which listens to both of 
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them. The name of this intense, pure, disinterested, gratuitous, generous 
attention is love.221 
The parallels between these two description are evident: from the fact that both Coetzee 
and Weil redefine this level of complete attention as love, to the similar states of grace 
which Weil stipulates and Coetzee tropes through his novel’s title and religious imagery. Yet, 
no religious allegory is told through this scene, which comes in the final chapter of a novel 
depicting brutal reality: sex abuse, shootings, post-Apartheid struggle despite the best 
intentions of the TRC, and a main character who explicitly does not believe in God. 
Anat Pick writes similarly about religious imagery in the film Au hasard Balthazar, 
directed by Robert Bresson, in which the camera follows the life of a donkey who is exposed 
to trials and tribulations throughout his life. Pick argues that, despite religious imagery, 
Bresson is not directing an anthropocentric film which turns the suffering of a donkey into a 
lesson for mankind, but rather that he wishes to focus on a creature, its vulnerability and its 
suffering: 
It […] seems to me mistaken to regard Au hasard Balthazar as a religious 
allegory, with the donkey as the innocent Christ figure. Although the film 
contains much allegorical paraphernalia, Balthazar does not stand in for 
anything or anyone. He is quite literally the embodiment of creaturely suffering. 
A process of interpretation that replaces the donkey with the idea of a suffering 
humanity (or with Christ who suffers for humanity) with a view to a redemptive 
meaning of the animal’s death at the end of the film does not do justice to 
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Bresson’s insistence on blind necessity and chance as the world’s operative 
modes, nor to the bleakness with which he views humanity (CP, 190). 
As in Disgrace, Au hasard Balthazar simultaneously invites and resists allegorising. The 
donkey may seem to be a suffering Christ figure, but there is no trace of redemption at the 
end of the film: the final shot of the film shows Balthazar dead, just as the final line in 
Disgrace is Lurie giving up his favourite dog to Bev Shaw’s clinic; a dog which Lurie ‘bear[s] in 
his arms like a lamb’, evoking Christ. Yet, biblically, this scene would be followed by one of 
resurrection, where here there is none. Instead, as in Balthazar, an animal is given up out of 
‘blind necessity’: there are ‘too many’ of them, so they must be culled (D, 85). The typically 
forceful act of killing is carried out with love, so that it seems as though it is nature and its 
‘operative modes’, rather than the two characters, which forces these creatures to term. 
Anat Pick considers how Weil’s writings on Marxism might be considered creaturely, and her 
summary is most applicable to these two, final scenes: 
 
Both power and justice are conceived nonanthropocentrically. Humanity’s 
susceptibility to the inhumanities of force (gravity) and to the good (grace) has 
little to do with the faculties of reason or language. The material and the 
supernatural meet for Weil in the reality of vulnerable bodies whose oppression 
is not a crime against humanity but a violation of the sacred (CP, 48). 
Here, ‘gravity’ and ‘grace’ denote the interplay between the sacred and the material. Pick 
argues that justice, as outlined above, is in relation to the impersonal part of ourselves. 
Acting justly, or in a good manner, means that one must reflect on our ability to exert force 
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on others not anthropocentrically, but rather with an appreciation of the sacred in material 
bodies. Therefore, Balthazar’s abuse or the rapists shooting dogs in Disgrace should not be 
reconceived as an allegory for crimes against humanity, but it should be recognised as 
creaturely suffering and subsequently as a violation of the sacred’. Lurie and Bev Shaw act 
impersonally nonetheless because they are forced to kill these dogs, and choose to do so in 
a manner which respects the sanctity of their bodies – hence the religious imagery. 
 
 Although allegorising this suffering to fit with crimes against humanity counteracts a 
creaturely reading of Disgrace, Coetzee certainly allows both to be considered within his 
novel. For example, Lurie uses the term ‘Lösung’ to describe the euthanasia killings of these 
animals. Previously, he defined this as ‘sublimation’ (D, 142) but a more apt translation 
would be ‘solution’: a term which is highly evocative of the Final Solution of Nazi Germany. 
Moreover, after the killings, Lurie takes the dogs’ corpses to be incinerated, which further 
invites comparison to the Holocaust. The religious imagery during the killings, followed by a 
religious reference to the incinerator (‘On the seventh day it rests’ (D, 145)), seems to 
confound any direct comparison to the atrocity, but when one considers the religious 
gravity given to the term ‘holocaust’ this does not seem so strange. As Bruno Bettelheim 
highlights, ‘the correct definition of “holocaust” is “burnt offering”’.222 Undoubtedly, 
Coetzee recalls the Holocaust in Disgrace, albeit to a far less explicit extent than in Elizabeth 
Costello when parallels between animal cruelty and the Holocaust are explored at length. 
Not only does the term Lösung recall the genocide, but religious imagery fits with the 
original use of the word ‘holocaust’ for burnt offering, and the fire motif within Disgrace 
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further fits with this term. For example, Lurie repeats ‘burned, burnt’ and once ‘burnt up’ 
three times within the novel: with Lucy, whilst reminiscing on teaching; after he has been 
set alight in the toilet; and finally when apologising for his affair to Mr Isaacs (D, 71, 97, 
166). Bettelheim goes on to denounce the term as that which refers to the genocide of the 
Jews because ‘using a word with such strong unconscious religious connotations when 
speaking of the murder of millions of Jews robs the victims of this abominable mass murder 
of the only thing left to them: their uniqueness’. Coetzee evokes the Holocaust to consider 
killing dogs in post-Apartheid South Africa, before which Lurie: was fired from his profession 
for sexual misconduct, was attacked, his daughter was raped and her dogs were cruelly 
shot. However, in doing so I do not believe that Coetzee is compromising the uniqueness of 
the Holocaust, nor any one of these events. Instead, Coetzee brings together the Holocaust, 
the Apartheid, animal cruelty and all of these other individual atrocities in order to consider 
the vulnerability of bodies shared by all creatures. 
 
 Coetzee couples this vulnerability with godlessness, leading to a novel about 
affliction. This is foregrounded by the title, Disgrace, where ‘dis-’ implies a turning-away-
from, or simply an apartness. Therefore, ‘disgrace’ is literally the state of being apart from 
God. In ‘Love of God’, Simone Weil considers how important it is to remain facing God 
despite life’s hardships: ‘a blind mechanism, heedless of degrees of spiritual perfection, 
continually tosses men about and throws some of them at the very foot of the Cross. It rests 
with them to keep or not to keep their eyes turned toward God through all the jolting’.223 
She argues that those who are afflicted have turned their gaze away from God. In an 
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interview with Derek Attridge, Coetzee uses a similar metaphor to consider intimations of 
freedom as Weil uses to consider faith in God: ‘I am someone who has intimations of 
freedom (as every chained prisoner has) and constructs representations – which are 
shadows themselves – of people slipping their chains and turning their faces to the light’.224 
Coetzee writes this shortly after considering duty as ‘transcendental imperative’, and an 
awareness of justice as something which ‘transcends laws and law making’.225 Similarities 
between this and Weil’s work on obligation and justice are evident. Both consider absence 
as a force on humanity, though Weil understands God’s presence as being contained within 
that absence, and Coetzee understands that it is a person’s intimations toward freedom and 
justice that transcend these concepts’ worldly absence. Moreover, Coetzee acknowledges 
that his novels are ‘shadows themselves’ of these intimations towards a higher force, 
meaning that they are at a further remove from truth: an idea he explores through the motif 
of the suffering body as that which cannot be represented in words. 
 
 It is this suffering, vulnerable body which unites humans and animals in Coetzee’s 
novel (and oeuvre) where Weil considers only humanity. Lurie, Lucy, Melanie, along with 
countless animals, are subject to force within Disgrace. They all suffer bodily abuse at the 
hands of others. The Isaacs family, with their belief in God, and the TRC style proceedings 
through which Lurie is expected to pass, posit Disgrace as a humanist text in which the 
vulnerable suffer but maintain a sense of impersonal justice. In line with Weil’s writing on 
God, justice and affliction, those characters are not afflicted because they remain transfixed 
by God ‘through all the jolting’. However, Coetzee’s godless characters: Lurie, Lucy and the 
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animals, are afflicted. They are truly ‘creaturely’ as their vulnerable bodies are in no way 
martyred in the name of a higher justice or truth. Nonetheless, Coetzee recognises 
something sacred in these characters: they accept affliction as a part of their lives, and they 
live according to it. This is shown nowhere better than when Lucy, pregnant after being 
raped, tells Lurie that she will give everything up in order to remain on the farm: 
 
‘Go to Petrus and tell him what I have said. Tell him I give up the land. Tell him 
that he can have it, title deed and all. He will love that.’ 
There is a pause between them. 
‘How humiliating,’ he says finally. ‘Such high hopes, and to end like this.’ 
‘Yes, I agree, it is humiliating. But perhaps that is a good point to start from 
again. Perhaps that is what I must learn to accept. To start at ground level. With 
nothing. Not with nothing but. With nothing. No cards, no weapons, no 
property, no rights, no dignity.’ 
‘Like a dog’ 
‘Yes, like a dog.’ (D, 205). 
 
Lucy also accepts that she will become Petrus’ property as his wife, simply in order to 
remain. Without giving up her farm and her name – even her baby – to Petrus, she knows 
that she will be driven out. As she and Lurie were attacked before, she would be attacked 
again, and she would be powerless to stop it. This is why she gives everything up. The 
similarities between this extract and Weil’s writing on affliction are striking: 
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‘Human thought is unable to acknowledge the reality of affliction. To 
acknowledge the reality of affliction means saying to oneself: ‘I may lose at any 
moment, through the play of circumstances over which I have no control, 
anything whatsoever that I possess, including those things which are so 
intimately mine that I consider them as being myself. There is nothing that I 
might not lose. It could happen at any moment that what I am might be 
abolished and replaced by anything whatsoever of the filthiest and most 
contemptible sort. 
 To be aware of this in the depth of one’s soul is to experience non-being. It is 
the state of extreme and total humiliation which is also the condition for passing 
over into truth’.226 
 
Both Lurie and Weil highlight the humiliation which accompanies affliction; both suggest 
that those who are afflicted lose everything; the only difference is that where Weil writes 
that it is impossible for humans to acknowledge their affliction, Lucy accepts that her loss 
and humiliation is a part of her new life in South Africa. Lurie cannot accept this and, in the 
following chapter, he attacks one of Lucy’s rapists after seeing the boy spy on his daughter. 
Lucy admonishes this attack and Lurie leaves with the final thought that ‘Lucy may be able 
to bend to the tempest; he cannot, not with honour’ (D, 209). It is this sense of honour 
which he retains and Lucy does not which drives him from the farm. At this point, Lurie is 
not ready to give everything up as Lucy does in order to ‘pass over into truth’ – which may 
be, in this case – accepting a new way of living. 
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Perhaps this is why Lurie’s last words in Disgrace are, with regard to the dog, ‘I am 
giving him up’. Like Lucy, he learns that he must start again with nothing. Whether this 
passing over into truth is a sense of self-knowledge (Lurie must adapt to fit with a changing 
South Africa) or whether it is a natural sense of justice after the crimes of Apartheid (Lurie 
asks his daughter whether she keeps her baby in order to ‘expiate the crimes of the past’) is 
left ambiguous (D, 112). However, it is clear that they must both give up in order to continue 
living in post-Apartheid South Africa. Indeed, the next and final time Lurie sees Lucy in 
Disgrace she is ‘the picture of health’, in a peaceful scene of what Lurie considers 
recognisable ‘beauty’ (D, 218). Weil follows the above passage by considering how ‘the spirit 
of truth and justice’ are what allows complete, gratuitous attention and love to blossom, 
and this blossoming is that which is most purely beautiful: ‘everything produced by a man in 
every sphere, when he is ruled by the spirit of justice and truth, is endowed with the 
radiance of beauty’.227 She continues: beauty ‘feeds only the part of the soul that gazes. 
While exciting desire, it makes clear that there is nothing in it to be desired, because the 
one thing we want is that it should not change’.228 The scene in which Lurie describes Lucy 
amongst the flowerbeds is idyllic. He gazes at her, not wanting to break the ‘spell’ (D, 218). 
Aware of the sense that she is ‘solid in her existence’, Lurie describes his daughter as ‘das 
ewig Weibliche’: the eternal woman, which echoes Weil’s description of the beauty of truth 
and justice as being unchanging (D, 217-218). 
Weil writes on subjects such as truth and justice through a humanist prism, but 
Coetzee explores these subjects with the knowledge that, in Pick’s words, ‘being human is 
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grappling with what is inhuman in us’.229 This is why Pick’s understanding of creatureliness is 
more suited to Disgrace than Eric Santner’s which is, loosely speaking: 
 
a dimension not so much of a biological as of ontological vulnerability, a 
vulnerability that permeates human being as that being whose essence it is to 
exist in forms of life that are, in turn, contingent, fragile, susceptible to 
breakdown.230 
 
 Here, Santner argues that humanity is fundamentally implicated in the knowledge that we 
are creaturely beings. However, Pick turns this on its head: she argues that – in the wake of 
the Holocaust – ‘the notion of crimes against humanity is the juridical trace of the coming to 
consciousness of humanity’s mortality’.231 In Disgrace, to bear affliction, one must accept 
the unravelling of humanity: like Lucy, one must give up what makes us human in order to 
bear affliction and live ‘like a dog’. The only distinction between Lucy and a dog is not 
ontological; it is biological. In fact, in the peaceful tableaux with Lucy, she is joined by – or 
perhaps paired with – her bulldog: ‘a patch of fawn on the path beside her’ (D, 217). This, 
Lucy seems to be suggesting, is the only way to move forward after crimes against humanity 
(the Holocaust but also, in Disgrace, Apartheid and the constant threat of rape). To live 
through affliction is the condition in which she can pass ‘over into truth’, where truth is not 
contingent with God (as in Weil) but rather with a secular sense of eternity, undeterred by 
and accepting of her bodily vulnerability. 
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 Therefore, creatureliness is explored in Disgrace through sacred attitudes towards 
the secular and an acceptance of affliction. Lurie, who once justified his actions by Blake’s 
dictum ‘to nurse unacted desires’ later falls victim to the force of circumstances outside of 
his control and, afflicted, supplicates himself before the family of his victim, all the while 
nursing unacted desires towards Desiree. In accordance with Pick’s definition of affliction as 
suffering which ceases to make sense, Lurie becomes the ‘dogman’ and saves ‘the honour of 
corpses because there is no one else stupid enough to do it’ (D, 146).232 He attends to 
afflicted creatures by putting them down with complete attention and love. Finally, the 
creaturely body is epitomised by Lucy handing over everything which defines her to Petrus, 
in an act which allows her to survive and indeed blossom in post-Apartheid South Africa. 
 
To explore creatureliness through an amalgamation of the sacred and the secular, and 
an acceptance of affliction, is to mirror the acts of the TRC, whose attitude was one of 
repentance, justice and working up from a state of base affliction through perpetrators 
recognising their crimes against humanity and victims issuing their forgiveness. Coetzee 
recognises that Disgrace, as a novel, cannot ever fully convey affliction because words 
cannot ever express the inarticulacy of the suffering body: The standard is the body. 
Whatever else, the body is not "that which is not" and the proof that it is the pain that it 
feels.233 Coetzee defines stories ‘by their irresponsibility: they are “that which is not”.234 By 
stating that ‘the body is not “that which is not”’, he suggests the body’s adverse is the story. 
Therefore, to discuss the significance of affliction and the suffering body in Coetzee’s fiction 
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seems paradoxical. As above, these representations of suffering are but ‘shadows 
themselves’. However, Simone Weil writes of how intimations of these truths are held in 
beautiful writing: 
 
And it sometimes happens that a fragment of inexpressible truth is reflected in 
words which, although they cannot hold the truth that inspired them, have 
nevertheless so perfect a formal correspondence with it that every mind seeking 
that truth finds support in them. Whenever this happens a gleam of beauty 
illuminates the words.235 
Inarticulate, creaturely affliction cannot be expressed, but Coetzee suggests this in his novel 
which contemplates: the paradox of a public confession (Lurie’s tribunal, mirroring TRC 
hearings); the impossibility of articulating the suffering body; and the sacred secularity of 
the impersonal, as that which – when all else is given up – remains. For all of these reasons, 
Coetzee gestures towards a creaturely poetics in Disgrace. 
 
Creatureliness in Elizabeth Costello 
I 
In her essay ‘The Difficulty of Reality and the Difficulty of Philosophy’, Cora Diamond 
draws upon Ted Hughes’ poem ‘Six Young Men’ and J. M. Coetzee’s novel Elizabeth Costello 
to help elucidate her thoughts on the difficulty of reality: a phrase which she borrows from 
John Updike and defines as ‘experiences in which we take something in reality to be 
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resistant to our thinking it, or possibly to be painful in its inexplicability, difficult in that way, 
or perhaps awesome and astonishing in its inexplicability’.236 In Hughes’ poem, this difficult 
reality is epitomised in the photograph of six young, smiling men in 1914 who all died within 
the following six months. The difficulty here is an impasse one might feel in viewing a 
photograph so instilled with life, knowing – but not quite believing – that these men could 
seem so alive and yet no longer exist. Diamond focusses on the final stanza of Hughes’ 
poem: 
That man’s not more alive whom you confront 
And shake by the hand, see hale, hear speak loud, 
Than any of these six celluloid smiles are, 
Nor prehistoric or, fabulous beast more dead; 
No thought so vivid as their smoking-blood: 
To regard this photograph might well dement, 
Such contradictory permanent horrors here 
Smile from the single exposure and shoulder out 
One’s own body from its instant and heat.237 
The contradiction of which Hughes writes is enough to ‘dement’ anyone who looks at the 
photograph and cannot reconcile the knowledge that no one was ‘more alive’ than these 
men, yet no one or nothing is now ‘more dead’. 
In Elizabeth Costello a similar impasse is reached by an old woman who cannot 
understand how people can eat meat. After delivering two lectures (which make up the 
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majority of Coetzee’s novella ‘The Lives of Animals’), she breaks down in her son’s car and 
admits: 
I no longer know where I am. I seem to move around perfectly easily among 
people, to have perfectly normal relations with them. Is it possible, I ask myself, 
that all of them are participants in a crime of stupefying proportions? Am I 
fantasizing it all? I must be mad! Yet every day I see the evidences. The very 
people I suspect produce the evidence, exhibit it, offer it to me. Corpses. 
Fragments of corpses that they have bought for money (EC, 114). 
Similar to Hughes, Coetzee highlights the madness Costello feels when confronted by this 
difficulty reality. Diamond does not focus on this madness in her essay except to write that 
‘to attempt to think [this or any other difficult reality] is to feel one’s thinking come 
unhinged’.238 This is the ‘difficulty of philosophy’ to which she refers in her title. In other 
words, one must try not to deflect the thought or make sense of it through philosophical 
discourse, rather one should try to appreciate this difficulty as an inherent paradox with 
ideas of what it means to be human. A further difficulty arises through the fact that 
Elizabeth Costello is a character in a novel and, as such, her difficult reality is expressed 
through the fiction which circumscribes her reality. Specifically, her difficulty (the difficulty 
she faces rather than the difficulty of eating animals anyone else – such as Coetzee himself – 
might face) is an unreality. This further remove from reality is an angle which Diamond 
chooses not to explore at length, it not being a central issue in her paper, but one which I 
shall explore in more depth because of the literary focus of this thesis. 
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 Diamond’s essay gestures towards many subjects explored by Simone Weil and 
therefore, at a further remove, Anat Pick in her Creaturely Poetics. These subjects include 
the senselessness (or madness) of affliction; the inability of the afflicted to explain their 
affliction and, therefore, the inability of anyone to listen to those who are afflicted; and 
beauty and goodness (which makes up a large proportion of the fourth section in Diamond’s 
essay). This final subject seems contradictory with the horror of death and annihilation 
otherwise covered in Hughes’ poem, Costello’s lectures and the death camps, but in fact it is 
essential to thinking about the difficulty of reality. Diamond argues that acts of goodness in 
a bad place, such as individual acts of kindness during the Holocaust, are as difficult to 
comprehend as the evil committed in what seems to be a good society. However, I posit 
that the connection between beauty, goodness and difficult realities is even tighter. Indeed, 
the death of the six men in Hughes’ poem would not seem so demented were they not 
smiling in the photograph; Elizabeth would not be so confused were she not to maintain 
normal relations and see ‘human kindness’ in the eyes of those she loves; the horrors of the 
death camps would not be so difficult to fathom were they not carried out in a world which 
seemingly values kindness, justice and beauty (EC, 115). In ‘Human Personality’ Weil shows 
us how these values are not as they seem and how, in fact, we are not confused by beauty 
and goodness but rather by such lesser concepts as art and rights. Indeed, Weil refers to 
truth and beauty as supernatural concepts towards which human beings must aspire. As 
they are supernatural, we must detach ourselves from our states of being in order to turn 
our faces towards them: ‘To use them legitimately one must avoid referring them to 
anything humanly conceivable’.239 She argues that if we can extend our notions of rights and 
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art to the realms of justice and beauty, then they would be ‘indispensable’ as the only cure 
to affliction.240 Therefore, Weil’s essay is integral to understanding the relationship between 
the difficulty of reality and the difficulty of philosophy. These concepts are, in turn, integral 
to this chapter and the thesis at large because the reality of our own creaturely bodies is at 
odds with philosophising our humanity. 
Diamond incorporates a quotation by Weil into ‘The Difficulty of Reality and The 
Difficulty of Philosophy’ but otherwise she is not a focus. Instead, Diamond draws heavily on 
Simone Weil in her essay ‘Injustice and Animals’ which considers the difference between 
rights and justice: a key subject in Weil’s essay ‘On Human Personality’ and which Diamond 
extends to include animals. Therefore, I shall consider both of Diamond’s essays in my 
creaturely reading of Elizabeth Costello as well as, more focally, selected essays by Simone 
Weil and Creaturely Poetics by Anat Pick. This allows me to explore Coetzee’s novel in two 
further sections which consider: creatureliness and the sympathetic imagination in 
Costello’s lectures, and the Holocaust and animal suffering in Elizabeth Costello. 
‘Sympathetic imagination’ is a term used by Thomas Nagel in his essay ‘What is it like to be a 
bat?’, to which Costello refers in her lecture on ‘The Philosophers and the Animals’ and 
extends to consider how a lack of sympathetic imagination leads to such atrocities as the 
Holocaust and, ostensibly, eating animals. It involves putting oneself in the shoes (or the 
wings, or the hooves) of those whose realities we find difficult to perceive. It is useful to 
consider the sympathetic imagination, potentially as that which goes some way to 
overcoming the difficulty of reality, but possibly as that which leads to it because of the 
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madness Costello herself feels when considering the lives of animals in a world which seems 
to foster beauty and goodness. 
 
II 
Chapters Three and Four of Elizabeth Costello consist of two lectures which Costello 
delivers on the subject of animals: ‘The Philosophers and the Animals’ and ‘The Poets and 
the Animals’. It also includes the context and response to these lectures: tensions during 
Costello’s stay with her son and his wife Norma, the conversations in which Costello 
participates after her first lecture, and the interview with a philosopher called Thomas 
O’Hearne after her second lecture. These chapters were delivered by Coetzee over two days 
at Princeton University, in a series of lectures known as the Tanner Lectures. The purpose of 
the Tanner Lectures is, to this day, to reflect upon human values through academic learning. 
Undoubtedly, Costello and by extension Coetzee deliver lectures which reflect upon 
human values, but these values are specifically with regard to non-humans. They are about 
our relationships with animals: in ‘The Philosophers and the Animals’ Costello’s focus is how 
we eat animals, and in ‘The Poets and the Animals’ her focus is how we embody animals, 
through literature but by extension in our everyday lives. Her choice to deliver her lectures 
in this order is curious not only because she is an author and therefore reputed in the field 
literature rather than philosophy, but also because her opening lecture is more polemical 
and, indeed, divides her audience to such an extent that one honoured guest refuses to 
attend the dinner after her paper because of the comparison she draws between factory 
farming and the Holocaust (EC, 94). Furthermore, one might argue that her lecture on eating 
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meat would be more affecting were her audience to have listened the day before on how 
we might inhabit the bodies of fellow creatures through the sympathetic imagination in 
literature. Ostensibly, hearing about our abuse of animals after identifying with them could 
have driven home a more compelling message. However, when answering a question from 
the floor on what message she is giving, Costello stipulates that she ‘was hoping not to have 
to enunciate principles’ and tells the questioner to ‘open your heart and listen to what your 
heart says’ (EC, 82). Clearly, Costello does not deliver these lectures in order to change 
minds, but rather to open them to the possibility of change, and to consider the reality of a 
shared, creaturely life with animals. As her son says to Norma, who is furious after Costello’s 
lectures, ‘why not try to see her as a preacher, a social reformer, rather than as an eccentric 
trying to foist her preferences on to other people?’ (EC, 113). In this light, her lectures seem 
more like a sermon than a manifesto, and the order in which she delivers them is chosen 
not for its rhetoric but for its urgency. 
This style of social reform is evocative of Simone Weil, who wrote one of her most 
influential essays on the injustice faced by trade-union workers. However, ‘Human 
Personality’ does not ‘enunciate principles’ and neither is it explicitly about how trade-union 
workers suffer under the force of their employers. Rather, it outlines Weil’s thoughts on the 
sacredness of every person who expects that good and not evil be done to him/her. This 
leads Weil on to discuss affliction and the part of a soul which cries out ‘Why am I being 
hurt?’ when evil is done to it.241 Affliction, injustice and the inability to have one’s voice 
heard were all pertinent to her cause, but Siân Miles notes how Weil’s colleagues reacted 
impatiently to her work: ‘They wanted her to write on ‘something concrete, like trade-union 
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problems’. She was in fact doing precisely that, though her approach was radically different 
from what they had expected’.242 Rather than writing about workers’ rights, Weil chose to 
write about how rights themselves are inadequate in comparison to justice. Weil’s 
colleagues may have wanted her to lay out a clear argument for the rights of workers, but 
Weil considered the inherent injustice in the system, where no amount of shifting the rights 
would tackle the fact that the situation itself was unjust. She gives an example to clarify her 
point: 
Suppose the devil were bargaining for the soul of some poor wretch and 
someone, moved by pity, should step in and say to the devil: ‘It is a shame for 
you to bid so low; the commodity is worth at least twice as much.’ 
  Such is the sinister face which has been played by the working-class 
movement, its trade unions, its political parties, its leftist intellectuals.243 
Here, Weil argues that the problem which needs to be overcome is not how much money 
workers are being paid for their toil, nor how many rights can be afforded them to make 
their load lighter; it is the injustice of treating these workers like commodity and asserting 
your force over them as such. 
In a similar way, Costello refuses to ‘enunciate principles’ to the man who asks her to 
clarify whether or not the point of her lecture was to persuade the audience to close down 
factory farms, stop eating meat and stop animal experimentation (EC, 81). She refuses to do 
so because, in her second attempt at a reply: 
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I have never been much interested in proscriptions, dietary or otherwise. 
Proscriptions, laws. I am more interested in what lies behind them. As for 
Köhler’s experiments [on animals], I think he wrote a wonderful book, and the 
book wouldn’t have been written if he hadn’t thought he was a scientist 
conducting experiments on chimpanzees. But the book we read isn’t the book 
he thought he was writing. I am reminded of something Montaigne said: We 
think we are playing with the cat, but how do we know that the cat isn’t playing 
with us? I wish I could think the animals in our laboratories are playing with us. 
But alas, it isn’t so. 
  She falls silent. ‘Does that answer your question?’ asks the dean. The 
questioner gives a huge, expressive shrug and sits down (EC, 82). 
Clearly, the questioner does not think that Costello has answered him well enough. Her 
response is tangential: it moves away from providing direct answers, towards wider 
considerations on the subject of the question. Once again, she chooses not to mould minds 
but to open them. Like Weil, she is less interested in the proscription for evil than to the 
society which needs a proscription; less interested in laws than in seeking the spirit of 
justice from which these laws should stem. She does not consider animal experimentation 
as something we should make more humane; she considers ‘the experiments themselves 
[…] imbecile’ (EC, 108). These are the things which ‘lie behind’ the conventional modes of 
philosophical thought. Diamond comes to a similar conclusion with regard to Costello’s 
responses more generally: 
In the life of the animal she is, argument does not have the weight we may take 
it to have in the life of the kind of animal we think of ourselves as being. She 
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sees our reliance on argumentation as a way we may make unavailable to 
ourselves our own sense of what it is to be a living animal.244 
Here, Diamond recognises that some people might consider our ability to argue and debate 
an essential part of what makes us rational human beings, but highlights how Costello 
moves away from that mindset to consider us first and foremost as vulnerable creatures. 
This is clarified in Diamond’s phrase ‘the kind of animal we think ourselves as being’: to think 
ourselves as being is a deflection from appreciating our sense of being, which lies beyond 
reason. In this sense, Köhler’s book to which Costello refers is ‘not the book he thought he 
was writing’. Presumably, Köhler thinks he is writing a scientific book based on evidence and 
reason. Perhaps Costello considers this book rather to be a book about force. Simone Weil 
wrote one of her most esteemed essays on the Iliad as a poem of force: she considers it a 
wonderful book, but believes it to be a mirror of society rather than the historical document 
we might take it as being.245 Neither book is essentially about history nor science, but about 
force which, as defined by Weil, ‘is that x that turns anybody who is subjected to it into a 
thing’.246 In Köhler’s case, the impetus behind his book is not the behaviour of chimps but 
rather the force exerted by humans over creatures, turning them into ‘things’: here, a 
scientific subject or – more cynical perhaps – a statistic. This is why the laboratory animals 
do not play with us: they are the things with which we play. In answering the man’s 
question in this tangential way, Costello suggests that closing down factory farms or not 
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eating meat is the solution to a problem which should not be there in the first place: a 
problem of force. 
 In a similar vein, perhaps Elizabeth Costello is not the novel Coetzee thinks, or 
suggests, it might be. That is to say, he understands that it cannot be any particular novel 
because it has at its core a philosophical void into which his main character attempts to 
draw us. Yet, it is framed as a work of fiction, and is read with all the expectations with 
which we approach one. This is a consideration which Diamond briefly but attentively 
explores: 
Coetzee gives us a view of a profound disturbance of soul, and puts that view 
into a complex context. What is done by doing so he cannot tell us, he does not 
know. What response we may have to the difficulties of the lectures, the 
difficulties of reality, is not something the lectures themselves are meant to 
settle. This itself expresses a mode of understanding of the kind of animal we 
are, and indeed of the moral life of this kind of animal.247 
Costello attempts to open the minds of those to whom she speaks. She does not try to 
persuade them to take up a cause, but rather to look within themselves for a creatureliness 
which is shared with animals. This, she imagines, is what lies behind a proscription for 
animal cruelty: an understanding that the basic play of force between humans and other 
animals is unjust. As such, the philosophical discussions we may have about animal rights 
and animal consciousness are not what we think them to be. Instead of changing how we 
treat animals, Costello argues that we should change our relationship with them. However, 
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to “argue” as such is not to argue, for that would be to participate in the very act of 
reasoning which we might consider distances ourselves from animals. Instead, she exposes 
her ‘profound disturbance of soul’ not as a philosophical conundrum but rather as what 
Diamond calls ‘a rawness of nerves’.248 Her problem is physical; it is tied to her body. It 
involves understanding what it is to be a creature. The ‘complex content’ of which Diamond 
writes is the fact that Costello is not a physical presence but a fictional character, albeit one 
who stands in Coetzee’s shoes as he delivers these chapters at the Tanner Lectures. Perhaps 
Elizabeth Costello is a novel which opens our hearts as the title character hopes to achieve, 
or perhaps it is another of Coetzee’s novels which grapples with the impossibility of 
representing the body in literature, and therefore calls into question ‘the kind of animal we 
are’: that which attempts to reason our way outside of reason. Norma may snort at 
Elizabeth’s comment that she sometimes feels herself to be a corpse and, as such, is ‘alive 
inside that contradiction, dead and alive at the same time’, but the contradiction is more 
ironic, and much more complex, than at first it seems (EC, 77). Costello is a figment of 
Coetzee’s imagination and, as such, her body is undone by the fiction in which it finds itself a 
part. Hers is a difficult reality. 
 This difficulty is made more complex by the fact that Costello is an author who, like 
Coetzee, creates her own imaginative characters (though ultimately they are, of course, 
Coetzee’s). Her son believes that her gift as a fiction writer is to be able to think her way into 
the lives of the characters she writes: 
my mother has been a man […]. She has also been a dog. She can think her way 
into other people, into other existences. I have read her; I know. It is within her 
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powers. Isn’t that what is most important about fiction: that it takes us out of 
ourselves into other lives? (EC, 22-23). 
Here, John highlights one of the demands of fiction: that we should identify with the 
characters. Moreover, he believes that his mother can ‘think her way’ into their existence. 
Through the authors’ shared career and parallel lives, it is inferred that the same can be said 
for Coetzee and, by extension, we may question our own sense of identification with 
Costello. If the importance of fiction is to ‘take us out of ourselves into other lives’, Coetzee 
ostensibly frames his own thoughts on animal cruelty in fiction so that his readers 
sympathise with Costello or even share Coetzee’s opinions through her. However, there is a 
further complexity which makes me believe this is not Coetzee’s primary aim. The use of the 
words ‘think’ and ‘power’ in the above quotation may be fair with regard to Costello’s 
fiction, but they are misleading when applied to the lectures she delivers at Appleton 
College. Perhaps they are the defining words which separate her most from Coetzee, who 
has power over his creative subject and who, perhaps, did not write the book ‘he thought 
he was writing’. 
 For when Costello introduces the philosophy of Thomas Nagel into her talk it is not 
to show how one might think their way into the life of a bat, but how one might feel their 
way into its life (similarly with regard to at once being and not being a corpse). She insists 
that ‘the knowledge we have’ in these cases ‘is not abstract’ (EC, 77). To become a bat or a 
corpse one must sympathise with it and, as Costello says, ‘sympathy has everything to do 
with the subject and little to do with the object’. Indeed, one must sense what it is to be a 
bat by understanding what it is to be: to live, to move, just as one does as a human being. 
Therefore, one sympathises with a bat on a bodily plane. Moreover, it is not Costello’s 
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power which allows her to become a bat or a corpse, but the giving up of her power: it is her 
vulnerability as a living, aging body; it is the creatureliness they share. 
 
III 
 It is with the sense of a shared creatureliness and in the spirit of sympathetic 
imagination that Elizabeth Costello makes her comparison between factory farms and the 
Holocaust. On a subject evocative of Bentham’s dictum: ‘the question is not, Can they 
reason? nor, Can they talk? but, can they suffer?’, Costello challenges her audience not to 
ask : ‘Do we have something in common – reason, self-consciousness, a soul – with other 
animals?’, because looking for such abstract commonalities can deflect from the physical 
realities we share (EC, 79).249 Moreover, asking such questions implies that we are searching 
from a position of difference: there is always a possibility that the answer will be that we 
share none of these things and, as such, we can only build a relationship with others which 
has at its foundation a complete lack of sympathy. Costello relates this to the Holocaust by 
considering how bystanders and perpetrators refused to sympathise with the victims: 
The particular horror of the death camps, the horror that convinces us that what 
went on there was a crime against humanity, is not that despite a humanity 
shared with their victims, the killers treated them like lice. That is too abstract. 
The horror is that the killers refused to think themselves into the place of their 
victims, as did everyone else. […] They said, “It must be the dead who are being 
burned today, making the air stink and falling in ash on my cabbages.” They did 
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not say, “How would it be if I were burning?” They did not say, “I am burning, I 
am falling in ash.” (EC, 79). 
Here, Costello separates two possible meanings for the word ‘humanity’. The first, in 
relation to a ‘shared humanity’ between perpetrators and victims, refers to the fact that this 
was a crime committed by humans, on humans. The second, and the one which Costello 
believes is key to the term ‘crimes against humanity’, is the ability to act with kindness 
(where kindness is used ‘in its full sense, as an acceptance that we are all of one kind, one 
nature’) and sympathy: to be humane (EC, 106). Of the two, she considers the second less 
abstract, despite the fact that the first is with respect to a physical species divide and the 
second considers the seemingly more abstract characteristic of sympathy.  This is because 
the first hinges upon how we consider the object (another race of people, or animals) and 
the second is reliant upon understanding the subject, that is: ourselves (how we feel and 
therefore how we would feel in certain situations). However, Costello takes this trajectory of 
thought even further: she does not only question ‘how would it be’ for subject to be object, 
but considers how it is for subject as object, as if there is no discernible difference between 
the two. In other words, she identifies with the other to such an extent as almost to 
convince herself of their inseparability. 
 In this sense, perhaps Costello over-identifies with others; perhaps her sympathy 
consumes too much. Just as Simone Weil died refusing to eat more than the ration afforded 
to the French during WWII, though her frail body was much in need of it, so Costello 
physically suffers from over-identifying with the dead and dying. Richard Rees writes the 
following passage in a letter about Weil’s life, and much of it can also be applied to Costello: 
‘her selfless idealism and her extraordinary capacity for sympathy and pity and self-
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sacrificing kindness stand out conspicuously in everything that is known about her life’.250 
The term ‘selfless idealism’ is particularly relevant to Costello’s cause because in 
sympathising and perhaps over-identifying with animals, she loses sense of her borders as 
an individual human being. She cares too deeply and, as such, feels physically affected by 
those animals with which she sympathises. ‘There are no bounds to the sympathetic 
imagination’, she says, and although she argues that the sympathetic imagination stems 
from a feeling of the fullness of being, she later admits to feeling lost amongst other 
humans; to longer know where she is (EC, 80, 114). Her own ‘extraordinary capacity for 
sympathy’ is exemplified when she considers the similarities between herself and Red Peter 
from Kafka’s ‘Report to an Academy’: 
Red Peter was not an investigator of primate behaviour but a branded, marked, 
wounded animal presenting himself as speaking testimony to a gathering of 
scholars. I am not a philosopher of mind but an animal exhibiting, yet not 
exhibiting, to a gathering of scholars, a wound, which I cover up under my 
clothes but touch on in every word I speak (EC, 70-71). 
Here, Costello remarks that both she and Red Peter embody the words they speak. Peter 
does not speak his testimony but presents himself as testimony, where his words impart his 
body, and Costello comments on the idea of her woundedness presenting itself through her 
words. 
 However, the inability of words to be able to express pain is a common theme of 
Coetzee’s oeuvre. For example, the final chapter of Foe (similarly ambiguous to the final 
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chapter in Elizabeth Costello) descends underwater into Friday’s world: ‘a place where 
bodies are their own signs’.251 There are other examples besides: the tortured old man and 
the slave girl’s scars in Waiting for the Barbarians; Elizabeth Curren’s cancer in Age of Iron; 
Paul’s amputated leg in Slow Man. However it is this quotation from Foe which most neatly 
mirrors Costello’s claim to speak through her wounded body. This is because, unlike any of 
the other characters mentioned above, Costello is not visibly wounded or sick, so far as we 
can tell. Similarly, we are told that Friday’s tongue has been cut out but this is never 
confirmed. This ‘wound’ of which Costello speaks is far more metaphysical and perhaps, like 
Friday, it is a mark of slavery. Certainly, Red Peter has become a slave insofar as he has been 
moulded into a slave of reason: 
Now that I am here, says Red Peter, in my tuxedo and bow tie and my black 
pants with a hole cut in the seat for my tail to poke through (I keep it turned 
away from you, you do not see it), now that I am here, what is there for me to 
do? Do I in fact have a choice? If I do not subject my discourse to reason, 
whatever that is, what is left for me but to gibber and emote and knock over my 
water glass and generally make a monkey out of myself? (EC, 68). 
If Costello’s wound, which she covers up, is comparable to anything here it is surely the 
monkey’s tail, which he hides from his audience: it is a bodily sign that he is not a being of 
reason but simply an animal. Costello’s wound, besides a more obvious Freudian reading of 
her femininity, is the same thing: not a tail, but an animal body nonetheless. In giving her 
lectures on animals and the (often, lack of) sympathetic imagination in philosophy and 
poetry, she is caught within the paradox of reasoning, whereby she is expected to deliver a 
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reasonable argument but wishes to do so on the subject of creaturely bodies, her own 
included; creaturely bodies which stand outside of reason and as such are covered up and 
forgotten about when we consider our humanity. Like Friday, her body is its own sign, but 
like Red Peter, she is forced to dress it up: in argument – albeit that which does not 
enunciate principles – and reason. 
 Perhaps this paradox of reasoning is why she resorts to making parallels with the 
Holocaust. In an essay on Kafka, George Steiner considers the author at once a prophet, 
compelled to write about the inevitable, forthcoming collapse of humanity, and an artist 
depicting ‘the temptations of silence’ in his literature. Steiner’s words reflect the paradox of 
reasoning the unreasonable and speaking the unspeakable, and he exemplifies this with the 
Holocaust, through Kafka and Hoffmannstahl, both of whom Coetzee draws upon in 
Elizabeth Costello: 
The world of Auschwitz lies outside speech as it lies outside reason. To speak of 
the unspeakable is to risk the survivance of language as creator and bearer of 
humane, rational truth. Words that are saturated with lies or atrocity do not 
easily resume life. This apprehension was not Kafka’s alone. The fear of the 
erosion of the logos, of the gain of the letter on spirit, is strong in 
Hoffmannstahl’s Letter of Lord Chandos[.]252 
Costello polarizes her audience by evoking the Holocaust so early in her proceedings to 
explain our treatment of animals. Yet perhaps she chooses to do this so as to immediately 
situate her talk outside of the realms of reason. Her words are ‘saturated with atrocity’ and, 
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as such, they lack impact. This is because the subject they evoke ‘lies outside speech’: they 
gesture towards the silent dead, just as Kafka’s ‘Report to an Academy’ gestures towards 
the same, inescapable atrocity. Indeed, Costello refers to Kafka as Red Peter’s ‘amanuensis’ 
– this creature’s secretary – ‘with a presentiment, a Vorgefühl, for the massacre of the 
chosen people’. Here, ‘Vorgefühl’ evokes Rilke – a poet to whom Costello returns – and his 
poem by the same name. The poem, written at the turn of the twentieth century, translates 
as ‘Presentiment’, and the narrator is an embodiment of this premonition. As Steiner calls 
Kafka’s works prophetical, the same might be said of this short poem, which begins: 
I am like a flag by far spaces surrounded. 
I sense the winds that are coming, I must live them 
while things down below are not yet moving: 
the doors are still shutting gently, and in the chimneys is silence; 
the windows are not yet trembling, and the dust is still heavy.253 
The silent chimneys and the heavy dust are, as Friday’s body, their own signs. They need no 
further explanation as they epitomize Steiner’s concept of language ‘as creator and bearer 
of […] truth’. Costello evokes this as she evokes Kafka’s own ‘presentiment’, ostensibly in 
order to give her own talk the prophetical gravitas we can, in hindsight, give these other 
works. However, her talk falls flat; she ‘does not have a good delivery’ (EC, 63). 
 Perhaps, then, she evokes the Holocaust not in order to shock her audience into 
action, nor to prophecy some further fall from grace after our sinful treatment of animals, 
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but quite the opposite. Perhaps she includes this seemingly tasteless (‘cheap’, she admits) 
metaphor in order to epitomise her own feelings of being overwhelmed, just as we are 
overwhelmed when we consider the scale and inhumanity of the Holocaust (EC, 66). If this is 
the case, her choice to compare factory farming to the death camps is not a way to simply 
get attention for a cause, nor is it as blasphemous as might otherwise be assumed, but 
rather it is a way to evoke her own sense of helplessness, banality and being-overwhelmed 
in the face of the suffering she sees surrounds us. This is backed up once more by the fact 
that she does not want to ‘enunciate principles’ and by the fact that she acknowledges that 
the Holocaust taught us ‘that we can do anything and get away with it; that there is no 
punishment’ (EC, 80). In other words, her use of the Holocaust is not pedagogical, nor is it 
moralistic, but rather it is polarizing, contentious and unreasonable. It is perhaps the most 
overwhelming example of when human beings were turned, by great force, into things. As 
Anat Pick writes: ‘if the Holocaust proves anything at all, it is that Jewish (and other) bodies 
are animal bodies’ (CP, 51). Costello gestures towards her own animal body – her ‘wound’ – 
in two lectures which mirror the Tanner Lectures on human values. She uses the Holocaust 
as a paradigm of inhumanity where, as she stipulates, inhumanity is not an abstract concept 
but an inability to recognise the shared vulnerability of our bodies (EC, 79). Coetzee, who is 
tied to Costello as he speaks at the Tanner Lectures, gestures towards the authority of the 
body in an interview with David Attwell, and confesses to an almost identical state of 
confusion stemming from the fact that humans can have such little sympathy as to cause 
others to suffer: 
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It is not that one grants the authority of the suffering body: the suffering body 
takes this authority: that is its power. To use other words: its power is 
undeniable. 
  (Let me add, entirely parenthetically, that I, as a person, as a 
personality, am overwhelmed, that my thinking is thrown into confusion and 
helplessness, by the fact of suffering in the world and not only human suffering. 
These fictional constructions of mine are paltry, ludicrous defenses against that 
being-overwhelmed, and, to me, transparently so.)254 
By referencing Kafka and Hoffmannstahl in his novel on creatureliness and the sympathetic 
imagination, Coetzee recalls and contributes to that school of thought which recognises 
what Steiner refers to as ‘the authority of silence’.255 He adds to this by focussing on ‘the 
authority of the suffering body’ and brings these two authorities together through the 
presence of animals: animals which ‘have only their silence left with which to confront us’ 
(EC, 70). As Costello recognises, ‘Kafka saw himself and Red Peter as hybrids, as monstrous 
thinking devices mounted inexplicably on suffering animal bodies’ (EC, 75); and as 
Hoffmannstahl’s Lord Chandos writes in his letter to Francis Bacon, imagining a mother rat 
unable to stop her babies dying from the rat poison Chandos himself lay down, 
it was much more and much less than pity [that I felt] – a vast empathy, a 
streaming across into these creatures, or a feeling that a flux of life and death, of 
dreaming and waking, had streamed into them for an instant.256 
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Costello, Red Peter and Chandos are all fictionalised creatures who are overwhelmed by 
their sympathetic imagination: Chandos is overwhelmed to such an extent that he reaches a 
creative stasis; Red Peter is overwhelmed such that he inhabits the clothes of another 
species; and Costello is overwhelmed to the point of emotional collapse (EC, 114-115). At a 
further remove, Costello overwhelms her audience and us by referencing the Holocaust: 
arguably the most overwhelming event in our immediate history. 
 Costello may be a ‘paltry, ludicrous defense’ against Coetzee’s state of being 
overwhelmed, but she is also aware of the paltriness of her words at the lectures. She 
admits to Thomas O’Hearne that her talk is insufficient to communicate the gravity of 
abused animal bodies: 
It is not the mode of being of animals to have an intellectual horror: their whole 
being is in the living flesh. 
‘If I do not convince you, that is because my words, here, lack the power to bring 
home to you the wholeness, the unabstracted, unintellectual nature, of that 
animal being. That is why I urge you to read the poets who return the living, 
electric being to language; and if the poets do not move you, I urge you to walk, 
flank to flank, beside the beast that is prodded down the chute to his 
executioner (EC, 110-111). 
Costello urges her sceptics to ‘walk, flank-to-flank’ with animals as they are processed to be 
slaughtered so as their sympathetic imagination can be jolted into understanding the 
urgency and wholeness of these animals’ bodies: an urgency which is felt just as keenly as 
our own, despite the animals’ lack of abstract thought. Diamond sees a similar vein of 
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thought in Weil’s work on ‘Human Personality’, where Weil contrasts ‘claims of fair 
entitlement’ with ‘the desperate cry that might be made by a girl being forced into a 
brothel’.257 The cries of the girl and of the animals, in Costello’s example, are not so 
different because, as Diamond explains, ‘there is a kind of response in the face of what is 
done to them: a pain and revulsion that requires for its expression the language of 
injustice’.258 In both cases, claiming one’s rights (to eat animals, or to sexually exploit a girl) 
may seem acceptable until faced with the desperate cries and struggles of the thing itself, 
which evoke the sympathetic imagination through a response to injustice. Nonetheless, 
Costello recognises that certain poets such as Ted Hughes and, to an extent, Rainer Maria 
Rilke can move the sympathetic imagination. Hughes, who wrote ‘Six Young Men’, grapples 
with a difficult reality through that poem, but he also returns life to language in his poems 
on jaguars. Costello stipulates that this life is not the mere, ghostly survivance of language 
as outlined by Steiner, above, but rather something which she considers to be an ‘electric’ 
movement within the words: a gesture towards ‘a different kind of being-in-the-world’ (EC, 
95). This is comparable to Rilke’s prophetic poem, above. For different reasons, the words in 
both Hughes’ and Rilke’s poems capture something essentially truthful, and Costello 
believes that such poetry might stir sympathetic imagination where her words cannot. 
 As with regard to the paradox of witnessing the Holocaust, Costello admits that her 
urgent words lack impact because they cannot approach the reality of the cruelty we inflict 
on animals. Yet, she gives examples of poets who have succeeded where she cannot. This 
brings to mind Paul Celan, who contended that, despite the Holocaust overwhelming 
language, it is important to gesture towards that state of being overwhelmed through 
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language. There is something intensely personal about his poetry, which he touches upon in 
his Meridian speech. He says that poetry 
holds its ground on its own margin. In order to endure, it constantly calls and 
pulls itself back from an ‘already-no-more’ into a ‘still-here’. […] This ‘still-here’ 
of the poem can only be found in the works of poets who do not forget that they 
speak from an angle of reflection which is their own existence. […] This shows 
the poem yet more clearly as one person’s language become shape and, 
essentially, a presence in the present.259 
Celan’s poetry is an act of language, an act tied unassailably to Celan himself. This is the 
strain of poetry which Costello believes can evoke the sympathetic imagination, because it 
works by understanding the subject first and foremost: by reflecting upon the poet’s own 
existence. This is what Costello means when she says that Hughes ‘is feeling his way towards 
a different kind of being-in-the-world’ (EC, 95). Hughes does not attempt to inhabit 
another’s mind through his poetry, but to inhabit another’s body, using his sense of self to 
understand the movement and vulnerability of any creature. Coetzee also attempts this 
because he works from his own feelings of helplessness in the face of suffering to create 
Costello. He stands and delivers his chapters at the Tanner Lectures as she herself delivers 
her speeches on animals. As such, when Costello reads the following, it may as well be 
Coetzee speaking, where we replace Costello’s novel and character with ones of his own 
oeuvre: 
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I wrote a book called The House on Eccles Street. To write that book I had to 
think my way into the existence of Marion Bloom. […] Marion Bloom never 
existed. […] If I can think my way into the existence of a being who has never 
existed, then I can think my way into the existence of a bat or a chimpanzee or 
an oyster, any being with whom I share the substrate of life (EC, 80). 
Here, Costello recognises the fact that successful authors must struggle with a difficult 
reality in their professional lives, where the term ‘successful’ implies not how much one has 
profited from the profession, but – as with Coetzee and Hughes – how one has successfully 
thought their way into their characters’ existence. These characters must live on the page, 
yet they are inherently fictional constructs: as in ‘Six Young Men’, they must be at once ‘no 
more alive’ and ‘no more dead’ than anything or anyone; as in Costello who thinks her way 
into being a corpse and recognises that ‘for an instant, before my whole structure of 
knowledge collapses in panic, I am alive inside that contradiction, dead and alive at the 
same time’ (EC, 77). Through Elizabeth Costello, Coetzee grapples with his own difficult 
realities, both as an author and as a sympathetic person, overwhelmed by suffering. Indeed, 
one difficult reality reflects the other as Elizabeth Costello struggles with matters of 
existence, despite being a fictional construct. Perhaps this is why the first chapter of 
Elizabeth Costello is entitled ‘Realism’: at once it implies a literary convention and an 
attitude of what Anat Pick terms ‘creaturely exposure’ (CP, 29). It foregrounds the difficult 
reality of a sympathetic imagination, as explored in Coetzee’s novel. 
 
Conclusion 
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 Although I have focussed on the two chapters in Elizabeth Costello which make up 
‘The Lives of Animals’, Coetzee’s entire novel is saturated in concepts and events which 
suggest a creaturely poetics. For example, Costello visits her sister Blanche who lives as a 
medical missionary and administrator at a hospital in Africa. While she is there, the sisters 
bicker about the purposes of humanities: Blanche takes a religious stand against them and 
Elizabeth extolls the virtues of the classics from a sympathetic but predominantly secular 
point of view. These discussions with Blanche mirror Elizabeth’s lectures and debates on 
animals, therefore perhaps Coetzee suggests that there is something in these debates 
themselves which is important: an openness to engaging with a creaturely poetics in 
Elizabeth’s case, and a willingness to engage with art on both a secular and sacred level in 
the case of Blanche. Simone Weil suggests that everything impersonal in a person is sacred, 
that is something which does not bear the stamp of her/his personality, and she continues: 
‘truth and beauty dwell on this level of the impersonal and the anonymous’.260 Elizabeth 
gestures towards this truth as she over-identifies with others and loses hold of herself 
through a sympathetic imagination; Blanche thinks that those studying humanities are no 
longer ‘animated […] by the purpose of finding the True Word’ and that they are therefore 
lacking in truth and beauty (EC, 122). She too loses her identity through her sacred 
aspirations, as she is a nun who goes by the name ‘Sister Bridget’. Nonetheless, Coetzee 
makes these characters flawed: Elizabeth is overbearing and insecure where Blanche is a 
stubborn ‘hardliner’ (EC, 133). In these flaws we witness traces of their personalities. As 
Weil agrees: ‘perfection is impersonal. Our personality is the part of us which belongs to 
error and sin’.261 Therefore, Coetzee does not seem to suggest that Elizabeth or Blanche 
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have reached a higher level pertaining to truth and beauty, but that it is the debates 
themselves (debates which can be read as largely impersonal due to the extent of the 
different opinions which are raised) which are important and gesture towards a creaturely 
poetics. 
In her introduction to Creaturely Poetics and specifically the subject of animal rights, 
Anat Pick agrees that ‘The Lives of Animals’ (and therefore, to an extent, Elizabeth Costello) 
‘helped reorient philosophical discussions in animal ethics away from utilitarian, reason, and 
rights-based approaches [toward] creaturely thinking’ (CP, 7). Indeed, Costello comes to 
face reasoned arguments against her sympathetic approach, such as the questions posed by 
O’Hearne, and she tries to steer her talk away from animal rights when an audience 
member questions her purpose and she refuses to ‘enunciate principles’. By including this 
reasoned rebuttal to her talks, Coetzee not only reorients philosophical discussions, but 
offers a new method of response to the old arguments and, significantly, shows how this 
response often falls on deaf ears. In other words, he is aware of the difficulty involved in 
creaturely thinking, primarily because it involves engaging with the sympathetic imagination 
over reason, but also because it destabilises our identities as human beings. Actually, these 
reasons are not separate: to engage with our sympathetic imagination can mean that we 
identify with animals and therefore lose our grip on what sets us apart from them. The 
paradox is this: how can one reason away reason; how can one imagine the fullness of 
another’s being without being aware of our own sense of being and, as such, be aware of 
one’s humanity?  
Costello addresses this difficulty when she derisively considers the standpoint of a 
philosopher who argues that because animals have no conceptual grasp on such matters as 
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death or absence, death and absence do not matter to them. The example cited is whether 
or not it is possible for a veal calf to miss its mother. Costello realises that this philosopher is 
not a man she would like to speak with, 
not when reason is what underpins the whole long philosophical tradition to 
which he belongs, stretching back to Descartes and beyond Descartes through 
Aquinas and Augustine to the Stoics and Aristotle. If the last common ground 
that I have with him is reason, and if reason is what sets me apart from the veal 
calf, then thank you but no thank you, I’ll talk to someone else (EC, 122). 
Just as Pick draws upon but moves away from Eric Santner’s concept of creatureliness as 
tied to humanity, and as in Disgrace when Coetzee’s godless characters must disregard their 
humanity in order to bear affliction, so Costello chooses to separate her humanity into a 
humanity of reason and a humanity of the body: she wishes to empathise on a bodily plane 
rather than a theoretical plane and, as such, she has no desire to reason with a man who 
rejects the shared vulnerability of humans and other creatures. Where her sister, Blanche, is 
more of a Simone Weil figure who eats small rations and looks heavenward ‘through all the 
jolting’ of life, Coetzee writes Costello largely as a secular figure who has to balance her 
intolerance of reason with something other than the mysticism of God. Like Lucy and Lurie 
from Disgrace, Elizabeth Costello struggles to omit reason from her life in order to live a 
bodily existence. 
However, unlike Lucy and possibly Lurie, Costello does not seem to be able to 
achieve this. As she is an author, she remains tied to literary conventions and therefore to 
traces of reason. Lurie has to step away from his life as a lecturer in order to give in to 
affliction, but Costello continues to define herself first and foremost as an author and, as 
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such, she reaches an impasse produced by this paradox of reasoning. This impasse is 
symbolised in the final chapter of Elizabeth Costello, where the author wakes into an 
ambiguous, purgatorial space and puts forward her case for reaching beyond a Kafkaesque 
gate – surely evocative of the gates of Heaven. Whether Costello has died here or not is 
unknown, but it is clear that she cannot pass through until she gives a truthful confession or 
statement of belief. This she feels unable to do because of her literary profession which, so 
she argues, means that she must ‘maintain beliefs only provisionally’ (EC, 195). ‘What if I am 
not a believer?’ asks Costello, ‘we all believe. We are not cattle’, replies the man at the gate, 
and later a judge replies: ‘without beliefs we are not human’ (EC, 194, 200). Here, belief is 
considered inherent to our humanity, but Costello argues that her ‘ideal self’ is ‘a secretary 
clean of belief’ (EC, 200). In other words, to truly take down the beliefs of her characters, 
she must not have her own stand in the way. This brings to mind Weil’s essay, Gravity and 
Grace in which she considers the idea of selfhood. Weil argues that we must destroy our 
individuality and claim to selfhood in order to bear affliction: 
We possess nothing in the world – a mere chance can strip us of everything – 
except the power to say ‘I’. That is what we have to give to God – in other 
words, to destroy. […] So long as we ourselves have begun the process of 
destroying the ‘I’, we can prevent any affliction from causing harm.262 
Where Blanche aspires to give herself up to God in a manner coherent with Weil’s 
discourse, Elizabeth gives herself up to her profession. Like Lucy and Lurie in comparison 
with the Isaacs family, hers is a secular sacrifice. However, unlike the characters from 
Disgrace she does not give everything up in order to live solely as a body devoid of 
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possessions; rather she gives up her beliefs in order to live solely as an author. Paradoxically, 
it is therefore this profession which at once unites and detaches her from the animals with 
which she sympathises. 
 This is because, where Lurie’s sense of self is destroyed through affliction, he learns 
to live like a dog, but Costello keeps a full sense of her being in order to engage with her 
sympathetic imagination and therefore to imagine embodying other creatures. His giving up 
is dependent on affliction but hers is a professional and ethical choice, respectively:  
To write [The House on Eccles Street] I had to think my way into the existence of 
Marion Bloom. […] If I can think my way into the existence of a being who has 
never existed, then I can think my way into the existence of a bat or a 
chimpanzee or an oyster, any being with whom I share the substrate of life (EC, 
80). 
Her professional urge to give up any belief at once allows her to think her way into the life 
of other creatures and detaches her from living like one, for out of the same channel of 
thought she at once sympathises with real animals and creates characters which never 
existed. There is little doubt that she engages in creaturely thinking, but this thinking is itself 
limited by her authorial voice. Nowhere better is this shown than in the penultimate 
paragraph to the final chapter which, when compared with the closing paragraphs of 
Disgrace, highlights the difficulty faced by authors in approaching creaturely bodies: 
She has a vision of the gate, the far side of the gate, the side she is denied. At 
the foot of the gate, blocking the way, lies stretched out a dog, an old dog, his 
lion-coloured hide scarred from innumerable manglings. His eyes are closed, he 
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is resting, snoozing. Beyond him is nothing but a desert of sand and stone, to 
infinity. It is her first vision in a long while, and she does not trust it, does not 
trust in particular the anagram GOD-DOG. Too literary, she thinks again. A curse 
on literature! (EC, 224-225). 
Costello finds it impossible to get beyond the dog as symbol. It has appeared to her in one of 
her authorial visions. Perhaps, as she is a self-confessed ‘secretary of the invisible’, she 
thinks it has come to her in order that she might speak for it (EC, 199). However, she 
mistrusts the vision; she wonders whether the voice she would give it would truly be that of 
this suffering dog, or whether it would be that of God himself. Either way, she is a human 
and therefore unable to speak for it. The curse she puts on literature might be because of 
this paradox outlined by Weil: ‘those who most often have occasion to feel that evil is being 
done to them are those who are least trained in the art of speech’.263 The difficult reality 
here is that being a creature is to be marked with the vulnerability of existence (a 
vulnerability which Costello shares especially as she ages), but to be an author is to channel 
one’s own existence into a fictional construct. This fictional construct, so much as it may 
appear to live on the page, is – to recall Coetzee’s quotation on the suffering body – ‘that 
which is not’.264 It is in complete contrast to the creaturely body it seemingly depicts. 
 However, in Disgrace the final paragraphs do not highlight this difficult reality. 
Coetzee’s authorial vision is not acknowledged as his fictional character Lurie has a real 
encounter with a creaturely body: 
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He opens the cage door. ‘Come,’ he says, bends, opens his arms. The dog wags 
its crippled rear, sniffs his face, licks his cheeks, his lips, his ears. He does nothing 
to stop it. ‘Come.’ 
  Bearing him in his arms like a lamb, he re-enters surgery. ‘I thought you 
would save him for another week,’ says Bev Shaw. ‘Are you giving him up?’ 
  ‘Yes I am giving him up.’ (D, 220) 
 
On first reading, and despite the religious connotation of the lamb simile, there is little 
doubt that this dog is more real than the one which appears to Costello. Simone Weil 
compares one who has his sense of self stripped from him to a dog, and the passage is 
strikingly similar to the bond felt between Lurie and his dog, above: ‘He […] in whom the ‘I’ 
is quite dead is in no way embarrassed by the love which is shown him. He takes what 
comes just as dogs and cats receive food, warmth and caresses’.265 Paradoxically, a bond of 
kindness is forged between Lurie and the dog the moment the creature is given up to be 
killed. At a wider glance, this dog may symbolise Lurie giving up his ‘I’ in order to live 
through affliction. However, without the metanarrative highlighted by Coetzee in Elizabeth 
Costello it is simply a depiction of a man and his dog. The novel closes on this depiction of a 
creature being brought to silence. 
 In relation to creaturely thinking, perhaps this is the main difference between 
Disgrace and Elizabeth Costello: whereas Coetzee creates fictional constructs in Disgrace 
who are able to live like animals because they give themselves and their possessions up, he 
creates Elizabeth Costello to represent the paradox of a creaturely poetics. A creaturely 
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poetics is that which at once engages with the vulnerable body and detracts from it through 
literature. Engaging with a creaturely poetics is a difficult reality because it means that the 
text gestures towards the vulnerable body while remaining detached from it. Nonetheless, it 
is important to understand this difficult reality through literature. To reiterate one reason 
for this, as outlined by Weil and quoted above:  
It sometimes happens that a fragment of inexpressible truth is reflected in 
words which, although they cannot hold the truth that inspired them, have 
nevertheless so perfect a formal correspondence with it that every mind seeking 
that truth finds support in them.266 
Despite Blanche’s disdain for the current state of the humanities, words can aspire to the 
truth and – as explored – this truth does not have to be religious, though it remains sacred. 
Moreover, another key reason for embracing a creaturely poetics is that, inspired by Paul 
Celan and paraphrased by Lawrence Langer, ‘what dims the light of creation need not 
extinguish the lamps of language, though it may compel us to reconsider the sources of 
efficient illumination’.267 This quotation concerns Holocaust Literature and, as shown 
through references to the Holocaust in both Disgrace and Elizabeth Costello, a similarly 
difficult reality is faced when considering creaturely poetics more generally. From both issue 
a painful urgency to convey truth through language, and this quotation acknowledges the 
role of literature in illuminating such difficult realities – as in Hughes, as in Celan, as in 
Coetzee – so as to reclaim realism as a literary convention which gestures towards the 
reality of our vulnerable existences. 
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Chapter Four 
Exploring Creatureliness as a Multidirectional Ethics 
Introduction 
This chapter uses Michael Rothberg’s Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the 
Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization to explore two different approaches to comparing 
the Holocaust and our treatment of animals. Rothberg posits that competitive memory, or 
the attitude that one atrocity is worse, more important or more deserving of recognition 
than others, should be abandoned in favour of multidirectional memory: loosely defined, 
memory which draws upon similarities between events in order to memorialise them 
simultaneously. Rothberg’s subtitle shows how this concept can be applied to the Holocaust 
and colonization, but he encourages the act of multidirectional remembrance more widely. 
As animal exploitation is not something which is limited to the past, and because animals 
have no collective memories of which we can speak, I shall touch upon whether or not 
including animal cruelty in this web of memorialisation is ethically appropriate or even 
possible. However, the focus of this chapter is how authors in the fields of Animal Studies 
and Holocaust Literature approach the comparison between the Holocaust and animal 
suffering, whether their comparisons are competitive or multidirectional, and whether or 
not we can consider one approach more or less creaturely than the other. 
Indeed, multidirectional memory acknowledges the shared vulnerability of 
persecuted groups, from Jewish victims of the Holocaust to black slaves during an age of 
colonization. Because recognising shared vulnerability is a key component of creatureliness 
as defined by Anat Pick, this would suggest that multidirectional memory is best articulated 
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through a creaturely poetics: a poetics which incorporates the silence inherent in the 
afflicted, creaturely body. As I have explored in Chapter Two, Pick is diligent to include 
animals at every step in her definition of creatureliness, but Eric Santner’s use of this term is 
slightly different. Although his definition is not at odds with Pick’s, he does not consider 
animals’ creatureliness an essential part of his study. Rather, he is more interested in how 
humans recognise and depict such creatureliness which, he argues, is ‘less a dimension that 
traverses the boundaries of human and nonhuman forms of life than a specifically human 
way of finding oneself caught in the midst of antagonisms in and of the political field’.268 
This definition recognises the fact that only humans can understand that their vulnerability 
is evidence of political force, which in turn highlights the fact that animals – although often 
creaturely themselves – cannot recognise their history of persecution. Pick might argue that 
this inability to recognise or voice their affliction is precisely what makes animals creaturely, 
but Santner is more interested in how humans articulate creatureliness. Now, when one 
considers that memorialisation is not only an act (‘memory is the past made present’, as 
defined by Richard Terdiman and quoted by Rothberg), but a socio-political act reliant on 
building from and forging collective memories in the public sphere, it is clear that animals 
have no part in their own memorialisation.269 As such, it is the responsibility of humans to 
articulate their histories and make a case for theirs to be considered deserving of our 
attention, similar to atrocities including the Holocaust and colonization. 
Eternal Treblinka by Charles Patterson is inspired by and dedicated to Isaac Bashevis 
Singer, a Jewish novelist and animal activist, who wrote in his short story ‘The Letter Writer’ 
that our treatment of animals equates to an ‘eternal Treblinka’. Therefore, the first part of 
                                                             
268 Santner, On Creaturely Life, p.xix. 
269 Rothberg, Multidirectional Memory, p.3. 
216 
 
this chapter focuses on Patterson’s text as a seminal work in Animal Studies which compares 
the Holocaust to our treatment of animals. The second part of this chapter offers a 
creaturely reading of Singer’s short story ‘The Letter Writer’. Singer’s family was uprooted 
and, in the case of some relatives, murdered by the Holocaust, and this is a lens through 
which his stories are written. As an animal lover and activist, many of his stories also feature 
animals prominently. Stories including ‘The Letter Writer’ combine these themes, leading to 
the comparison Patterson borrows to name his text. I posit that this connection is not 
coincidental, and agree with Singer’s biographer, Janet Hadda, that ‘most likely, [Singer’s 
own] determination not to eat flesh was connected to post-Holocaust feelings of revulsion 
against human cruelty, misuse of power, and disregard for life’.270 With this in mind, I 
analyse ‘The Letter Writer’ in light of its ‘eternal Treblinka’ quotation and question whether 
or not this quotation adheres to a competitive model of ethics (animal cruelty is worse than 
the Holocaust because it is ‘eternal’) or multidirectional (there is an implicit connection 
between our treatment of humans and animals, which implies that the Holocaust is 
eternally mirrored in such acts of violence as animal cruelty). 
Up to this point, I have explored: the use of animal metaphors in Holocaust 
Literature, the use of reciprocal animal-Holocaust metaphors in literature, and Coetzee’s 
use of creatureliness in Disgrace and Elizabeth Costello. This chapter focuses on Holocaust 
metaphors in Animal Studies, but moves on to explore the comparison between the 
Holocaust and animal suffering in fiction. Bringing in Rothberg’s ideas on memory and 
memorialisation allows me to consider not only how creatureliness is explored in literature, 
as was largely the case in the previous chapter on Coetzee, but how authors attempt to 
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bring a concept so defined by its powerlessness, into the public sphere. Indeed, David 
Attwell draws upon essays by Michael Vaughan, Peter Knox-Shaw and Peter Kohler to assert 
that much of Coetzee’s literature has been criticised for offering ‘neither an analysis of the 
play of historical forces nor a moral anchor in the search for a humane response to 
colonialism and apartheid’.271 Although there is much to dispute the idea that Coetzee’s 
literature does – or should – address the context out of which it was written, 
Multidirectional Memory allows me to identify how arising themes and motifs in literature 
can become worldly. Although Rothberg’s study offers a new lens through which to 
approach Holocaust Literature, I continue to draw upon Anat Pick and Simone Weil in order 
to engage in a creaturely analysis of both Eternal Treblinka and ‘The Letter Writer’. 
Ultimately, I posit that both texts gesture towards a creaturely poetics, and that reading 
them through one another encourages a cross-disciplinary, and therefore multidirectional, 
approach to the contentious idea of comparing atrocities.  
 
I - Charles Patterson’s Eternal Treblinka 
Upon visiting the US Holocaust Memorial Museum, Khalid Muhammad not only 
voiced his doubts as to the Holocaust’s legitimacy, but also argued that it paled in 
comparison to the treatment of slaves throughout America’s history: “the black holocaust 
was 100 times worse than the so-called Jew Holocaust. You say you lost six million. We 
question that but … we lost 600 million”.272 This forms part of the opening quotation in 
Michael Rothberg’s introduction to Multidirectional Memory, and it helps to clarify the 
                                                             
271 David Attwell, J. M. Coetee: South Africa and the Politics of Writing (Oxford: University of California Press, 
1993), p.1. 
272 Rothberg, Multidirectional Memory, p.1. 
218 
 
subheading under which it appears: ‘Beyond Competitive Memory’. In this context, 
competitive memory is the opinion that one atrocity surpasses another and, moreover, it 
promotes what Rothberg describes as a ‘real-estate’ mindset with regard to memorialising 
these events.273 In other words, Muhammad does not only hold the opinion that slavery is 
worse than the Holocaust, but suggests that remembering the Holocaust comes at the 
expense of remembering the ‘black holocaust’. The Holocaust Museum physically gets in the 
way of a museum which could memorialise slavery but, more importantly, he suggests that 
there is not enough space in the public’s collective memory to remember both: we must 
choose, is the thrust of competitive memory, and therefore we must compete with other 
atrocities to prove how ours was the most atrocious, caused the most deaths, or lasted the 
longest amount of time. 
 It could be argued that Charles Patterson seems to commit to this model in 
Eternal Treblinka, where the title, quoted from Singer’s short story, implies that our 
treatment of animals is worse than the fate of the Jewish people during the Holocaust. 
Whereas Treblinka was an active extermination camp for fifteen months, we continue to kill 
animals in vast numbers today, with no sign of stopping. Indeed, like Muhammad, Patterson 
includes death statistics which outnumber those associated with the Holocaust. For 
example, Patterson describes how, from the time they opened in 1865 until 1900, the Union 
Stock Yards in Chicago slaughtered 400,000,000 livestock. He adds: ‘that number is a drop in 
the water compared to what’s going on now. Today, American slaughterhouses kill that 
number of animals in less than two weeks’.274 In a text which draws heavily on the murder 
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of approximately 6,000,000 Jews, the fact that Patterson refers to the deaths of 
400,000,000 creatures as ‘a drop in the water’ is provocative: it is unclear whether or not, 
by merit of the events being compared throughout the text, Patterson considers the death 
toll of the Holocaust ‘a drop in the water’ compared to the staggering statistics which come 
from American slaughterhouses. If so, this suggests that the model of competitive memory 
as outlined by Rothberg fits Patterson’s writing. At this point, Patterson’s comparison could 
seem to be as such: animal suffering is like the Holocaust, except that it goes on forever and 
the death statistics are immeasurably higher. 
However, there is already one key difference between Muhammad and Patterson: 
whereas the former forges his collective identity in a history of slavery – ‘we lost 600 
million’, he asserts – Patterson does not identify with animals on the same level. Indeed, 
Patterson initially approached the question of animal suffering through a more personal 
connection with the Holocaust. His father died fighting the Nazis and, as Patterson admits in 
an interview with Biman Basu, ‘my intense interest in World War II and the Holocaust may 
have been my way of looking for my dead father and feeling connected to him’.275 
Furthermore, his first published book was entitled Anti-Semitism: The Road to the Holocaust 
and Beyond, and came out of his desire as a history teacher to introduce his students to the 
background and causes of the Holocaust. This title bears obvious similarities to Chapter 
Three in Eternal Treblinka, entitled ‘The Industrialization of Slaughter: The Road to 
Auschwitz Through America’. Where one text focuses on how anti-Semitism led to the 
Holocaust, the other considers how modern industry such as the production line produced 
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both the machinery and attitudes which allowed the Holocaust to happen. There is nothing 
in Eternal Treblinka to suggest that Patterson changed his mind about which of these paved 
the way to the Holocaust; rather, he posits that both anti-Semitism and the industrialisation 
of slaughter simultaneously play key roles in the developments which led to genocide. 
Michael Rothberg asks: ‘what happens when different histories confront each other in the 
public sphere? Does the remembrance of one history erase others from view?’276 A 
competitive model of memory such as Muhammad’s would suggest that one history takes 
predominance over another, but multidirectional memory allows for more than one history 
to assert its claim over the present. Moreover, the multidirectional model allows for cross-
overs between these histories which serve to highlight and even build upon one another. In 
the case of the roads leading to the Holocaust, Patterson shows how anti-Semitism and 
industrialisation are not altogether separate. 
The figure whom Patterson shows to exemplify this crossover between anti-
Semitism and industrialisation is Henry Ford. Here, Patterson explains how Ford applied the 
industrialisation of animal slaughter to manufacturing automobiles, which in turn influenced 
the Nazis’ methods of extermination: 
In his autobiography, My Life and Work (1922), Ford revealed that his inspiration 
for assembly-line production came from a visit he made as a young man to a 
Chicago slaughterhouse. “I believe that this was the first moving line ever 
installed,” he wrote. “The idea [of the assembly line] first came in a general way 
from the overhead trolley that the Chicago packers use in dressing beef.” […] 
Ford, who was so impressed by the efficient way meat packers killed animals in 
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Chicago, made his own special contribution to the slaughter of people in Europe. 
Not only did he develop the assembly-line method the Germans used to kill 
Jews, but he launched a vicious anti-Semitic campaign that helped the Holocaust 
happen.277 
Following this, Patterson documents Ford’s anti-Semitic propaganda and explains how it 
added to the growing hatred of Jews in Germany. Not only did Ford publish ninety-one 
articles based on the anti-Semitic text Protocols of the Elders of Zion, but he also published 
anti-Semitic brochures and a now notorious compilation of his articles entitled The 
International Jew (a text which heavily influenced Art Spiegelman to represent Jewish 
people as mice in Maus, after Ford’s text compared the Jewish race to vermin). This text 
also reached huge acclaim in Germany, where it was rebranded as The Eternal Jew. 
 Although Rothberg’s concept of multidirectional memory focuses on how past 
events are remembered in the present, Patterson’s awareness and analysis of the different 
paths which led to the Holocaust can also be considered multidirectional. For example, 
Patterson takes into account not only Ford’s influential anti-Semitism, but also how he was 
influenced by slaughterhouses to revolutionise production-line industry.278 One could either 
compare which of these had the most influence on the Holocaust (or, at least, which was 
the more symptomatic of the attitudes which led to the Holocaust), or one could analyse 
what these two causes have in common. This is not simply to say that the Holocaust had 
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more than one cause – this is an undeniable fact – but it is to interrogate the causes for any 
links between them, which may produce further insight into both. This approach seems to 
use Rothberg’s concept of multidirectionality without considering memory, but if 
researching anti-Semitism alongside the industrialisation of the meat industry exposes 
commonalities, it may produce a better understanding of the past in order to build 
collective memories in the present. Indeed, Rothberg agrees that memory can be reformed 
through a deeper understanding of histories which previously may not have been explored 
alongside one’s own:  
what looks at first like my own property often turns out to be a borrowing or 
adaptation from a history that initially might seem foreign or distant. Memory’s 
anachronistic quality – its bringing together of now and then, here and there – is 
actually the source of its powerful creativity, its ability to build new worlds out 
of the materials of older ones.279 
By exploring the victimisation of animals alongside anti-Semitism, Patterson attempts not 
only to shed light on both histories, but to build identities out of these seemingly disparate 
histories: to ‘build new worlds out the materials of older ones’. 
This he achieves chiefly in two sections of Eternal Treblinka: in Chapter Three where, 
in his analysis of Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle, he explores the shared identities of factory 
workers and the animals they process; and in Chapter Six where he includes the testimonies 
from animal advocates whose desire to help vulnerable creatures stem from their 
identification with (and in some cases, as) victims of anti-Semitism. Patterson’s analysis of 
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Sinclair’s The Jungle shows how works of literature can help to establish connections 
between the lives of animals and humans. The comparison here is not between Jews and 
animals, but between animals and factory workers at the beginning of the twentieth 
century. Nonetheless, it introduces the idea of a shared history between oppressed groups 
of people and animals: an idea which Patterson then builds into his discussion of Henry 
Ford’s influence leading up to the Holocaust. Sinclair wrote The Jungle to propagate his 
socialist beliefs and encourage a shift in the rights of factory workers, and especially 
immigrants, working in the United States. However, analysing the text from a creaturely 
angle suggests that Patterson implies a more fundamental shift in attitude towards both 
workers and animals is necessary to bring an end to these inhumane conditions. 
 Simone Weil wrote on a similar subject to Sinclair, and it is interesting to compare 
their approaches. Both experienced the conditions of factory work themselves (Weil more 
so than Sinclair, who learnt about the Union Stock Yards in a worker’s disguise but mostly 
spent his time making notes). Both Weil and The Jungle’s protagonist, Jurgis Rudkus, have 
hopeful expectations when they join the factory, which are quickly shattered. Rudkus is 
‘breathless with wonder’ when he first witnesses life on the killing floor and naively believes 
that ‘this whole huge establishment had taken him under its protection’.280 However, after 
working there he soon sees the meat industry as ‘the incarnation of blind and insensate 
Greed’ and ‘Capitalism made flesh’.281 Similarly, Simone Weil writes in a letter to her friend 
that factory life does not provide the joy of honest labour as she had hoped, but rather that 
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it strips workers of their identities and forces them to work as part of a soulless, mechanised 
whole: 
What a factory ought to be is […] a place where one makes a hard and painful, 
but nevertheless joyful, contact with real life. Not the gloomy place it is where 
people only obey orders, and have all their humanity broken down, and become 
degraded lower than the machines.282 
She continues, this time highlighting the fact that factory life not only stripped her of 
humanity, but of the rebellious spirit which might have won it back: 
What working in a factory meant for me personally was as follows. It meant that 
all the external reasons (which I had previously thought internal) upon which my 
sense of personal dignity, my self-respect, was based were radically destroyed 
within two or three weeks by the daily experience of brutal constraint. And don’t 
imagine that this provoked in me any rebellious reaction. No, on the contrary; it 
produced the last thing I expected from myself – docility. The resigned docility of 
a beast of burden.283 
In these quotations, Weil compares herself both to the machines with which she works and 
to ‘a beast of burden’, which is to say a domesticated animal: trained to carry out arduous 
work for its master. Despite how shocking these conditions seem, Weil was not alone in 
feeling objectified and bestialised by the work. Indeed, Hannah Arendt defines the 
difference of ‘work’ and ‘labour’ with the chief distinction that labouring often means ‘to be 
enslaved by necessity’: labourers do not have to be slaves in the common sense of the 
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word, but – like Weil and Rudkus – their bodily work often requires little skill and is 
necessary for survival. Arendt also draws attention to the term ‘animal laborans’ in this 
context: humans who work under necessity’s yoke, who are considered ‘at best the highest, 
of the animal species which populate the earth’.284 In other words, Arendt describes how 
labouring for the sake of survival means that you are a victim of force and, as such, you 
become animal-like. 
By drawing upon Sinclair’s novel, Patterson draws similar ideas to Arendt and Weil 
into the figure of the hog. As with Weil’s machines, the hogs which are processed are the 
material with which the workers must toil; they are also beasts of burden in the sense that 
they are exploited for the sake of more powerful humans. However, unlike Weil’s 
metaphors, these hogs are not a figure of speech, but creaturely bodies with whom Rudkus 
identifies: 
a hog was just what he had been – one of the packers’ hogs! Labor was their 
hog, and the public was their hog, and they themselves were the biggest hogs of 
all. They were businessmen; and business was business. What they wanted from 
a hog was all the profits that could be got out of him; and that was what they 
wanted from the workingman and that was what they wanted from the people. 
What the hog thought of it, and what he suffered, was not considered; and no 
more was it with the workingman, and no more was it with the purchaser of 
meat.285 
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Instead of thinking about three separate, exploited groups – the hogs, the workers and the 
public – Sinclair identifies a chain of events which tie all three together, not simply because 
the hogs were killed by the workers and eaten at the expense (and, it was found out, the 
health) of the public, but because all three were objectified by the Capitalists who stripped 
them of individuality and turned their lives into profit. In this sense, all three groups are 
creaturely because of the force exerted over their bodies by those with a higher power: the 
hogs’ bodies are taken apart by the workers, whose bodies are used like machines to 
produce meat for the consumers, whose bodies ingest the diseased meat. 
 Where Upton Sinclair wanted to make a Socialist statement predominantly about 
the force exerted by capitalists over workers like Rudkus, Patterson notes that the public’s 
response was predominantly to protest the third form of exploitation listed above: they 
demanded that the meat they ate was of a higher quality: 
The public outcry over the diseased and rotten meat it was eating was so strong 
that within six months of the book’s publication, Congress passed two new meat 
inspection laws – the Pure Food and Drug Act and the Beef Inspection Act. To 
Sinclair’s great disappointment, however, the book’s readers were more moved 
by his exposé of what went into the making of their meat than by his socialist 
message. […] “I aimed at the public’s heart,” he wrote in his autobiography, “and 
by accident hit it in the stomach.”286 
Where Sinclair hoped that his novel would unite the meat-eating public with those who 
worked to produce that meat, against their Capitalist society which produced such 
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conditions, the public largely ignored his Socialist message. The comment in his 
autobiography shows how Sinclair wanted to open up channels of empathy and a shared 
sense of bodily vulnerability, but that the public were only concerned with their own 
exploitation.  
 However, a creaturely analysis of The Jungle might suggest that even Sinclair’s 
intended message did not go far enough. Where Sinclair ‘aimed at the public’s heart’ to 
deliver a Socialist message, a creaturely message might go back further to protest the 
original bodily abuse of the hog. Here, Rudkus depicts the hogs’ rough treatment and even 
suggests that their bodily violation is no less obscene for their being animals: 
Once started upon that journey, the pig never came back; at the top of the 
wheel he was shunted off upon a trolley, and went sailing down the room. And 
meantime another was swung up, and then another, and another – until there 
was a double line of them, each dangling by a foot and kicking in a frenzy – and 
squealing. The uproar was appalling […] There would come a momentary lull, 
and then a fresh outburst, louder than ever, surging up to a deafening climax. 
[…] The most matter-of-fact person could not help thinking of the hogs, they 
were so innocent, they came so very trustingly; and they were so very human in 
their protests – and so perfectly within their rights!’287 
In this passage, Rudkus shifts his attitude towards the hogs: at first he pities them, then he 
identifies with them (‘they were so very human in their protests’) and then he seems to 
anthropomorphise them by bringing in the language of law: they were ‘so perfectly within 
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their rights’. Sinclair’s wording is interesting: these animals are being shackled and hung; 
evidently, they have no rights. Yet, judicial language is evoked, perhaps in order to convey 
the injustice being done to these creatures. 
Later in the novel, Rudkus is incarcerated in jail for attacking his wife’s boss, who had 
forced her to have sex with him under the threat that otherwise she and her family would 
lose their jobs and starve to death. Rudkus is overwhelmed by the injustice enacted on his 
family simply for having less power and money than the capitalists who forced him into a 
life of poverty. Similar to his revelation near the end of the novel that he had been a hog all 
along, here Rudkus is made aware that he is no more than an animal to those above him: 
Ten thousand curses upon them and their law! […] There was no justice, there 
was no right, anywhere in it – it was only force, it was tyranny, the will and the 
power, reckless and unrestrained! They had ground him beneath their heel, they 
had devoured all his substance; […] and now they were through with him, they 
had no further use for him – and because he had interfered with them, had 
gotten in their way, this was what they had done to him! They had put him 
behind bars, as if he had been a wild beast, a thing without sense or reason, 
without rights, without affections, without feelings.288 
Whereas, previously, Rudkus had anthropomorphised the hogs by speaking of their rights to 
protest, here he depicts his own affliction by comparing himself to beasts with no rights. 
Moreover, the language he uses to describe how the capitalists have treated him – they 
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‘ground’ and ‘devoured’ him – are evocative of the meat-industry and the exploitation of 
animals for food. 
The sense of injustice he feels and his awareness that he is a victim of force is 
reminiscent of Simone Weil’s writing and, subsequently, Anat Pick’s description of 
creatureliness. ‘Both power and justice are conceived nonanthropocentrically’ writes Pick, 
analysing Weil’s writing on Marx, social relationships and force: 
Humanity’s susceptibility to the inhumanities of force (gravity) and to the good 
(grace) has little to do with the faculties of reason or language. The material and 
the supernatural meet for Weil in the reality of vulnerable bodies whose 
oppression is not a crime against humanity but a violation of the sacred.289 
Previously, I analysed this quotation in relation to Coetzee’s Disgrace but it is no less apt 
here: Pick shows how, although Weil’s writing focuses on force exerted over humans, the 
ideas of force and justice is nonanthropocentric and therefore can be applied to any 
creature. The comparison Rudkus makes between the shackled pigs and humans, and the 
comparison between himself and a caged beast, are not necessarily anthropomorphic or 
dehumanising respectively. Rather, they both hark to a more fundamental sense of injustice 
being committed to vulnerable bodies. Moreover, when he considers how those powerful 
figures at the top consider both the hogs and himself as profitable material to be used up, 
the hogs are no less violated than he. Read in this light, Sinclair is disappointed that his 
readers focussed on their own exploitation rather than the exploitation of the workers, but 
he might have extended that disappointment to consider how the hogs were still not 
                                                             
289 Pick, Creaturely Poetics, p.48. 
230 
 
treated with a sense of justice, even after he unveiled the cruel acts of force committed by 
those at the top to those underneath, irrespective of species. 
 Indeed, to further interrogate Sinclair’s disappointment under a creaturely light, one 
might ask how much would have changed if the public had not thought only of themselves 
but also of the workers’ conditions, if these sympathies had not also extended to the hogs. 
As Weil recognises when she analyses Marx’s repudiation of religion, ‘when force changes 
hands, it still remains a relation of stronger to weaker, a relation of dominance. It can go on 
changing hands indefinitely, without a single term of the relation being eliminated’.290 If 
Rudkus identifies that something inherently unjust is being enacted on the pigs, transferring 
power over to the masses under a socialist regime may mean that more people are treated 
justly, but it will not mean that the tyrannical force he experienced himself has disappeared, 
it merely will have shifted. Ostensibly, without a system in place which gestures towards the 
sacred ideals of justice for all creatures, there is still the possibility of atrocity. Indeed, one 
of two quotations Patterson chooses to introduce Part II of Eternal Treblinka – the Part 
which begins with this chapter on The Road to Auschwitz – is attributed to Theodor Adorno 
and illustrates this point by showing where the acceptance of force, even against animals, 
can lead: ‘Auschwitz begins wherever someone looks at a slaughterhouse and thinks: 
they’re only animals’.291 Even though The Jungle is a work of fiction written before the 
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Holocaust in order to promote socialism, Patterson chooses to include it in Eternal Treblinka 
to highlight the ways in which those in power use force to strip creatures of their 
individuality and turn everyone into the same, creaturely subject: a process which Adorno 
also locates in Nazi extermination camps. 
Moreover, The Jungle teaches us how slaughterhouses use force against their 
workers: a force which is not only mirrored in their use of animals, but intrinsically 
connected to it. Although this is a work of fiction, it is rooted in the real events Sinclair 
witnessed; and although the novel may now seem dated, it is evident that similar conditions 
continue in slaughterhouses today. Indeed, this is the subject of Charlie LeDuff’s essay in 
Zoontologies: The Question of the Animal – a collection on Animal Studies edited by Cary 
Wolfe which includes contributions from academics who are working or have worked in the 
field, such as Wolfe himself and Jacques Derrida. The final chapter, comprising of LeDuff’s 
essay, stands alone as the only one written by a non-academic. Much like Sinclair’s 
experience while writing The Jungle, LeDuff is a journalist who investigated conditions in a 
slaughterhouse. Also like Sinclair, LeDuff’s investigation focuses less on the animals being 
processed and more on the human workers. Nonetheless, it is included as the final chapter 
in Zoontologies, as if to end the book on an essay which reaches beyond academia or 
species barriers: both of which are key factors in engaging with Creaturely Poetics, where 
‘attitudes and actions [are] judged according to their orientation toward reality’, and 
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Here, Adorno acknowledges that dehumanising victims makes them easier to kill, and traces that attitude to 
the gaze between a dying animal and a human. Although Patterson, and others, capture a similar message in 
the phrase ‘Auschwitz begins…’, the original is less specific to the Holocaust and the meat industry. 
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‘contact with the flesh and blood vulnerability of beings – whether human or not – is the 
nexus within the readings in [Pick’s] book take shape’.292 LeDuff’s essay, entitled ‘At a 
Slaughterhouse, Some Things Never Die’ is an investigation into the racial divide in The 
Smithfield plant in North Carolina: ‘the largest pork production plant in the world’.293 As the 
title suggests, the plant is working proof that racial segregation is alive today, and that it 
seems particularly pronounced in an environment which profits on exploiting the weak. 
Although the article focuses on racial segregation, which I analyse below, one 
relatively short section describes the kill floor and the process of slaughter. It is worth 
quoting at length so as to see how similar conditions are to Sinclair’s observations, above, 
and also to set the scene for the other, human power relations at play within the 
slaughterhouse: 
Kill-floor work is hot, quick and bloody. The hog is herded in from the stockyard, 
then stunned with an electric gun. It is lifted onto a conveyer belt, dazed but not 
dead, and passed to a waiting group of men wearing bloodstained smocks and 
blank faces. They slit the neck, shackle the hind legs, and watch a machine lift 
the carcass into the air […]. The carcass is run through a scalding bath, trolleyed 
over the factory floor, and then dumped onto a table […], men slit along its hind 
tendons and skewer the beast with hooks. It is again lifted and shot across the 
room on a pulley and bar, where it hangs with hundreds of others as if in some 
kind of horrific dry-cleaning shop. It is then pulled through a wall of flames and 
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met on the other side by more black men who, stripped to the waist beneath 
their smocks, scrape away any straggling bristles. 
 The place reeks of sweat and scared animal, steam and blood. Nothing 
is wasted from these beasts, not the plasma, not the glands, not the bones. 
Everything is used, and the kill men, repeating slaughterhouse lore, say that 
even the squeal is sold.294 
LeDuff combines factual evidence with evocative language to describe the scene, in a style 
similar to eye-witness accounts in Eternal Treblinka, such as when Sue Coe describes how a 
horse and her foal are abused on the kill floor.295 Where simple description does not suffice, 
LeDuff relies on figurative language – the ‘horrific dry cleaning shop’ – which at once offers a 
familiar object of comparison (the dry cleaning shop) and strips the comparison of any 
familiarity (it is ‘horrific’). This suggests that work on the kill-floor is atrocious despite being 
unexceptional, and offers a fitting parallel to the main subject of LeDuff’s essay: the routine 
inequality, casual racism, ostensibly even the banal evil carried out every day at this plant, 
not against the animals (or, perhaps, not just against the animals), but against the workers. 
 Indeed, these workers are split into groups to carry out different jobs which are 
designated less on ability than on the workers’ races (a fact supported by a former 
director).296 This promotes racism between the groups and discourages any solidarity 
between the workers, which in turn allows the predominantly white managers to exploit 
them. LeDuff lists the divisions as follows: 
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The few whites on the payroll tend to be mechanics or supervisors. As for the 
Indians, a handful are supervisors; others tend to get clean menial jobs like 
warehouse work. With few exceptions, that leaves the blacks and Mexicans with 
the dirty jobs at the factory[.]297 
Power relations between the black and Mexican workers are further divided, with the 
Mexicans pushed to the lowest rung of the ladder, forced to put up with the worst jobs and 
racial abuse. In a system which is driven on nothing but capital, these workers are silenced 
through segregation, as one group is unprepared to stand up for the rights of another. 
Therefore, the slaughterhouse lore also applies to them: as no one raises their voices (in 
contempt for other workers and in fear of losing their jobs), it might be said that ‘even the 
squeal is sold’. 
Workers who deal with one part of the process are turned against others who deal 
with another part. In this sense, the hogs embody the segregation, both literally and 
figuratively, as the division of their bodies expose the division of labour and subsequently 
race. Anat Pick quotes Nancy Condee in her analysis of Asthenic Syndrome: a film which 
follows two characters who suffer from nervous exhaustion; and Condee’s summary of how 
different spaces are linked by force can be applied not only to Pick’s concept of 
creatureliness in general, but also to the specific system at work in this plant. Condee writes 
that the spaces are linked in a ‘continuum as common sites for an ongoing discharge of 
aggression’.298 As in The Jungle, a system of force is in place, where those in charge divide 
and conquer both their products (the hogs) and their workers. Moreover, Cary Wolfe 
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decides to include ‘At a Slaughterhouse’ as the final essay in Zoontologies which suggests 
that he believes this aggressive force can be discharged across the species divide. This in 
turn infers that the division of the hogs does not only embody the division amongst workers, 
but that it is intrinsically linked to it. This is similar to Patterson’s argument in Chapter Three 
of Eternal Treblinka, ‘The Industrialization of Slaughter: The Road to Auschwitz Through 
America’: that the Chicago stockyards and American slaughterhouses foregrounded the 
Holocaust. Moreover, it is indicative of the attitude outlined in Patterson’s fourth chapter: 
‘Improving the Herd: From Animal Breeding to Genocide’: that eugenics, murder and 
ultimately genocide are discharged from similar acts of force committed against animals. In 
summary, LeDuff’s essay on racial division in a slaughterhouse, and especially its inclusion in 
an anthology on Zoonthology, is similar to Eternal Treblinka, which includes extracts from 
Sinclair’s socialist novel. In both cases, managers, overseers and investors put in place a 
system which discharges aggression from top to bottom, through workers and animals. In 
this sense, one cannot accuse Patterson of using a competitive model to compare animal 
cruelty to the Holocaust because he identifies that one is intrinsically linked to the other. 
Patterson follows his section on The Jungle with a description of modern 
slaughterhouses (such as that described by LeDuff), and then of Henry Ford’s contribution to 
the Nazi regime, which links factory work with the industrialisation of slaughter with, finally, 
the industrialised methods of genocide. In doing so, he does not only show how the three 
are linked by the common factor of industrialisation, but how this common factor 
encourages the tyrannical attitude which allows living creatures, both animal and human, to 
be reduced to things: like Simone Weil who was made to feel like the machines with which 
she worked; like the creatures in slaughterhouses who are ‘only animals’; and like human 
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victims in concentration and extermination camps whose identities were taken away and 
whose bodies were processed into corpses. Rothberg compares different atrocities on more 
specific terms but reminds us that ‘too often comparison is understood as “equation”’ 
where his project ‘takes dissimilarity for granted’.299 In the same vein, writing of these 
subjects one after the other does not mean that the Holocaust is being equated with factory 
work, it simply means that a common force can be traced between them. This is similar to 
one of the chief purposes of Multidirectional Memory: to discuss ‘the nonidentical, yet 
overlapping and equally conflictual legacies of the Nazi occupation and the unravelling 
project of colonialism’.300 Colonialism and the Holocaust, like factory farming and the 
Holocaust (and, as Patterson argues in the beginning of Eternal Treblinka, like factory 
farming and colonialism) share an overlapping legacy of force, which allows each set of 
victims to be objectified in a comparable, but nonidentical, manner. 
 Moreover, this legacy of force – which can be traced through many atrocities – 
leaves in its wake a stream of creaturely bodies, all of which have been treated with 
injustice. The shackled hogs whom Rudkus believes are ‘perfectly within their rights’ to 
protest their suffering may not actually have rights as we understand them in a court of law, 
but their bodies are still protesting a higher injustice. Where Simone Weil might apply this 
‘higher’ injustice to the workings of God, justice does not have to be a religious ideal. As 
discussed in Chapter Three, a creaturely poetics maintains that vulnerable bodies remain 
fundamentally sacred, even when the creatures who suffer injustice are godless or 
incapable of higher thought: even when they are animals. This is essential to understanding 
Rothberg’s concept of multidirectionality. Often, this idea is not limited to memory, such as 
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when Rothberg shows how multidirectionality is a key method for understanding ethics. He 
calls for 
a multidirectional ethics that combines the capacious open-endedness of the 
universal with the concrete, situational demands of the particular. An ethics of 
multidirectional memory involve creating fidelity (in the sense given that term 
by Alain Badiou’s Ethics) with the multiple events and historical legacies that 
define any situation. A politics based on that ethical foundation will require a 
notion of transnational, comparative justice that can negotiate conflicting and 
sometimes mutually exclusive demands made on unstable and shifting 
terrain.301 
As in Coetzee, who imbues the material world with the sacred, Badiou understands fidelity 
in a specifically secular manner. In Ethics: On the Understanding of Evil, Badiou attempts to 
impress on humans a sense of ethical responsibility, irrespective of the idea or promise of 
God. This sense of ethical responsibility comes to the fore during what Badiou terms an 
‘event’, which is a moment at which something happens which forces humans to make a 
decision by supplementing their typical, base lives with a deeper understanding of truth. 
Indeed, he writes that since this event ‘was excluded by all the regular laws of the situation 
[it] compels the subject to invent a new way of being and acting in the situation’: this event 
must be unprecedented, therefore it calls for a decision based solely on a deeper 
understanding of truth and justice, rather than a decision based on tried and tested 
methods or rights.302 Badiou’s idea of fidelity is based on this decision because he argues 
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that we must honour this decision by being truthful to it. That is, not only must we make an 
ethical decision based on truth, but we should treat this decision with fidelity and maintain 
it with the same urgency even after the event. He defines this notion of fidelity in the 
following way: ‘the decision to relate henceforth to the situation from the perspective of its 
evental [événementiel] supplement’.303 In other words, our ethical decision towards the 
unprecedented event makes us the subjects of truth, and we must henceforth regard that 
event from the perspective of the subject it caused us to become. Rothberg uses this 
definition of fidelity and applies it to his concept of a multidirectional ethics, whereby we 
must remain truthful to the decisions we make according to one event, and apply that new-
found sense of truthfulness and justice to events which need similar attention. Rothberg 
considers Badiou’s concept of fidelity an ‘ethical foundation’ which should be applied 
transnationally and anachronistically, so that we might retain the fidelity of our decision – 
made as it was in the spirit of truth and justice – by applying it to other events which 
demand an ethical response. 
 In Eternal Treblinka, Patterson promotes a similarly ethical foundation by comparing 
our treatment of animals to the Holocaust. A comparison which may seem hyperbolic and 
disrespectful when viewed in a competitive light, especially by implying that animal cruelty 
is worse than the Holocaust because it is ‘eternal’, seems more reasonable under a 
creaturely gaze, where we might recognise the shared vulnerability of all creatures and act 
accordingly in the common spirit of justice. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the final 
part of Patterson’s text: ‘Holocaust Echoes’, beginning with Chapter Six: ‘We Were Like That 
Too’. Patterson describes the subject of this final part, where ‘the focus turns to bearers of 
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opposed memories – Jewish and German – whose advocacy of animals has been influenced 
and in some cases shaped by the Holocaust’.304 This is the Part of Eternal Treblinka to which 
Rothberg’s Multidirectional Memory is most applicable: it draws on the ‘opposed memories’ 
of Jewish and German people who have personal ties to the Holocaust in order to promote 
justice for animals, and therefore promotes a multidirectional ethics based on empathy. 
Indeed, Rothberg insists that memory is ‘often a spur to unexpected acts of empathy and 
solidarity; indeed multidirectional memory is often the very grounds on which people 
construct and act upon visions of justice’.305 Badiou’s concept and Rothberg’s application of 
fidelity is most relevant here, where those who have made ethical decisions based on the 
Holocaust (an unprecedented ‘event’) remain true to those ethics by applying them 
elsewhere. 
However, the Holocaust victims’ animal activism is rarely a case of remaining truthful 
to actions made during the event: more often, victims recall their passivity during the 
Holocaust – their or their family’s indecision and powerlessness – when they witness the 
powerlessness of other creatures. One such example is Marc Berkowitz who was forced to 
watch his family march into the gas chambers whilst he remained behind: a twelve year old 
selected for Dr Mengele’s experiments. Mengele forced Berkowitz and his twin sister ‘to 
undergo experimental spinal surgery. Today Berkowitz strongly opposes forcing animals to 
undergo similar experiments’.306 In Berkowitz’ own words at a public meeting called 
together to defend Canada geese, “My mother doesn’t have a grave, but if she did I would 
dedicate it to the geese. I was a goose too.”307 Here, Berkowitz commits to a 
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multidirectional model of memory, where he not only recalls his own victimisation in the 
victimisation of the geese, but acts upon those feelings of empathy where previously he 
could not take action for himself. 
This is further applicable to Rothberg’s study, where he draws upon and discusses 
Freud’s concept of ‘screen memory’ in relation to multidirectionality. Rothberg begins his 
application of screen memory by defining the term according to Freud’s original analysis: 
Freud tries to understand why some memories from childhood are preserved 
and others are not. […] Freud determines that the banal memory of the 
everyday life is in fact a screen memory, “one that owes its value as a memory 
not to its intrinsic content, but to the relation obtaining between this content 
and some other, which has been suppressed. […] The mechanism of screen 
memory thus illustrates concretely how a kind of forgetting accompanies acts of 
remembrance, but this kind of forgetting is subject to recall.308 
For Freud, screen memory is a recourse which simultaneously allows one to remember and 
forget a certain event, by “screening off” the memory itself but recalling it through everyday 
life situations. For example, a child who was taken to the hospital in a taxi after falling over 
might screen off the memory of the accident in favour of the memory of the taxi journey. 
Nonetheless, she might find herself remembering the event whenever she rides in a taxi. 
Rothberg applies screen memory to multidirectionality because of its ability to recall an 
event by linking it with others which happen at different times or in different places: 
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screen memory is, in my terminology, multidirectional not only because it stands 
at the center of a potentially complex set of temporal relations, but also – and 
perhaps more importantly – because it both hides and reveals that which has 
been suppressed.309 
Similarly, when Berkowitz considers animals used for experimentation, he recalls his 
childhood experiences during the Holocaust. However, instead of hiding this memory 
behind the geese, he reveals it, not only to himself but to others in order that they might 
also situate the animals’ victimisation within a grander narrative of suffering. This shows 
that Berkowitz is not only aware of the similarities between the geese and himself, as one 
might recognise similarities between Lucy’s rape and the Lurie’s sexual exploitation of 
Melanie in Disgrace, but that he is prepared to acknowledge a shared history of violence 
between them, in a similar way to Lurie when he supplicates himself before the Isaacs, 
appearing to recognise that his own forceful behaviour was endemic of a culture which led 
to the force he and his daughter endured. To recognise a shared history between 
persecuted groups is what Rothberg promotes through a multidirectional ethics when he 
writes that 
Awareness of the inevitability of displacement and substitution in acts of 
remembrance points toward the need both to acknowledge the conflicts that 
subtend memory and work toward a rearticulation of historical relatedness 
beyond paradigms of uniqueness.310 
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Memory is an act – it is ‘past made present’, Rothberg emphasises – and therefore 
Berkowitz actively and vocally brings his personal memories into the present in order that 
his audience’s collective memory of the Holocaust might henceforth associate the genocide 
and its history of violence with the plight of animals, and vice versa.311 
 In this final Part of Eternal Treblinka Patterson also includes excerpts from an 
interview between Israeli psychologist Dan Bar-On and a former doctor at Auschwitz. When 
Bar-On asks the doctor about how his work at Auschwitz affected his life afterwards, his 
reply not only shows clear evidence of someone who is screening the Holocaust behind 
banal moments in everyday life, but also how – disturbingly – these “banal” experiences still 
include the selection and killing of creatures: 
I didn’t have any dreams. I had quite different experiences. It’s not the actual 
horror, the terrible fate of the people, that’s not it, you understand. It’s strange, 
but you get used to that. No, it’s the fact of the selection that I think of, like 
when I’m in the garden digging, and there are snails. Not that I can’t kill the 
snails, that’s no problem. But then there’s one that I miss, that I see and have to 
kill, to dig up and kill the last one. That’s what’s so unpleasant. Take this one 
snail out especially, and it’s such a disturbing, phobic experience. The notion 
that selection is continuing, going on. Or when I see cattle being transported.312 
Rothberg’s focuses his study on comparisons between colonialism and the Holocaust and 
therefore deals with histories which are both traumatic. As such, when he applies screen 
memory to situations where one might compare colonialism to the Holocaust, he is aware 
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that there is an obvious difference between Freud’s conception and his use of the term: ‘for 
Freud, screen memories stand in for and distract from something disturbing – either a 
traumatic event or an illicit, unacknowledged desire. […] What is odd about Holocaust 
memory, however, is that such memory hardly seems innocent or comforting’.313 This is also 
the case in the doctor’s experience of killing snails: rather than hiding memories of selection 
behind a snail, killing the snail is itself a ‘disturbing, phobic experience’. Therefore, 
multidirectional memory complicates our understanding of what is innocent or disturbing 
because it does not only function one way. 
As in Chapter Two of this thesis, where I explore metaphors in Beatrice and Virgil, 
multidirectional memories prove reciprocal and, as such, one event is not hidden from view 
but rather viewed in light of another. Rothberg gives another example to highlight this 
point: there was a development in the collective memory of the Holocaust when France 
used torture methods during the Algerian War. Later, France started remembering these 
events in light of the Holocaust comparison.314 This back-and-forth relationship between 
paralleled histories and our response to them is characteristic of multidirectional memory, 
and often leads to some unexpected soul-searching: as Rothberg agrees, ‘these examples 
alert us to the need for a form of comparative thinking that, like memory itself, is not afraid 
to traverse sacrosanct borders of ethnicity and era’.315 From the responses offered by 
Berkowitz and the Nazi doctor, above – and certainly in light of a creaturely poetics – there 
is a case to argue that ‘species’ might be added to this list of sacrosanct borders. 
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 However, despite the multidirectionality provided by this model of screen memory, 
where the plight of geese and the selection of garden snails remind both victims and 
perpetrators of their experiences during the Holocaust, the reciprocity of these memories is 
limited when we consider traversing the borders of species. As Patterson shows, it is 
possible to trace a shared history of persecution between victims of colonialism, the 
Holocaust and animal atrocity. However, it remains impossible to access the collective 
memories of different species. It may be true that some animals have innate senses – a sort 
of inbuilt, ancestral memory – which determine migration patterns, mating grounds, or 
graveyards to which they return and die, but this is barely comparable to the collective 
memories we develop as humans. Rothberg paraphrases one of Maurice Halbwach’s 
theories concerning collective memory, to give an understanding of the context in which he 
uses the term in Multidirectional Memory: 
all memories are simultaneously individual and collective: while individual 
subjects are the necessary locus of the act of remembrance, those individuals 
are imbued with frameworks common to the collectives in which they live. The 
frameworks of memory function something like language – they provide a 
shared medium within which alone individuals can remember or articulate 
themselves.316 
In his study On Collective Memory, Halbwachs insists that memory is not only an individual 
act but also and reciprocally a collective one: an individual’s memory might disappear if 
she/he does not recall it with others who share in that memory. Indeed, Halbwachs 
observes that ‘most frequently, we appeal to our memory only in order to answer questions 
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which others have asked us’.317 With regard to those asking such questions, he continues: 
‘in order to answer them, we place ourselves in their perspective and we consider ourselves 
as being part of the same group or groups as they’.318 This is not only how collective 
memories are formed, but also collective identities. Therefore, to engage in multidirectional 
memory one must similarly place ourselves in the perspective of other people, whose 
individual memories we do not share but whose collective identities are forged from similar 
patterns of history as our own. To borrow Halbwach’s turn of phrase, we must place 
ourselves in their perspective and recognise ourselves as being part of the same history or 
histories as they. 
 Now, despite the fact that Holocaust victims and other persecuted peoples might 
share similar histories of violence with animals, it remains much more difficult to identify 
with animals on a similar plane; to ‘place ourselves in [their] perspective’. Simone Weil 
writes extensively on affliction, as explored in Chapter Three, and one quotation proves 
particularly applicable to Halbwach’s writing on collective memory: ‘To listen to someone is 
to put oneself in his place while he is speaking. To put oneself in the place of someone 
whose soul is corroded by affliction, or in near danger of it, is to annihilate oneself’.319 
Whereas collective memory is identity-forming, identifying with one ‘whose soul is corroded 
by affliction’ is identity-destroying. Weil writes about afflicted humans, but our inability to 
listen to one who is truly afflicted can be applied to animals just as easily, especially as they 
are speechless. This complicates the idea of multidirectional memory, which seeks to open 
up avenues of conversation between different groups. Rothberg’s key examples – the 
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Holocaust and colonialism – promote a multidirectional discourse based on shared histories 
of violence but, although Rothberg considers how individual acts of empathy can channel 
this discourse, there remains an impasse when considering those groups whose affliction 
continues today, and especially those groups – such as animals – who are incapable of 
articulating collective memories as defined by Halbwachs. Individuals such as Berkowitz who 
have experienced atrocity may be able to empathise with animals, but without analysing 
multidirectional memory through a creaturely prism it is impossible to identify with them on 
collective or reciprocal plains as they cannot contribute to a multidirectional discourse. 
However, reading Multidirectional Memory through a creaturely prism offers a possible way 
to include animals in this discourse. After all, ‘creaturely life is material and vulnerable and 
so oriented toward life and not toward destruction’, writes Pick, therefore it seems 
paradoxical to assume that identifying with these creatures is destructive.320 That is, it could 
only be destructive if one’s core sense of identity is based on more than creaturely life. 
 
II – Eternal Treblinka in ‘The Letter Writer’ 
 Eternal Treblinka’s title is taken from a short story by Isaac Bashevis Singer called 
‘The Letter Writer’, in which Herman Gombiner – the story’s protagonist – can be seen to 
lead a creaturely existence. When Singer writes of the food Herman eats or the energy he 
expends, he does so using the language of bare life, survival and necessity: ‘He had 
discovered that a human being requires very little. A half cup of milk and a pretzel could 
suffice for a whole day’; ‘his soul barely survived in his body’.321 In such a sense, his is indeed 
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creaturely: a ‘subject of necessity’ as defined by Pick.322 Herman also has creaturely 
sensibilities, whereby he ‘wouldn’t take a bite of meat if is life depended on it’ and feels 
faint when he smells meat and fish from the neighbouring apartments.323 He considers 
humans and animals as God’s creatures, and in this providential sense he identifies with a 
mouse which has made his apartment her home. He names this mouse Huldah and 
considers her not as a worthless creature, but as evidence of a community of mice and, 
moreover, as a trace of God’s work in the universe: 
Can there be any greater wonder, Herman thought. Here stands a mouse, a 
daughter of a mouse, a granddaughter of mice, a product of millions, billions of 
mice who once lived, suffered, reproduced and are now gone forever, but have 
left an heir, apparently the last of her line. Here she stands, nourishing herself 
with food. What does she think about all day in her hole? She must think about 
something. She does have a mind, a nervous system. She is just as much a part 
of God’s creation as the planets, the stars, the distant galaxies.324 
Herman’s own family are all dead, having been persecuted or murdered during the 
Holocaust, and there is some trace of empathy in his assumption that Huldah’s family also 
lived and suffered which bonds these creatures together, as well as the idea that providence 
unites them. They are drawn together in these decidedly non-anthropocentric ways, where 
all creatures are evidence of God and suffering. Herman’s soliloquy prompts us to read ‘The 
Letter Writer’ through a creaturely prism which, as defined by Pick, ‘recognizes in culture 
more than the clichéd expression of the “human condition” but an expression of something 
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inhuman as well: the permutations of necessity and materiality that condition and shape 
human life’.325 Herman identifies with the mouse because of their shared existence in the 
world, their shared vulnerability and their shared relation to God. As such, this 
“identification” is misleading, as it is less true that he identifies with her than that he 
identifies in her something of himself: a shared creatureliness which deserves his attention. 
 Attention, as discussed in Chapter Three, is a key mode for Simone Weil through 
which to respond to the body. Anat Pick quotes Sharon Cameron, who understands Weil’s 
use of attention to mean ‘regard without motive’. Cameron clarifies: ‘Seeing like this – 
without identification – is seeing that resists ‘reading’’.326 Just so, Herman regards this 
mouse and the mouse regards him. Herman understands that she must think inside her 
mouse hole, but he cannot imagine what. He does not assume to read the creature (though 
he thinks of her as being thankful for the food he leaves), and as such he cannot identify 
with her on anything more than a bodily plane, and by the knowledge that both he and she 
have histories of suffering, ancestors, and a God who has created them. When Herman 
becomes sick with pneumonia he cannot give Huldah the bodily attention she needs to 
survive, but even at the moment where he believes himself to be dying, she is at the 
forefront of his mind: ‘it’s the end, he thought. What will become of Huldah?’327 This is 
reminiscent of a scene depicted in Eternal Treblinka, where Patterson quotes Aviva Cantor, 
‘a journalist, Socialist Zionist, feminist, and animal advocate who believes that patriarchy is 
the root cause of human oppression’:  
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Cantor writes about an incident, recalled by Rabbi Michael Weissmandel, which 
took place in Slovakia during the war: “While being shoved onto a deportation 
train, a Jew named Itzik Rosenberg called out to his non-Jewish neighbors, who 
were watching the scene with glee, ‘I beg you – go to my home and feed the 
geese. They have had nothing to eat or drink all day’.328 
Like Rosenberg towards his geese, Herman feels responsible for Huldah, to whom he usually 
gives a saucer of water and cheese. In both cases, it is their own bodily affliction which stops 
them from giving these creatures what they need to survive. It is clear that both men are 
concerned for the wellbeing of the creatures, not with selfish motivations but simply 
because they regard them as deserving of attention. 
 Just as Herman gives Huldah attention, he receives it from Rose Beechman when he 
is dying of pneumonia. Rose corresponds with Herman, who offers understanding and 
support when she claims to speak with her grandmother from beyond the grave. However, 
Rose and Herman are not well acquainted when she visits him following a sign from her 
grandmother’s spirit. She has no material purpose for helping Herman, but she is willing and 
eager to do so, and asks for no repayment when he recovers.329 When Herman is too weak 
to feed Huldah he asks Rose to give her a saucer of milk, and she obliges. Still, Herman 
presumes the mouse dead and considers himself a murderer for not taking care of her.330 
However, when he awakes to see that the mouse is alive he is  
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filled with love both for the mouse and for the woman, Rose Beechman, who 
had understood his feelings an without question had obeyed his request and 
given the mouse some milk. “I am not worthy, I am not worthy,” he muttered. 
“It is all pure Grace.”331 
Just as aggression can be discharged across the species barrier, and most strongly affects 
those who are already the most vulnerable (as shown in The Jungle and LeDuff’s essay), 
Singer shows that so too can gratuitous attention. Rose cares for Herman at his most 
vulnerable, who in turn cares for a vulnerable creature. Herman articulates this attention as 
‘love’, and – as discussed in Chapter Three – loving attention is a key theme in Simone 
Weil’s essay on ‘Human Personality’, where she writes: 
Only by the supernatural working of grace can a soul pass through its own 
annihilation to the place where alone it can get the sort of attention which can 
attend to truth and to affliction. It is the same attention which listens to both of 
them. The name of this intense, pure, disinterested, gratuitous, generous 
attention is love.332 
Singer’s novel displays the forces named by Weil: supernatural workings, annihilation, grace, 
attention and love; through Herman’s belief in the occult and Rose’s correspondence with 
her grandmother, Herman’s nearly fatal pneumonia, and the care and attention which 
Herman, Rose and possibly Rose’s grandmother offer to creaturely bodies. It is this love – 
we might call it caritas – which fills Herman when he sees that Huldah has survived. 
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 To read ‘The Letter Writer’ through a creaturely prism, it is important to consider 
Herman’s love for the mouse when re-approaching his eulogy for her. Indeed, before he 
sees that Huldah has survived, he convinces himself that he has killed her through not giving 
her enough attention. This passage offers the inspiration for Patterson’s title: 
“What do they know – all those scholars, all those philosophers, all the leaders 
of the world – about such as you? They have convinced themselves that man, 
the worst transgressor of all the species, is the crown of creation. All other 
creatures were created merely to provide him with food, pelts, to be tormented, 
exterminated. In relation to them, all people are Nazis; for the animals it is an 
eternal Treblinka. And yet man demands compassion from heaven.”333 
Immediately, Singer engages with a creaturely poetics: his rhetorical question, ‘what do they 
know’, suggests that philosophers divert their attention away from creaturely bodies, 
choosing instead to philosophise the significance of animals in relation to mankind. This is 
‘deflection’: a term used by Cora Diamond and Anat Pick to identify moments when ‘we are 
moved from the appreciation, or attempt at appreciation, of a difficulty of reality to a 
philosophical or moral problem apparently in the vicinity’.334 In this case, the deflection is to 
convince themselves that man ‘is the crown of creation’ and, as such, creatures are not only 
inferior, but purposed to serve mankind: they cannot be afflicted because their suffering 
makes sense in the context of man’s “need” for food, pelts and sport. Up to this point, 
Herman has not said anything contentious: his eulogy is evidence of a creaturely ethics as he 
is willing to admit that because of his neglect, the mouse has – so far as he knows – died. 
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This proves to be a difficult reality for Herman. However, the second part of this eulogy is 
more contentious, and moves this thesis on from the points regarding creatureliness and 
difficult realities as discussed in Chapter Three. 
 For measuring the suffering of one mouse against the lives of those who died 
during the Holocaust seems to trivialise their suffering: it appears to commit to the 
competitive model of memory, where the suffering of Holocaust victims is outweighed by 
the ‘eternal’ suffering of animals. Moreover, to compare all people to Nazis ostensibly 
accuses innocent people of atrocity, and normalises the atrocity committed by perpetrators. 
However, re-reading this passage following Herman’s joy at seeing Huldah alive changes this 
reading. Lawrence Friedman argues that his outpouring of love undermines his ‘eternal 
Treblinka’ eulogy: ‘at some risk of trivializing Herman’s epiphany, Singer insists upon 
juxtaposing the sudden surge of love for Rose with the love for a mouse’.335 Friedman 
implies that Herman’s outpouring of love is evidence of his confused mind, and that his love 
for both woman and mouse in equal measure is unrealistic.  He argues that Singer 
specifically juxtaposes Herman’s relationship with the mouse and the woman, which in turn 
shows up his comparison between animal cruelty and the Holocaust as unfounded and even 
delusional. However, Anat Pick argues that there is no evidence to support the idea that 
Singer mocks Herman for his feelings: 
nothing in [‘The Letter Writer’] suggests that Herman’s love for the mouse is 
more “trivial” or silly than, say, his belief in the occult or Rose’s insistence that 
her dead grandmother speaks to her. To argue as much is to misrecognize the 
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peculiarities of Singer’s universe, in which shtetl humor and fairy-tale elements 
fuse with modernist mores, and where the Holocaust acts as an irrevocable 
cosmic intervention336 
Here, Pick argues that Singer has coloured the lens through which we read this story, such 
that we should not ridicule the love Herman feels for Huldah. Herman’s family was killed 
during the Holocaust, so Pick argues we must read ‘The Letter Writer’ as a work of 
Holocaust Literature, which demands a different reading from other works of literature. 
Moreover, Singer’s stories often employ magical realism and it is common for his characters 
to receive visits from devils or spirits, meaning that what Pick terms the ‘fairy-tale’ elements 
of the story – Rose’s grandmother, Herman’s belief in the occult or even his relationship 
with a mouse – should not be read entirely through a realist prism. As such, Herman’s 
comparison between animal suffering and the Holocaust is not straightforward, and 
therefore cannot immediately be said to commit to a competitive model of ethics, but 
requires a more complex reading which takes into consideration literary tropes and 
conventions associated with Holocaust fiction and magical realism. 
 First and foremost, these considerations demand definitions of ‘magical realism’ and 
‘Holocaust fiction’. William Spindler suggests that magical realism is employed in ‘texts 
where two contrasting views of the world (one “rational” and one “magical”) are presented 
as if they were not contradictory’.337 Spindler’s definition is useful not only because he 
states that the strands of magic and realism might interweave, but because he locates these 
strands in the context of a story: they are ‘presented as if they were not contradictory’ (my 
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italics). Friedman’s analysis, above, argues that Singer juxtaposes Herman’s love for the 
mouse and for the woman, but in the context of a story where love can be so strong it 
reaches beyond the grave (Rose’s grandmother draws her from Kentucky to New York to 
visit Herman), this love is not contradictory. Indeed, in the prologue to her biography on 
Isaac Bashevis Singer, Janet Hadda acknowledges that ‘witnessing aspects of Bashevis’s life 
has made his fiction, even at its most bizarre, authentic and believable to [her]’.338 In this 
sense, ‘The Letter Writer”s magical realist qualities do not contradict its worldliness, as 
Singer’s life and especially his family’s ties with the Holocaust makes this style of writing no 
less realistic than others which try and fail to gesture towards overwhelming tropes such as 
love or atrocity. With this in mind, ‘The Letter Writer’ may also be considered Holocaust 
fiction: it is not set during the Holocaust but draws upon it in both literal and symbolic 
senses. 
Herman’s family have been murdered in the Holocaust, which means that it casts a 
shadow over the narrative, especially considering Herman’s solitudinous and bare living 
conditions. In a more symbolic sense, Herman’s appearance is evocative of the Muselmann 
in Holocaust testimonies, which is a point Anat Pick picks up on in her analysis of ‘The Letter 
Writer’ as a creaturely text: ‘When Rose cares for the dying Herman, she is helping the one 
who, like the Muselmann, does not ask for help, who is very nearly beyond help’.339 
Muselmanner, the figures whom Primo Levi identifies as making up the backbone of the 
Nazi camps, were recognised for their state of existing between life and death.340 However, 
more than this, Giorgio Agamben argues that ‘the Muselmann is not only or not so much a 
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limit between life and death; rather, he marks the threshold between the human and the 
inhuman’.341 Here, Agamben does not argue that these victims were stripped of their 
humanity (he recognises that that ‘would be to accept the verdict of the SS and to repeat 
their gesture’), but rather that their harsh conditions unveiled a layer of their humanity 
which might not have been exposed before: a veil which we share with inhuman 
creatures.342 Combining the magical realist and Holocaust tropes in Singer’s fiction, ‘The 
Letter Writer’ provides a platform from which Singer can explore conflicting ideas 
concerning the human and the inhuman (where the category of ‘inhuman’ includes both 
Herman and the mouse). Where other genres may expose a paradox in the concept of a 
person being at once human and inhuman, the magical realist space allows conflicting ideas 
to flourish without contradiction, and its connection to the Holocaust exposes a difficult 
reality where human beings were turned into Muselmanner, who marked ‘the threshold 
between the human and the inhuman’. Analysing ‘The Letter Writer’ as a realist text means 
that these contradictions are exposed as farcical, and the love Herman feels towards a 
mouse might trivialise his love for a fellow human; but analysing it as a work of magical 
realist, Holocaust fiction encourages a more creaturely reading, where his love for a mouse 
does not contradict his humanity, but actually exposes it. 
 It is significant that Herman’s eulogy directly follows his recovery: Huldah’s life is the 
first thing he remembers upon waking from fevered sleep. Herman cannot help but to 
contrast his present state with Huldah’s: ‘“She is surely dead,” he said to himself. “Dead of 
hunger and thirst!” He felt a great shame. He had recovered.’343 This sense of shame is 
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common to Holocaust survivors. Like Herman, the deaths of others was not their fault, but 
there was a prevalent feeling that one victim died in place of another. Agamben explains 
this sense of shame: ‘everyone dies and lives in place of another, without reason or 
meaning; the camp is the place in which no one can truly die or survive in his own place’.344 
In other words, after reaching a point where your perceived humanity was unravelled to 
reveal a creaturely body, there is an eternal shame over your vulnerability which continues 
throughout the recovery of those identifiable layers. Singer contrasts these two sentences: 
‘He felt a great shame. He had recovered.’ Perhaps Herman’s shame partly exists because 
he believes he recovers in place of Huldah; certainly much of his shame stems from the fact 
that he had not fed her and so, in some sense, he was responsible for her death; but the fact 
that ‘The Letter Writer’ remains a work of Holocaust fiction may also suggests that 
Herman’s shame is rooted in his survival as a creature. 
 This theory would fit with Agamben’s analysis of survivor shame, which he describes 
as timeless.345 Timelessness is key to understanding ‘The Letter Writer’ and specifically 
Herman’s eulogy because of his reference to an ‘eternal’ Treblinka, which so names 
Patterson’s text. A survivor who has recovered her/his humanity may experience eternal 
shame remembering their creatureliness which the Holocaust laid bare. Just so, a survivor’s 
traumatic memories of the Holocaust might outstrip everyday reality. Agamben quotes 
Primo Levi to highlight this point, whose memories of the Holocaust pursue him in the 
present, and whose nightmares insist that Auschwitz unveiled a deeper reality:  
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I know that I’ve always known it: I am once again in the camp, and nothing 
outside the camp was true. The rest – family, flowering nature, home – was a 
brief respite, a trick of the senses. Now this inner dream, this dream of peace, is 
over; and […] the outer dream […] continues relentlessly[.]346 
This quotation may document Levi’s dream, but this dream is just as real as Levi’s waking 
world: it reminds him – just as survivors are reminded that they are creaturely bodies – that 
the world of Auschwitz is embedded in reality. It may be tempting to redress one’s 
humanity, as it may be tempting to recall a peaceful life, but after Auschwitz Levi finds this 
impossible. His sleeping world, where he is back in the camps, is more real than the façade 
of wakefulness, and in this sense the Holocaust pursues him eternally. 
 This is mirrored in ‘The Letter Writer’ through Herman, but – as with a mirror image 
– Singer reverses expectations: Herman is a survivor, but he appears more like a 
Muselmann; unlike Levi’s vivid memories, Herman’s feverish dreams draw him in with the 
promise of forgetfulness; finally, and most significantly, I argue that he is not ashamed of his 
unveiled creatureliness but of his unshakable humanity.347 Anat Pick identifies the first of 
these reversals in her Creaturely Poetics, where she writes that ‘in his anorectic-apathetic 
state Herman resembles not the archetypal survivor but that other central figure of the 
Holocaust, the Muselmann’.348 She draws upon his appearance as ‘a short man, in oversized 
pajamas, emaciated to skin and bone’; his ‘tremors’ and his sense of having lived through 
death: ‘a corpse returning from its own funeral’.349 Singer attends to this Muselmann in his 
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story, where magical realist tropes allow for such a liminal figure – so often portrayed in 
Holocaust testimonies as silent and afflicted, waiting to die – to survive and to speak. 
Furthermore, Herman’s dreams are not those of a survivor but similar to Levi’s other 
documented dream where he is in Auschwitz. Here, Levi notes that many other inmates 
have the same dream: they tell family and friends about their experiences but their 
audience is ‘completely indifferent: they speak confusedly of other things amongst 
themselves’.350 Similarly, Herman dreams of his family quarrelling over a straw basket and a 
comb, and marvels that they should find such mundane objects so important.351 In both 
cases, the dreamer’s life is in the balance, Levi’s because he is in constant fear of being 
murdered and Herman’s because he is suffering near-fatal pneumonia, yet the subjects of 
their dreams are preoccupied with far more trivial matters. Items like baskets and combs 
are items used exclusively by humans, far from the lives of creaturely necessity Levi and 
Herman are used to. The preoccupations of their family and friends are superficial, and 
provide a screen from the realities of vulnerability and death. 
 As quoted with regard to Multidirectional Memory, screen memory allows for a 
victim to remember one event in place of another, more traumatic one: 
Freud determines that the banal memory of the everyday life is in fact a screen 
memory, “one that owes its value as a memory not to its intrinsic content, but to 
the relation obtaining between this content and some other, which has been 
suppressed. […] The mechanism of screen memory thus illustrates concretely 
how a kind of forgetting accompanies acts of remembrance.352 
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 In Herman’s case, his family have died and their spirits’ obsession with superficial objects is 
‘too ridiculous’, especially considering that they died in the Holocaust.353 Arguably, they 
screen off their trauma by fighting over ‘banal memor[ies] of everyday life’. Similarly, when 
Levi dreams that his relatives ignore him, his story is so traumatic as to be unbelievable: to 
believe it would be world-shattering so they choose to screen it off. However, this screening 
is not so simple: it is a willed forgetting used as a protection mechanism and therefore 
involves a simultaneous denial and acceptance of the event. This is similar to the feelings of 
shame felt by many Holocaust survivors. As discussed, these survivors often feel ashamed 
because they have lived through death and, as such, they know what it is to have their 
humanity stripped down to bare creatureliness. The more of their identity they can recover 
(the more that superficial objects like combs or baskets seem to cover up their 
creatureliness) the more they are aware that these items are not identity-forming, but 
actually identity-screening. Banal, everyday items at once build back preconceived ideas of 
humanity, and confirm that underneath it all is a vulnerable creature: ‘for if the Holocaust 
proves anything at all, it is that Jewish (and other) bodies are animal bodies’.354 Similar to a 
screen which touches upon two events – the event remembered and the event “screened 
off” – shame is ‘what is produced in the absolute concomitance of subjectification and 
desubjectification, self-loss and self-possession’; in other words, it is produced in the space 
between memory and forgetfulness of the creaturely body.355 
  Just as Singer reverses our expectation of Herman as an archetypal Holocaust 
survivor, so too he reverses Herman’s sense of shame. I posited above that, as ‘The Letter 
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Writer’ is a work of Holocaust Literature, Herman’s shame ostensibly stems from this 
simultaneous memory and forgetfulness of his creaturely body. However, much more 
evidence suggests that Herman’s shame rather stems from his identity as a human, despite 
living a bare and creaturely existence. Indeed, he is at ease in his vulnerable body and 
accepts his bare life: even when he is on the threshold of death, he accepts his lot and asks 
for no help in his prayers.356 He understands that his ‘sleepiness had transformed him into a 
helpless creature’ and it is significant that, in his eulogy to Huldah, he speaks of men and 
‘other creatures’, which suggests he also considers humans to be creaturely.357 However, he 
still sets mankind apart as ‘the worst transgressor of all the species’ for the atrocities they 
commit on each other and animals. It is clear that Herman speaks of mankind’s 
transgression not from human to creature, but rather from creature to human. This is why, 
after his eulogy, he begs to die: ‘Herman clapped his hand to his mouth, “I mustn’t live, I 
mustn’t! I can no longer be a part of it! God in heaven – take me away!”358 As a human, 
Herman identifies with other transgressors, ‘Asmodeous, Hitler, and Stalin’, who have used 
others for their own gain.359 From this collective, human identity he cannot detach himself, 
and as such he is filled with shame. 
 If it seems hyperbolic that Herman should be so moved by a mouse, or so consumed 
with the shame of his collective species, it is because ‘The Letter Writer’ gestures towards 
infinity at every turn. The ‘eternal Treblinka’ so often quoted is only one such example, 
where others include references to God, the cosmos and Herman’s belief that we are all tied 
to one another through the life we share: 
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‘He believed there was life in everything’. 
He believes ‘in psychic powers and in the world beyond’. 
“It is predestined that no human institution will last forever.” [my italics] 
‘This particular day, this very date would never return again, unless Nietzsche 
was right in his theory about the eternal return. Even if one did believe that time 
was imaginary, this day was finished, like the flipped page of a book. It had 
passed into the archives of eternity’. 
‘The steam seemed to speak in the pipes, consoling Herman: “You are not alone, 
you are an element of the universe, a child of God, an integral part of Creation. 
Your suffering is God’s suffering, your yearning His yearning. Everything is right. 
Let the Truth be revealed to you, and you will be filled with joy.”  
‘Here stands a mouse, a daughter of a mouse, a granddaughter of mice, a 
product of millions, billions of mice who once lived […]. She is just as much a part 
of God’s creation as the planets, the stars, the distant galaxies’. 
‘Memory itself demonstrates that there is no oblivion’. 
‘What was the connection between the molecules in New York and the 
molecules in Kalomin?’ 
“Each day begins with amnesia.”360 
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Listing these references to eternity in ‘The Letter Writer’ does not only contextualise the 
‘eternal Treblinka’ quotation within a grander narrative which gestures towards the infinite; 
it also locates this concept within three further capacities: memory, the interconnectedness 
of all things, and God. The above quotations, particularly Singer’s reference to Nietzsche’s 
eternal return, reveal how these capacities may channel a multidirectional, creaturely 
ethics, especially when situated in Singer’s magical realist, Holocaust fiction. For the 
quotation above which begins ‘This particular day’ suggests two contrasting lines of thought 
regarding the concept of return. The first half of the quotation is evocative of Paul Celan’s 
Meridian speech, where he discusses art as an eternal problem, its relation to the creature 
and the artist, and – specifically evoked here – the significance of a date from and towards 
which the poet writes. The second half explicitly draws upon Nietzsche’s concept of eternal 
return, which Giorgio Agamben analyses in relation to the Holocaust in Remnants of 
Auschwitz. Eternity is the common trope between these two meditations, which is further 
explored in ‘The Letter Writer’ and, by extension, Eternal Treblinka. 
 Paul Celan’s Meridian speech approaches ideas about art’s purpose and its relation 
to the author, the world and creatures, so even though Singer does not reference it 
explicitly in his short story, a brief comparative reading illuminates similar themes between 
Celan’s ideas on eternity in art and poetry, and ‘The Letter Writer’. Celan delivered this 
speech upon receiving the Georg Büchner Prize for Poetry. In it, he refers to Büchner as ‘the 
poet of the creature’ and continues to use his oeuvre to highlight how the artist or poet 
might work in relation to creatures. Celan believes that art should be ‘put next to the 
creature as God made it’ and the ‘nothing this creature is wearing’.361 Here, Celan highlights 
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the duty of art to stand up against the impenetrable, bodily reality of the creature. There 
must be an element within art which is aware both of its distance from this reality, and its 
dependence upon it. Indeed, Celan explains how an artist must take an imaginary step 
beyond the human world into a world where the artist – not himself but an uncanny version 
of the artist – and the creatures are at home.362 This could be illustrated in ‘The Letter 
Writer’: Herman is not an uncanny projection of Singer, but they do bare striking 
resemblances as both are vegetarian Jews of the same era. As well as this, the world of ‘The 
Letter Writer’ seems similar to the human world in which we live, but the magical realist 
tropes such as Rose’s correspondence with her grandmother, Herman’s belief in the occult 
and his identification with a mouse, show how Herman’s world is uncanny to Singer’s. This is 
further evocative of Celan’s speech, as he wishes his poems to become ‘the poem[s] of a 
person who still perceives, still turns towards phenomena’.363 The uncanny projection of the 
poet is one who questions the world as if much of it were a mystery. Similarly, Herman, who 
‘believed there was life in everything’, ‘considered himself to be among the select few 
privileged to see beyond the façade of phenomena’.364 He speaks to the mouse, even to his 
soap, as if it were a living thing. Indeed, he pays everything its due attention, and Celan 
defines such attention as ‘the natural prayer of the soul’.365 Next, Celan’s focus shifts from 
the creature to the author. There must be a recognised distance between the poem (or in 
Singer’s case, short story) and the real world: the poem must at once contain its author and 
move beyond her/him. Magical realism can gesture towards this movement, as the created 
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world contrasts with reality without contradicting it. Celan highlights these thoughts 
through his analysis of dates. 
This is where Celan’s Meridian speech best compares to Nietzsche’s eternal return, yet 
seems more applicable to a post-Holocaust era. He writes that ‘every poem is marked by its 
own 20th January’.366 20th January 1942 is the date of the Wannsee Conference, where the 
Final Solution to the Jewish question was confirmed, leading to the extermination of 
European Jews including Celan’s parents. This date holds unspeakable significance for Celan, 
who writes from and towards such a date: from, because it is his tragedy, and towards 
because his poetry aims to transport future readers to such a date, which may hold 
significance both for them and for the poet. In this vein, Celan writes that a poem must be 
‘mindful of its dates’, and continues: 
I think […] that the poem has always hoped, for this very reason, to speak also 
on behalf of the […] altogether other. […] Perhaps an encounter is conceivable 
between this ‘altogether other’ […] and a not so very distant, a quite close 
‘other’ […]. The poem takes such thoughts for its home and hope – a word for 
living creatures.367 
The future of the poem is determined by an ‘altogether other’ whom the poet cannot know. 
This may be a future reader of the poem, and Celan must trust that, despite being an 
‘altogether other’, the reader might have a conceivable encounter with the uncanny poet 
within his poem. The future of this poem is entrusted into the hands of an altogether other 
who must also be mindful of its dates: in other words, the future of the poem is dependent 
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on the future of memory. These thoughts encompass the hopes of the poet who writes such 
a poem, yet they are also the place from which the poet writes. As such, they foreground an 
eternal return and, moreover, it is an eternal return dependent on the multidirectionality of 
memory. Indeed, the encounter may be between the uncanny poet and an altogether other, 
from an altogether different time, place and history. 
 For Celan, 20th January 1942 is a marked date not only because it is the date from 
which he writes and towards which future readers might turn, but because it may be the 
first date of its kind. Agamben touches upon a similar idea in Remnants of Auschwitz, where 
he argues that Nietzsche’s concept of eternal return is foreclosed by the Holocaust. In this 
extensive quotation, Agamben outlines Nietzsche’s concept and explains why it fails in the 
face of Auschwitz: 
Zarathustra teaches men to will backward, to desire that everything repeat 
itself. […] The eternal return is above all a victory over resentment, the 
possibility of willing what has taken place, transforming every “it was” into a 
“thus I wanted it to be” – amor fati. 
Auschwitz also marks a decisive rupture in this respect. Let us imagine repeating 
the experiment that Nietzsche, under the heading “The Heaviest Weight,” 
proposes in The Gay Science. “One day or one night,” a demon glides beside a 
survivor and asks: “Do you want Auschwitz to return again and again, 
innumerable times, do you want every instant, every single detail of the camp to 
repeat itself for eternity, returning eternally in the same precise sequence in 
which they took place? Do you want this to happen again, again and again for 
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eternity?” This simple reformulation of the experiment suffices to refute it 
beyond all doubt, excluding the possibility of it even being proposed. 
Yet this failure of twentieth-century ethics does not depend on the fact that 
what happened at Auschwitz is too atrocious for anyone ever to wish for its 
repetition and to love it as destiny. [For Primo Levi, at least] the impossibility of 
wanting Auschwitz to return for eternity has another, different root, one which 
implies a new, unprecedented ontological consistency of what has taken place. 
One cannot want Auschwitz to return for eternity, since in truth it has never 
ceased to take place; it is always already repeating itself’.368 
Agamben draws on Primo Levi’s dream, not from when he is in Auschwitz and dreams of 
going back home, but from when he is back home and dreams that he has never left 
Auschwitz. This leads Agamben to discuss the eternal shame of survivors who cannot forget 
their essential creatureliness. Levi could not overcome his creatureliness even if he were to 
go back and repeat Auschwitz day after day because it is not something which can be 
overcome: it is something which was exposed as a reality. As such, everything which follows 
his experience is marked by this reality: even life outside the camp is viewed through the 
lens of a creaturely survivor. This is also a way in which Celan is marked by 20th January. 
 Celan’s model of eternal return is multidirectional, where Nietzsche’s is not. 
Nietzsche conceptualises eternity by repeating one event endlessly. This involves going back 
to the same time and the same place in order to gain mastery over it. On the other hand, 
Celan gestures towards eternity by marking a date within his poetry. This means the poem 
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carries Celan within it, but also speaks on behalf of others: the other which may be an 
uncanny projection of himself, but also the ‘altogether others’ whom Celan has never met. 
Celan conceptualises this eternity as a ‘meridian’: ‘something as immaterial as language, yet 
earthly, terrestrial, in the shape of a circle which, via both poles, rejoins itself and on the 
way serenely crosses even the tropics’.369 This meridian passes through Celan but moves on 
to pass through endless numbers of other spaces. In other words, it is multidirectional: 
‘subject to ongoing negotiation, cross-referencing, and borrowing’.370 This is mirrored in 
‘The Letter Writer’ when Herman identifies the interconnectedness of all things, such as his 
thoughts on the similarities between ice crystals in New York and crystals in Kalomin, where 
he spent his childhood. The one reminds him of the other, crossing both time and space. 
Similarly, Herman’s letters, which he sends to unknown recipients, are like messages in a 
bottle: an image Celan uses elsewhere to describe how poetry is sent over time and space to 
an ‘altogether other’, whom, he hopes, receives them in the spirit of compassion. Herman’s 
letters and Celan’s poetry cross the meridian in the hopeful ‘belief that somewhere and 
sometime it could wash up on land, on heartland perhaps’.371 In Herman’s case, his letter 
reaches Rose who – in the spirit of gratuitous attention – nurses him back to health, 
allowing him to care for Huldah. 
 The image of one person sending letters across the globe in the hope for a 
compassionate encounter with others is once more evocative of Rothberg’s multidirectional 
ethics which ‘combines the open-endedness of the universal with the concrete, situational 
demands of the particular’. Moreover, Agamben’s model of eternity – through Levi and 
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impressed upon Herman – creates fidelity ‘in the sense given that term by Alain Badiou’s 
Ethics’.372 As discussed, Badiou understands fidelity as remaining true to an ethical decision 
following an unprecedented event. Now, the fact that Holocaust victims were stripped 
down to a vulnerable, creaturely body cannot be considered an ‘ethical decision’, and nor 
can they remain truthful to this state when, for them, the Holocaust has never ceased to 
take place: it has simply become an unescapable reality. However, Herman chooses to 
embrace his creatureliness and makes ethical decisions by remaining true to his shared 
vulnerability with other creatures. Presumably this is why he donates money to Palestine: 
his shared identity as a creature outweighs his collective, Jewish identity, which means he 
offers support to those who are most vulnerable, irrespective of geographical or ideological 
identities.373 Similarly, Herman gives loving attention to Huldah despite (or because of) the 
fact that she is a mouse. As a result of Herman’s multidirectional, creaturely ethics, Herman 
speaks a eulogy for Huldah in which he compares the plight of animals to an ‘eternal 
Treblinka’. Previously, I questioned whether this fits a competitive model of memory, 
whereby Herman suggests that animal cruelty is more atrocious than the Holocaust. 
However, in the spirit of shared creatureliness and the interconnectedness of all things, 
Herman combines the open-endedness of universal, animal suffering with his own, 
particular demands as a human animal. Indeed, for him too, the Holocaust has never ceased 
to take place: he appears as the archetypal Muselmann and his murdered family visit him in 
his dreams. 
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Yet, despite being a victim himself, he cannot escape his connection as a human 
being to Nazi perpetrators: ‘in relation to [animals], all people are Nazis’.374 Herman at once 
identifies with the mouse through their shared creatureliness, and recognises human-animal 
distinctions between them. In favour of a multidirectional ethics, Michael Rothberg argues 
that finding common ground between two groups should never come at the expense of 
their individual identities: ‘Shared histories of racism, special segregation, genocide 
[etcetera], provide the grounds for new forms of collectivity that would not ignore equally 
powerful histories of division and difference’.375 This seems applicable to Herman who at 
once identifies and distances himself from Huldah; however, in this case this simultaneous 
identification and division puts Herman’s identity in crisis: he is at once human, as were Nazi 
perpetrators, and creature, as were their victims. The powerful human-animal histories of 
division and difference seem incompatible with their shared histories of creatureliness and, 
as such, Herman feels ashamed of his collective, human identity. To see beyond this crisis, 
Herman needs a revelation, which he experiences by the end of this short story: Rose agrees 
to stay with Herman and bear his burden; Huldah has survived; a new day begins and he 
awakes to familiar sounds of humans, animals, and even inanimate objects (in which 
Herman believes there is life). The final image in ‘The Letter Writer’ is of Herman’s books 
bathed in morning light and, as everything interconnects, ‘it all had the quality of a 
revelation’.376 
This closing tableau suggests that Herman’s identity crisis is put to rest: the story 
does not end with the idea of an eternal Treblinka dividing humans and animals, but rather 
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with transcendental unity between all things. In Gravity and Grace, Simone Weil writes 
about the revelatory powers of attention whereby the whole self is given over to the 
attention of another: 
‘The most commonplace truth when it floods the whole soul, is like a revelation’. 
‘Attention, taken to its highest degree, is the same thing as a prayer’. 
‘Attention alone – that attention which is so full that the ‘I’ disappears – is 
required of me’. 
‘The poet produces the beautiful by fixing his attention on something real. It is 
the same with the act of love. To know that this man who is hungry and thirsty 
really exists as much as I do – that is enough, the rest follows of itself’.377 
The gratuitous, loving attention Herman both receives and gives brings him out of his 
identity crisis, not because he has lost sight of who he is but because he has given himself 
over to the full attention of another being. As a result, he is ‘filled with love both for the 
mouse and for the woman’, and sees all three as existing together in attentive harmony: “It 
is all pure Grace”, he says.378 Singer focuses on creaturely bodies in his short story: Herman 
recognises that Huldah exists as much as he does and, as a result, gives her the care and 
attention she needs; so too, Rose attends to Herman. As I wrote at the end of section I, 
above, it may be impossible to put oneself in the place of an animal, but by recognising its 
worth as a fellow creature and giving it full attention, identity beyond creatureliness ceases 
to matter. Singer produces the beautiful by fixing his attention on something real – that is – 
                                                             
377 Weil, ‘Attention and Will’, Anthology, pp.231, 232, 233, 234. 
378 Singer, ‘The Letter Writer’, p.274. 
271 
 
the shared vulnerability of bodies. As such, it can be said that ‘The Letter Writer’ gestures 
towards a creaturely poetics. Moreover, as Singer tropes creatureliness through the 
interconnectedness of all things, it can also be said that ‘The Letter Writer’ adheres to a 
multidirectional ethics, and it is this ethics, rather than a competitive one, in which he, and 
subsequently Patterson, writes of an ‘eternal Treblinka’. 
 
Conclusion 
 Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust may seem to suggest 
that Patterson adheres to a competitive model of ethics, whereby our treatment of animals 
is far worse than the treatment of Jewish people under the Nazi regime. However, instead 
of adhering to this competitive model of ethics, which would be contentious at best, 
Patterson focuses his content on the interconnected legacies of force which are discharged 
from humans to animals. Not only does he argue that animal cruelty can lead directly to 
genocide, as through Henry Ford, but also that Holocaust victims often turn to animal 
activism because they understand what it is to be treated like an animal, as if having their 
identity stripped down to its bare creatureliness is an excuse for further violence. Some 
survivors, such as Marc Berkowitz, stand up for animal rights because they empathise with 
victims of animal abuse and, as such, argue that their relative treatments are comparable to 
one another. 
 In ‘The Holocaust and the Henmaid’s Tale’, Karen Davis also makes a case for 
comparing atrocities. Her argument generally fits Rothberg’s model for multidirectional 
memory, whereby one event can be remembered in light of another: 
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When the oppression of one group is used metaphorically to illuminate the 
oppression of another group, justice requires that the oppression that forms the 
basis of the comparison be comprehended in its own right. The originating 
oppression that generates the metaphor must not be treated as a mere figure of 
speech, a mere point of reference. It must not be treated illogically as a lesser 
matter than that which it is being used to draw attention to.379 
Davis’ use of the term ‘justice’ in this context encapsulates the tone of much of Patterson’s 
text, where both humans and animals are shown to be treated cruelly albeit legally. In The 
Jungle, for instance, Rudkus is victimised by a capitalist society. He protests the injustice of 
his situation and compares himself to a hog at the killing plant, but those who abuse him do 
so within the scope of the law, just as the hogs are processed cruelly but legally. Yet, Rudkus 
does not seem to consider the dual implications of comparing himself to a hog. By including 
Sinclair’s socialist text as a key reference point in Eternal Treblinka, Patterson seems to 
suggest that the originating oppression, in this case the slaughter of the hog in such dire 
conditions, not only mirrors but foregrounds the inhumane treatment of Rudkus. This is 
similar to Cary Wolfe’s choice to include LeDuff’s essay in Zoontologies, despite the fact that 
its focus is on racial segregation in the workhouse. In both texts, the implication is that a 
system of justice which starts at the bottom of the chain of oppression might discharge 
compassion, rather than force, further up. 
 Davis’ text is similar to Patterson’s not only in discipline but also because the title of 
‘The Henmaid’s Tale’ is literary. In Davis’ case, the referenced text is Margaret Attwood’s 
The Handmaid’s Tale: a dystopic fiction in which women are used for their function as 
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mothers, which Attwood compares to the treatment of hens. On the other hand, 
Patterson’s text references ‘The Letter Writer’: a magical realist, Holocaust fiction in the 
form of a short story by Isaac Bashevis Singer. In both The Handmaid’s Tale and ‘The Letter 
Writer’, the fictional space (and especially the magical realist space in Singer’s story) allows 
the authors to create a world which is at once contrasts to our own without contradicting it. 
In the case of ‘The Letter Writer’, the story’s magical realism allows for fantastical 
relationships to bloom, such as Rose’s correspondence to her grandmother and Herman’s 
deep (and non-farcical) love for a mouse. Here, Pick’s analysis of Simone Weil’s oeuvre, and 
especially her work on injustice, can be applied to Singer’s story, where ‘the material and 
the supernatural meet […] in the reality of vulnerable bodies whose oppression is not a 
crime against humanity but a violation of the sacred’.380 It is in such a sense that Herman 
cannot stand the thought of Huldah dying of starvation: she is a part of God’s cosmos every 
bit as much as he, and as such her creaturely body is sacred. It is by paying this sacred body 
full attention, and by believing in the interconnectedness of all things, that Herman 
experiences something comparable to a revelation by the end of the story. 
 By displacing Singer’s quotation from its context in a work of fiction into the title of a 
historical text, Patterson risks oversimplifying the story’s message, therefore seeming to set 
up his text as competitive and contentious. It is at odds with the historicist focus of 
Patterson’s text and therefore the title may be considered in the same vein as Lawrence 
Friedman’s analysis of Herman’s love for Huldah: hyperbolic and, as such, a trivialisation of 
the text’s message. However, Patterson’s choice can be read in a more forgiving light. As 
Paul Celan suggests, a poem – as a work of the utmost attention – is as a message in a 
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bottle, sent out into the world to at once speak on behalf of the author and its unknown 
recipient. The poet must dare to hope that the message reaches a compassionate hand. In a 
similar way, Herman sends letters across the globe and one finds its way into the hands of 
Rose Beecham, who nurses him to health; so too Patterson reads ‘The Letter Writer’ and 
takes from it a creaturely message applicable to his own life and work. In the spirit of 
multidirectionality and creatureliness, there is reason to hope that this message will 
continue on its meridian journey to influence others and demand their attention. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis has engaged with comparisons made between the Holocaust and animal 
cruelty, and suggests that literature which gestures towards a multidirectional, creaturely 
poetics may be the best form through which to compare these, and other, atrocities. In 
Chapter One, I analysed a sample of Holocaust testimonies for examples where the authors 
compared themselves, their perpetrators or their situations to animals. Although I split this 
chapter into sections which analysed the use of different species in testimonies, there 
remained many similarities between the species and what they signified, such as 
vulnerability or a perceived sense of inhumanity. This sense of inhumanity is undercut by 
the sheer number of animal comparisons made, which implies that inhumanity is, 
paradoxically, a common characteristic of humans: when social conventions, individuality, 
self-restraint or dignity are removed, the human remains in a bare and barely recognisable 
state. Taking this as the key point of Chapter One, Chapter Two went on to explore the idea 
of a shared creatureliness between humans and other animals, where creatureliness can 
either be accessed through an anthropocentric mode (as outlined by Santner) or gestured 
towards in literature which seeks to move beyond anthropocentricism (Pick). I explored 
these theories by applying both to Yann Martel’s Beatrice and Virgil, which also allowed me 
to touch upon how fiction can use tropes such as metatextuality and metaphor to compare 
atrocities through a creaturely prism. As Chapter Two concluded that Pick’s model of 
creatureliness is more applicable to this thesis, Chapter Three moved forward using this 
model to analyse Disgrace and Elizabeth Costello, both by J. M. Coetzee, as texts which 
gesture towards a creaturely poetics. One key difference between these novels is the 
protagonists’ relation to literature: where Lurie gives up his profession and lives a creaturely 
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existence despite himself, Costello cannot escape her authorial roots despite her willingness 
to engage with other animals on a creaturely plane. Therefore, this chapter allowed me to 
explore the difficulties involved in representing creatureliness in works of fiction, especially 
due to the fact that literature narratavises difficult realities and therefore may deflect from 
them. In my fourth and final chapter, I analysed Eternal Treblinka as a work of non-fiction 
which engages with animal cruelty in comparison with the Holocaust, and ‘The Letter 
Writer’ as the short story from which Patterson took his title. This allowed me to compare, 
contrast and connect the presentation of creatureliness as a multidirectional ethics in fiction 
and non-fiction. Rothberg’s concept of multidirectionality offered an excellent justification 
for reading Holocaust literature as a creaturely poetics, which brought me back to the idea 
explored in Chapter One that inhumanity is a common trope in literatures of atrocity. As 
such, this thesis concludes that reading Holocaust literature as a creaturely poetics allows 
each atrocity to be remembered through the due attention, memorialisation and literatures 
of others. 
 Despite the fact that this thesis suggests applying a multidirectional, creaturely mode 
of comparison across any number of different groups’ histories of persecution, its focus on 
the Holocaust and animals is not merely paradigmatic. Michael Rothberg justifies his use of 
the Holocaust as central to Multidirectional Memory by positing that ‘there is probably no 
other single event that encapsulates the struggles for recognition that accompany collective 
memory in such a condensed and global form’ as the Holocaust.381 Here, Rothberg highlights 
the worldliness of the Holocaust as an event which has moved towards the centre of our 
consciousness especially since the second half of the twentieth century. This, in and of itself, 
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is a fine reason to take the Holocaust as a central concern of this thesis. However, as an 
added incentive to focus on the Holocaust, especially from a literary perspective, it initiated 
– or at the very least perpetuated – the genre of testimony whereby survivors felt 
compelled to write about and share their experiences in a form which could not bear the 
weight of these experiences. This has put immense pressure on the genre not only to 
represent atrocity but also to gesture towards its difficult realities. As Raul Hilberg writes, 
survivors of the Holocaust maintain a unique knowledge which cannot, and yet must, be 
translated into literature. These survivors 
have referred to [their knowledge] in expressions like ‘planet Auschwitz’ and in 
such sentences as ‘Those who were not there cannot imagine what it was like’. 
Clearly, they were there, and thus they are set apart or set themselves apart 
from anyone who did not share their fate. The outsider can never cross this 
divide and can never grasp their experience.382 
The idea, put forward by Hilberg and reflected in many testimonies, that those who were 
not there can never access the event, suggests that the Holocaust at once necessitates and 
renounces literature. This makes the comparison between the Holocaust and animal cruelty 
especially pertinent because of the difficult reality we – and characters such as Elizabeth 
Costello – encounter when trying to empathise with other animals on a shared, creaturely 
plane. Humans stripped down to a creaturely existence may empathise with other animals 
(and indeed this is reflected in the copious amount of animal comparisons in Holocaust 
testimonies), but this only serves to highlight the impossibility of communicating atrocity in 
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literature: as I suggested in Chapter Two, Holocaust survivors share with other creatures the 
incapacity to represent their incapacitating experiences. From this concept I moved on to 
coin the phrase ‘tangential empathy’, which suggests the difficult reality of empathising with 
another’s singular experience of suffering. This calls for a multidirectional approach to 
comparing atrocities: that which accounts for the events’ shared singularities, and which 
might be gestured towards in a creaturely poetics. 
In his essay ‘Trauma, Absence, Loss’, Dominic La Capra considers differences 
between absence and loss through an extended analysis of trauma, particularly following 
the Apartheid and the Holocaust. He maintains that these events are, in many personal and 
historical ways, incomparable, but moves on to recognise that a transhistorical sense of 
absence is left behind by both. He argues that this sense of absence, when conflated with or 
founded on a particular, historical loss, leads to various groups of people identifying 
themselves, at least in part, by a founding trauma: 
 The Holocaust, slavery, or Apartheid – even suffering the effects of the atom 
bomb in Hiroshima or Nagasaki – can become a founding trauma. Such a trauma 
is typical of myths of origin and may perhaps be located in the more or less 
mythologized history of every people. But one may both recognize the need for 
and question the function of the founding trauma that typically plays a 
tendentious ideological role, for example, in terms of the concept of a chosen 
people or a belief in one’s privileged status as victim. As historical events that 
are indeed crucial in the history of peoples, traumas might instead be seen as 
posing the problematic question of identity and as calling for more critical ways 
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of coming to terms with both their legacy and problems such as absence and 
loss.383 
La Capra identifies how people might use their collective identities as victims to argue for a 
privileged status above other groups. This leads to groups who adhere to a competitive 
model of memory, such as the example given by Michael Rothberg of Khalid Muhammad, 
outlined in Chapter Four. However, La Capra calls ‘for more critical ways of coming to terms’ 
with one’s sense of absence or loss, such that one can respond to another’s suffering 
without competing against, or over-identifying with it. 
Instead, he suggests that we might respond through the mode of ‘empathic 
unsettlement’: a phrase which may help to clarify how tangential empathy, multidirectional 
memory and creatureliness – three key concepts of this thesis – might together form a 
discursive model by which to articulate and respond to suffering: 
Trauma is a disruptive experience that disarticulates the self and creates holes in 
existence; it has belated effects that are controlled only with difficulty and 
perhaps never fully mastered. The study of traumatic events poses especially 
difficult problems in representation and writing both for research and for any 
dialogic exchange with the past which acknowledges the claims it makes on 
people and relates it to the present and future. Being responsive to the 
traumatic experience of others, notably of victims, implies not the appropriation 
of their experience but what I would call empathic unsettlement, which should 
have stylistic effects or, more broadly, effects in writing which cannot be 
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reduced to formulas or rules of method. […] At the very least, empathic 
unsettlement poses a barrier to closure in discourse and places in jeopardy 
harmonizing or spiritually uplifting accounts of extreme events from which we 
attempt to derive reassurance or a benefit (for example, unearned confidence 
about the ability of the human spirit to endure any adversity with dignity and 
nobility).384 
Something similar to tangential empathy – the idea that we empathise with other creatures 
through a shared sense of suffering which, in turn, distances us from them – is here 
acknowledged through the difficult ‘dialogic exchange’ between past and present events, or 
personal trauma compared to the trauma of someone else. Moreover, empathic 
unsettlement encourages a multidirectional mode of memory, whereby traumatic events 
are not misappropriated through others but viewed in light of a shared sense of disruption 
of the self. In other words, one might empathise with someone else’s trauma not through 
identifying with the victim directly, but rather through acknowledging a shared sense of 
disorientation or loss. Finally, it is clear to see how articulating empathic unsettlement 
through ‘stylistic … effects in writing’ might concur with a creaturely poetics, whereby 
literature gestures towards loss and suffering through the destruction of standard ‘formulas 
or rules’ of writing. This can be traced from the Horrors Sewing Kit in Beatrice and Virgil, 
through Singer’s use of magical realism in ‘The Letter Writer’. Just as Anat Pick’s creaturely 
analysis of the Holocaust concludes that, ‘in the name of progress, the Holocaust drained 
not only the idea of humanity but of inhumanity as well, of their intelligible powers’, proving 
only that ‘Jewish (and other) bodies are animal bodies’, so La Capra argues that empathic 
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unsettlement discourages the anthropocentric idea that the human spirit can ‘endure any 
adversity with dignity and nobility’ (CP, 50-51). 
 Empathic unsettlement entails ‘being responsive to the traumatic experience of 
others’, whilst it also ‘resists full identification with, and appropriation of, the experience of 
the other’.385 Reading Holocaust literature as a creaturely poetics involves an awareness of 
how empathic unsettlement might be translated into language: by gesturing towards gaps in 
comprehension due to personal trauma or the inability to identify with the traumatic 
experiences of others. It is not a term I have alluded to throughout this thesis because of its 
association with loss, absence and trauma: concepts which, when applied to other animals, 
become difficult to analyse, and perhaps deflect from the physical rawness of suffering 
bodies. However, it is a mode of thought which consolidates three key ideas (tangential 
empathy, multidirectional memory and creatureliness) within the context of literatures of 
atrocity. Moreover, La Capra explores this concept through both the Holocaust and the 
Apartheid, which serves as a reminder towards the end of this thesis that, although I have 
focused primarily on Holocaust literature (with the necessary exception of Disgrace in 
Chapter Three), literature which responds to other atrocities or founding traumas might also 
be read through a similar, creaturely prism. 
 Along with the primary texts I have explored at length in this thesis, Eating Animals 
by Jonathan Safran Foer encapsulates ideas pertaining to animal cruelty, the Holocaust and 
literature. Foer’s text offers a glimpse into the American meat industry, as researched by 
Foer himself, after he made the decision to find out more about what he and his family were 
eating.  Like Eternal Treblinka, it is a work of non-fiction, but as its first and last chapters are 
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entitled ‘Storytelling’, it also recognises the significance of narrative to identity, memory and 
the attention we afford to others. Furthermore, Foer’s oeuvre also includes Everything is 
Illuminated and Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close: two works of fiction on The Holocaust 
and 9/11, respectively. Foer does not explicitly compare animal cruelty to other atrocities in 
his text, but through interweaving his personal story as a vegetarian Jew into Eating 
Animals, the Holocaust and animal cruelty are accessed through his memories, by merit of 
which these memories and narratives become multidirectional. Indeed, Foer’s text is not a 
simple argument for vegetarianism: his text is, among other things, a story. Moreover, it is a 
story about eating. Eating is a part of his childhood stories, part of his Thanksgiving, and part 
of his relationship with his Grandmother: a Holocaust survivor whose experience left her 
obsessed with food and especially meat. Recognising the significance of food to his personal 
identity as a Jew, Foer writes: 
 
Stories about food are stories about us – our history and our values. Within my 
family’s Jewish tradition, I came to learn that food serves two parallel purposes: 
it nourishes and it helps you remember. Eating and storytelling are inseparable – 
the saltwater is also tears; the honey not only tastes sweet, but makes us think 
of sweetness; the matzo is the bread of our affliction.386 
 
The story which accompanies one’s meal often come to define that person. It is for the 
memories that are evoked through food that Foer writes Eating Animals, but – more than 
this – it is for the battle against forgetfulness. Foer’s memories of his Grandmother are tied 
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closely with her relationship to food, especially as this relationship with food is something 
which was key to her survival.387 However, when Foer remembers the joy he experienced 
from eating his Grandmother’s signature dish of chicken with carrots, he recognises that this 
memory also involves closing his mind to the story of the animal whose flesh he ate. Eating 
Animals is about recovering that memory and offering insight into animals’ lives: in this 
sense, it is about a choice of stories, whereby Foer’s personal story does not involve 
‘screening off’ animal suffering. 
 Reading Holocaust literature as a creaturely poetics involves making a similar choice 
to Foer. As discussed in Chapter Four, a memorial to the Holocaust does not have to mean 
that one atrocity is remembered in place of another. Instead, a more multidirectional 
interpretation might be that it does not only memorialise the specific events of the 
Holocaust, but also traces the stories of other groups who share histories of persecution. On 
a smaller scale, the genre of testimony has the dual function of telling the survivor’s tale and 
also of witnessing the murders of other individuals whose deaths make up the Holocaust. 
Similarly, Eating Animals is the story of one man’s relation to food, where this food is also 
considered as a collection of individual animals. For example, Foer includes statistics in his 
text: ‘less than 1% of the animals killed for meat in America come from family farms’, yet he 
also exemplifies the importance of identifying animals as individual lives, such as when he 
insists that ‘no two animals, breeds of animals, farms, farmers, or eaters are the same’.388 
Effectively, Foer expands and contracts ideas of animals, in order that statistics or large 
numbers of animals do not remain as such, but rather that they give a sense of individual 
suffering on a mass scale. As Primo Levi remarks, ‘a single Anne Frank excites more emotion 
                                                             
387 Foer, Eating Animals, pp.15-17. 
388 Foer, Eating Animals, pp. 201, 13. 
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than the myriads who suffered as she did but whose image has remained in the shadows’.389 
A creaturely poetics involves the choice to include and attend to such myriads of others in 
one’s own story, not simply in relation to yourself but by recognising and memorialising 
their individual experiences of embodiment. By writing or reading in such a way as to attend 
to these creaturely bodies, one begins to lay down an ethical foundation whereby all 
creatures are afforded due attention. 
 
83,346 words 
 
                                                             
389 Primo Levi, The Drowned and the Saved, trans. Rayond Rosenthal (London: Abacus, 2005), p.39. 
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